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Abstract
International Cartels and International Trade: Theory and Evidence
Delina Emilova Agnosteva
My dissertation studies the links between international cartels and international
trade both theoretically and empirically.
In the first section of my dissertation, I examine the implications of collusion for
trade and welfare in the context of two different theoretical frameworks. First, I build
a quantity-setting duopoly model of multi-product firms which interact repeatedly in
national markets separated by trade costs to study the impact of collusion on trade
and welfare. Each firm produces two goods but has a competitive cost advantage in
one. In this setting, an international cartel can choose to shut down production of the
inefficiently produced good and import it instead, and thus, can promote trade relative
to competition. Further, the cartel extracts surplus by exploiting its market power,
but also generates efficiency gains by rationalizing production and trade. Therefore,
maximal collusion can welfare-dominate Cournot competition regardless of whether
trade costs take the form of transportation costs or import tariffs.
Second, I construct a multi-market duopoly model to study the consequences of
economic integration for collusive discipline, optimal shipments, and welfare. Firms
interact repeatedly in quantities in each other’s home markets as well as in third-
country markets. When the no-deviation constraint is active, national markets be-
come strategically linked and thus internal and external trade liberalization affects
output deliveries and welfare levels in all countries. I characterize the dependence of
collusive stability and cartel discipline on trade costs and relative market size. I derive
novel results regarding the impact of economic integration on national welfare. For
ix
instance, the analysis shows that regional trade liberalization can hurt all countries
and the absence of internal trade might be welfare-superior to free internal trade to
all nations.
In the second chapter, I describe the novel data on international cartels that
I have hand-collected. The cartel data cover 173 international cartels and include
information on the exact duration of the cartels, the countries of nationality of the
cartel-members, as well as the 6-digit product code of the goods subject to collusive
activities. Moreover, the data contain various cartel characteristics pertaining to
the instruments of collusion (i.e., price-fixing, bid-rigging, sales quotas) as well as
details on the practices adopted by the cartel members and the scope of collusion
(i.e., cartel’s market share). I merge the cartel dataset with the most disaggregated
trade data available, standard proxies for trade costs, and product substitutability.
In the last chapter, I analyze the empirical linkages between cartels and trade.
First, I find that the average effect of cartels on trade is positive and significant.
With regards to the effects of multi-product collusion on bilateral trade, the results
show that the impact of multi-product cartels on trade is positive, significant and
statistically larger than the effect of single-product cartels, consistent with my model.
The positive and significant impact of multi-product cartels on trade becomes more
pronounced when the goods are sufficiently unrelated, in line with the theoretical
model. Moreover, I propose a two-stage estimation procedure to examine empirically
1) the relations between cartel discipline and (internal and external) trade costs; 2)
the relation between (internal and external) trade and cartel discipline. As predicted
by the theory, both internal trade costs and external trade costs are inversely related
to collusive discipline. Using the first-stage estimates, I construct different measures
of cartel discipline, and in the second-stage analysis I find the effect of cartel discipline
on both internal and external trade to be negative and significant, in line with the
theoretical predictions.

1Part I. Introduction
“... cartels, and particularly international cartels, are a true scourge of the world
economy.”1
Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice
Since 1990 the European Commission has discovered and prosecuted 122 interna-
tional cartels, imposing fines of about e26 billion and clarifying the nature of their
collusive practices.2 One common characteristic of such cartels is that they are com-
prised of multi-product firms that differ in productivities.3 One notable example is
the ‘great global vitamins conspiracy’ (Connor, 2006) when major vitamins produc-
ers entered into a price-fixing and market-sharing agreement during the 1990s. The
participants produced a number of vitamin products and diet supplements, such as
Vitamin A, E, C, D3, H, Folic Acid, Thiamine, Riboflavin, Calpan, Beta Carotene.4
The vitamins industry is highly concentrated and the manufacturing process requires
considerable production experience (which acts as a barrier to entry). Moreover, as
Kovacic et al. (2007) explain: “Although the major producers have similar produc-
tion technologies, the chemical synthesis processes involve substantial ‘learning by
1 “The War Against International Cartels: Lessons from The Battlefront” by Joel I. Klein,
available at https : //www.justice.gov/atr/speech/war− against− international− cartels−
lessons− battlefront.
2 Statistics on contemporary international cartels are available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf
3 More information on the characteristics of modern international cartels are available in Agnos-
teva (2016) Data Appendix.
4 For more information about the vitamins cartel refer to http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release IP-01-1625 en.htm?locale=en
2doing.’ Each producers becomes better, through time, at debottlenecking the chem-
ical synthesis process at any given plant.” Furthermore, even though the actual list
of multi-product cartels is extensive, I know little about the effects of such cartels
on output, trade or national welfare. Especially when the cartel members exhibit
different production efficiencies.
Moreover, the empirical evidence on these contemporary international cartels re-
veals that their collusive practices usually extend to outside countries, which only
import the cartelized product(s). For instance, in 2012, the European Commission
fined seven international groups of companies for colluding in the cathode ray tubes
sector. The cartel participants were from Taiwan, France, Netherlands, Japan and
South Korea, but their illegal cartel operations extended worldwide.5 Similarly, the
European Commission and the United States Department of Justice charged four
firms from Japan and South Korea for price-fixing, customer allocation, and the ex-
change of confidential information in the nucleotides (food flavor enhancers) sector.
These illegal activities affected not only the home countries of the cartel members,
but also North America, Europe, and Asia.6 And these are just a few examples of
the numerous international cartels, whose collusive activities have extended beyond
the boundaries of their home countries.
The above quote from Joel I. Klein exemplifies the general perception about
cartels. However, the Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) suggests that there might be collusive agreements that generate certain pos-
itive economic effects: “Some horizontal agreements between companies can fall short
5 Details regarding collusive activities in the cathode ray tubes sector can be found in:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-1317 en.htm
6 For more information on the decision of the European Commission regarding the nucleotides
cartel see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-02-1907 en.htm?locale=en.
The U.S. Department of Justice’s decisions are available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f9200/9297.htm, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/August/435at.htm,
and http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f9300/9301.htm.
3of a hard core cartel, and in certain cases may have beneficial effects. For example,
agreements between competitors related to research & development, production and
marketing can result in reduced costs...”7
In Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?, I seek to show that not
all cartels are created equal and that not every cartel should be considered “a true
scourge of the world economy.” Specifically, I focus on international cartels comprised
of multi-product firms with differing technologies and I study their effects on bilateral
trade and national welfare (total surplus). To that end, I build a model of two
firms, each located in a different country, producing two goods and competing in
quantities internationally, repeatedly over the infinite time horizon. Marginal costs of
production are constant, but heterogeneous across goods and across firms. That is,
each firm produces one of the goods at a lower marginal cost than its competitor and,
therefore, enjoys a competitive advantage in the production of that good. In addition,
exporting products from one country to the other incurs per-unit trade costs.
Under Cournot competition, the duopolists may produce and export even their
respective high-cost goods as they do not internalize the cost inefficiency and thus
also inflict a pecuniary externality onto each other. Under collusion, each firm always
produces its low-cost good domestically. To supply the high-cost product, the car-
tel decides whether to import it from the country that has a competitive advantage
in it or to produce it locally. If the cost of producing the high-cost good domesti-
cally exceeds the cost of importing it, then under the cartel agreement, each country
specializes completely in the production of its efficient good and exports it, while
importing the inefficient one. If the trade costs exceed the difference in the firms’
marginal production cost8, the cartel shuts down trade and manufactures both goods
7 More information is available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/
8 Henceforth, I use “cost differential” and “cost heterogeneity” interchangeably to refer to the
difference in the firms’ marginal costs of producing these goods. Later on, I provide a precise
definition of this cost differential.
4domestically. Each cartel member internalizes the cost inefficiency and never exports
his respective high-cost good as it is subject to both higher marginal costs and trade
costs. By rationalizing production of the inefficient good, collusion raises profits and
also generates efficiency gains.
The first novel insight of the model is that multi-product, multi-market cartels
can promote trade of the good each firm has a competitive advantage in. Under col-
lusion, each cartel member always supplies its competitive-advantage good in positive
quantities domestically. If the cost of producing the high-cost good locally exceeds
the cost of importing it, then the cartel forecloses its production. Moreover, if the
products are sufficiently unrelated, shipping more of one good exerts only a negligi-
ble negative externality onto the marginal revenue of the other. On the other hand,
under competition, the firms do not internalize the pecuniary externality they inflict
upon each other and can trade even their cost-inefficient good. Collusion can provide
a mechanism for more efficient production and distribution of both goods and can
enhance trade relative to competition. This interesting result stands in sharp contrast
with previous work on multi-market cartels (e.g., Bond and Syropoulos, 2008), where
collusion necessarily impedes bilateral trade relative to competition.
A second finding is that collusion can also enhance national welfare relative to
competition. While the cartel generates efficiency gains by shutting down inefficient
plants and foreclosing on costly trade, it also reduces consumer surplus by exploiting
its market power. I identify conditions on trade costs and the degree of product
differentiation that ensure that the welfare gain due to improved production efficiency
under collusion can dominate the loss in consumer surplus. I analyze welfare when
trade costs take the form of transportation costs in the main text.9
My analysis reveals that, if the cost differential is sufficiently larger than trans-
9 The case of import tariffs needs to be examined separately as tariffs generate revenues, which
further contribute to national welfare.The case of import tariffs is discussed in details in Ap-
pendix A.
5portation costs and the goods are sufficiently distant substitutes, collusion can be
welfare-superior to competition. The former condition allows for complete specializa-
tion in production and exports of the low-cost good under collusion, while the latter
ensures collusion delivers sufficient welfare gains. If the difference in marginal costs
is sufficiently smaller than the transportation costs, then collusion improves welfare
relative to competition for any degree of substitutability. In this scenario, the cartel
shuts down the costly international exchange and produces both goods domestically
in each country. Again, collusion welfare-dominates competition as the welfare gain
due to higher profits and improved production efficiency more than offsets the lower
consumer surplus.10 These welfare implications of multi-product collusion remain
valid even if trade costs take the form of import tariffs, subject to some caveats.11
Specifically, there exists a threshold level of the degree of substitutability above which
competition is weakly welfare-superior to collusion in the case of tariffs.
In Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs, I examine the dependence of cartel disci-
pline on trade costs, market size, and time preferences, when international cartels
exploit their market power in outside countries. I also analyze the direct and indirect
(channeled through cartel discipline) effects of economic integration on optimal ship-
ments and welfare. To that end, I develop a symmetric, homogeneous-good duopoly
model in which firms interact in quantities not only in each other’s markets, but also
in third-country markets. Countries are separated by per-unit trade costs, but I allow
10 Although different in method, Deltas et al. (2012) also find that cartels can improve welfare
relative to competition. They use a duopoly model of horizontal differentiation a` la Hotelling,
where markets are separated by per-unit trade costs and the firms face identical constant
marginal production costs. In this setting, Deltas et al. (2012) study the equilibrium outcomes
under price competition and maximal collusion. They show that the cartel can enhance welfare
as it reduces the waste of resources in the form of unnecessary transportation costs. In their
model, collusion can even increase consumer surplus as long as it decreases the price of the
efficiently produced domestic good so as to keep a fraction of the marginal consumers.
11 In standard segmented-markets duopoly models with perfect substitutes welfare under
monopoly might exceed welfare under competition if trade costs only take the form of trans-
portation costs, but not of tariffs. Here, the possibility of welfare-enhancing collusion exists
regardless of the type of trade costs considered.
6firms to pool their incentive constraints across markets (in the spirit of Bernheim and
Whinston, 1990). Implicit collusion is sustained in the model through repeated firm
interactions over the infinite time horizon.
In this model, I pay close attention to incentive compatibility constraints and
study the dependence of efficient cartel agreements on trade costs, market size, and
time preferences. First, I describe the incentive-compatibility constraint faced by the
representative cartel member. Second, I examine the dependence of unconstrained
collusion on internal (between cartel-member countries) and external (between a car-
tel country and an outside country) trade costs. Contrary to previous work, I find
that the stability of maximal collusion, as captured by the minimum discount fac-
tor, depends non-monotonically on the trade costs between the host countries of the
cartel. This novel result implies that internal trade liberalization can actually be pro-
collusive, rather than pro-competitive as the conventional wisdom holds. In addition,
cartel sustainability is non-monotonically related to external trade costs and to the
relative size of the markets. This exercise also helps us identify the circumstances
under which the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) is active or inactive and
thus facilitates the subsequent analysis.
I then solve the profit optimization problem of the cartel when the no-deviation
constraint is active. I derive the optimal output allocations and characterize their
dependence on trade costs, relative market size, and time preferences. Importantly,
this exercise allows us to introduce an index of cartel discipline, a measure of the
tightness of the incentive compatibility constraint, which is an endogenous function
of internal trade costs, external trade costs, market size and time preferences. Thus,
in the model, markets that are separated by trade costs actually become strategically
linked.
I find that cartel discipline is inversely related to both internal trade costs and
external trade costs when intra-industry trade is present between the host countries
7of the cartel. This suggests that trade liberalization (either internal or external)
enhances collusive stability when internal trade costs are sufficiently low. This is
one of the predictions of the model, which I test empirically. Reductions in internal
trade costs can be pro-collusive also when these costs are considerably high. On
the other hand, when internal trade costs are intermediate, cartel discipline depends
non-monotonically on these costs. Interestingly, the impact of internal trade costs
on collusive discipline hinges on the initial level of external trade costs, the relative
market size, and time preferences.
In the model, optimal cartel shipments depend on both types of trade costs, market
size, and time preferences both directly and indirectly through cartel discipline. The
results suggest that when internal trade costs are initially low, strengthening of cartel
discipline reduces the cartel’s domestic production and exports to all markets. This
is another prediction of the theory, which I examine empirically and provide support
for. Further, I study the overall (direct and indirect) effects of economic integration or
changes in market size on output allocations. In the presence of cross-hauling, internal
trade liberalization can diminish total domestic output in each cartel country due to
the stronger cartel discipline. Moreover, integration between cartel hosts diverts
optimal shipments away from the partner’s market and from the outside market.
Importantly, the spillover effects of economic integration depend on the initial levels
of all trade costs, the relative market size and time preferences. In addition, this
analysis highlights the significance of cartel discipline as a novel channel through
which reductions in trade costs affect equilibrium outcomes.
Next, I turn the attention to the impact of economic integration on welfare when
the cartel exploits its market power in outside countries. I find that maximal collusion
can welfare-dominate Cournot-Nash competition, depending on the relative size of
the non-cartel country and the level of trade costs. More interestingly, constrained
collusion can enhance national welfare relative to unconstrained collusion for the
8host countries of the cartel. This possibility arises if the welfare gain due to higher
consumer surplus under constrained collusion compensates for the reduction in cartel’s
profits relative to the case of unconstrained collusion. In addition, if internal trade
costs are already considerably low and firms value future profits highly, then pursuing
further internal integration can be welfare-reducing for all nations. Internal trade
liberalization improves cartel discipline, reduces total domestic output and exports to
the outside market and, thus, decreases welfare in all states. The analysis also reveals
that the absence of internal trade may welfare-dominate free internal trade for all
countries. Further, the possibility of trade with a non-cartel country in fact makes it
more likely that cartel countries will benefit from economic integration between them.
This is due to the fact that profits gained by the cartel in the non-member country,
which are decreasing in internal trade costs, feature prominently in the welfare of
cartel hosts. Overall, the cartel’s exploitation of its global market power alters the
relation between trade liberalization and national welfare for all countries.
The aforementioned theoretical models generate interesting and novel findings re-
garding the effects of international cartels and collusive discipline on trade as well as
regarding the relation between trade costs and cartel discipline. A notable contribu-
tion of my dissertation is that I offer a reduced-form empirical analysis of some of the
predictions of the theoretical models. To that end, I employ a novel hand-collected
dataset. The data cover 173 private discovered and prosecuted international cartels,
which operated between 1958 and 2010 and included participants from 48 countries.
The data include information on the countries of nationality of each cartel mem-
ber, the duration of the infringement, and the product code of each of the cartelized
goods. Further, I have created variables that describe various collusive practices (such
as price-fixing, bid-rigging, allocation of markets and/or customers, setting of sales
quotas, etc.) and cartel characteristics (e.g., whether the cartel had a group leader,
market share controlled by the cartel, recidivism, etc.). Then, I merge my data on
9international cartels with data on international trade at the most disaggregated prod-
uct level available.12 The sample size is largely determined by the availability of the
trade data at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level and therefore spans
between 1988 and 2012 and focuses on cartels with members from OECD countries
only. About 37% of the cartels in the final dataset involve more than one 6-digit
HS product and are therefore considered multi-product cartels.13 Part III of this
dissertation describes the data.
In Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?, I employ the empirical grav-
ity model of trade to test whether multi-product collusion actually enhances trade.14
First, I analyze the average treatment effect of collusion on trade and find it to be
positive and significant, suggesting that on average the existence of cartels promotes
trade between cartel members. Second, I focus specifically on the impact of multi-
product cartels and offer evidence that collusion between multi-product firms exerts
a positive and significant effect on trade. This effect is statistically larger (at the 1%
confidence level) than the impact of single-product cartels on trade.
Third, I test whether the effects of multi-product cartels and single-product cartels
differ depending on the degree of product substitutability. To proxy for the degree
of substitutability, I employ Rauch’s (1999) classification of goods in the main spec-
ifications and experiment with Broda and Weinstein’s (2006) elasticity estimates in
12 Ideally, I would use firm-level trade data to examine the links between international cartels and
international trade. Unfortunately, such data are not readily available for a large sample of
countries and for a large period of time, and therefore I resort to using trade data at the most
disaggregated product level available: 6-digit Harmonized System level.
13 I view this definition of a multi-product cartel as a rather conservative one. If I were able to
use a more disaggregated product level (such as 8-digit HS or 10-digit HS), I believe that the
number of multi-product cartels in my sample would expand dramatically.
14 The empirical gravity model has been widely popular in the trade literature and has been
applied to various research questions, ranging from estimating the trade effects of geography,
free trade agreements, membership at the World Trade Organization, immigration, currency
unions to the Olympic Games and the World Cup. For a detailed overview of the gravity model,
its theoretical foundations as well as its proper empirical estimation, I refer the interested reader
to Head and Mayer (2014).
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the sensitivity tests. In line with the theory, I find that the positive and significant
effect of multi-product cartels on trade becomes much more pronounced for differ-
entiated goods relative to homogeneous goods. On the other hand, the impact of
multi-product collusion on trade when the goods are relatively closer substitutes is
still positive, but insignificant. The effect of single-product cartels on trade does not
vary with the degree of substitutability. These findings are robust to a series of sensi-
tivity experiments, where I use different sets of fixed effects, an alternative proxy for
product substitutability, as well as different year intervals. The results are consistent
with the prediction of the model that multi-product international cartels promote
trade, especially when the goods are sufficiently unrelated.
In Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs, I take some of the interesting theoretical
results to the data and provide empirical support for them. I propose a two-stage
estimation approach to analyze the relations between (internal and external) trade
costs and cartel discipline, as well as between cartel discipline and (internal and
external) trade. In the first-stage analysis, I test the hypothesis that in the presence of
intra-industry trade between the cartel-member countries, cartel discipline is inversely
related to both internal trade costs and external trade costs. To that end, I employ the
Cox Proportional Hazard model of cartel duration and adopt distance as the preferred
proxy for trade costs.15 Controlling for various cartel characteristics and industry
effects, I find that internal distance exerts a positive and statistically significant effect
on the hazard of cartel break-up. This result is consistent with the prediction of the
model that internal trade costs are inversely related to cartel discipline. Moreover,
the impact of external distance on the hazard of collusive dissolution is also positive
and significant, suggesting that external trade costs are indirectly related to cartel
discipline, again in line with the theoretical model. Encouraged by these results, I
15 I also experiment with tariffs and percentage tariff changes as additional proxies for trade costs
and trade liberalization.
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use the first-stage estimates of the trade costs and the cartel characteristics, as well
as actual data, and construct several different measures of cartel discipline.
Then, in the second-stage analysis, I test the hypothesis that stronger cartel dis-
cipline reduces trade between cartel members and between cartel exporters and non-
cartel importers. To that end, I adopt the empirical gravity model of trade and include
cartels and cartel discipline as potential sources of bilateral trade frictions. In line
with the theoretical model, I find that the effect of cartel discipline on internal trade
is negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that stronger collusive
discipline obstructs trade between the host countries of the cartel. Moreover, con-
sistent with the theory, I find that cartel discipline exerts a negative and significant
impact on trade between a cartel exporter and a non-cartel importer. This finding
suggests that the more disciplined the cartel, the lower the value of external trade.
Furthermore, even though the theory does not specifically model cartel formation and
makes no predictions about the impact of the presence of cartels on trade, I obtain a
positive and statistically significant estimate of the effect of cartels on internal trade
and on external trade.
1 Related Research
The present section offers a brief overview of the related literature. My dissertation
contributes to several strands of the existing literature. First, I add to the liter-
ature examining the impact of economic integration on multi-market collusion by
focusing on cartels comprised of multi-product firms, characterized with heteroge-
neous marginal production costs as well as on multi-market collusion that extends to
outside countries. Second, I contribute to works studying the effects of cost asymme-
tries on collusive behavior. However, in the model presented in Trade-Promoting and
Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?, differences in marginal costs are coupled with hetero-
geneity in trade costs, which offers novel insights about the implications of collusion
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for trade and welfare. Third, I add to the empirical literature on collusion by creating
an extensive dataset on international cartels and using it to analyze some of the pre-
dictions of the theoretical models. Following the general outline of my dissertation, I
first present the theory-related papers and then discuss the recent empirical work on
international cartels.
1.1 Theoretical Literature
The initial theoretical work on international cartels has focused on the impact of
trade costs on implicit collusion sustained through repeated interactions in a single
market. Davidson (1984) develops a Cournot oligopoly model, where domestic and
foreign firms collude in the domestic market only, and shows that for negligible tariffs
collusion is easier to sustain, while sufficiently high tariffs tend to be pro-competitive.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) extend Davidson’s (1984) model to import quotas and
find that in the case of Cournot-Nash punishments, the imposition of negligible quo-
tas improves cartel sustainability, while high quotas have the opposite effect. When
Bertrand-Nash punishments are considered, as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1989),
quotas tend to be pro-competitive. Syropoulos (1992) treats cartel behavior as en-
dogenous and examines the welfare implications of tariffs and quotas for an importing
country faced with a foreign oligopoly. Fung (1992) employs a differentiated duopoly
model of a quantity-setting cartel and shows that tariff reductions enhance competi-
tion if the foreign firm is the low-cost producer. However, if the foreign firm is the
high-cost producer, then economic integration could be pro-collusive if the tariff rate
is initially low. Matschke (1999) develops a homogeneous-good model of collusion
with side payments and exclusive market agreements and shows that reductions in
import quotas improve cartel stability. My work differs from this strand of the ex-
isting literature in that it focuses on collusion between domestic and foreign firms
sustained across multiple markets.
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The models presented in my dissertation are most closely related to the literature
examining the impact of multi-market contact and trade liberalization on cartel sta-
bility. Pinto (1986) extends Brander and Krugman’s (1983) model by allowing for
repeated firm interactions and demonstrates that for certain values of the discount
factor there will be no trade if firms choose the monopoly output. Lommerud and
Sørgard (2001) prove that when firms are initially colluding on prices through trigger
strategies, decreases in trade costs make collusion easier to sustain, while the opposite
is true for quantity-setting collusion. Departing from this branch of the related liter-
ature, Schro¨der (2007) incorporates ad valorem tariffs as well as fixed trade costs in a
homogeneous-good duopoly model and shows that economic integration can enhance
competition by increasing the deviation prices and profits of each colluding firm.
Bond and Syropoulos (2008) develop a segmented-markets homogeneous-good
Cournot duopoly model of collusion and allow firms to pool their incentive constraints
across markets. The authors show that optimal cartel agreements entail intra-industry
trade when trade costs and the discount factor are sufficiently low. Furthermore, in
their setting, trade liberalization is pro-collusive when trade costs are below a thresh-
old value and the discount factor is intermediate, while the opposite is true when trade
costs are initially prohibitively high. Bond and Syropoulos (2012) show that when
the same framework is applied to the case of multiple countries and multiple firms,
economic integration affects collusive sustainability non-monotonically. Akinbosoye,
Bond and Syropoulos (2012) consider multi-market collusion in a Bertrand framework
with differentiated products and prove that when the goods are close substitutes, trade
liberalization is pro-collusive if trade costs are initially high, but pro-competitive
if trade costs are initially low. Ashournia et al. (2013) use a segmented-markets
differentiated-goods Cournot duopoly model and show that as long as trade costs
are low enough, economic integration improves collusive stability. Bhattacharjea and
Sinha (2015) study multi-market collusion in homogeneous-good segmented-markets
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price-setting oligopoly model, where firms sustain the monopoly outcome through
territorial allocation of markets. The authors demonstrate that an expansion in the
number of firms per country might make collusion easier to sustain. The work pre-
sented here departs from this strand of the related literature in that it considers the
implications of multi-product collusion for trade and welfare as well as the possibility
of firms exploiting their market power not only in each other’s markets, but also in
outside (non-cartel member) countries.
The literature also analyzes heterogeneity in firms’ costs and its potential effects
on collusion. The general consensus is that asymmetry in cost functions hinders
collusive stability as it makes the more efficient firm difficult to discipline (Bain,
1948; Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1988). Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991) also find that
cost heterogeneity obstructs collusion even if inefficient allocations are allowed to
equalize firms’ short-term deviation gains. On the other hand, heterogeneity in firms’
marginal costs has been considered a justification for a merger between competitors in
the same market.16 Such mergers can increase prices by reducing competition, but can
also give rise to efficiency gains and cost savings (Williamson, 1968). Nonetheless, the
literature has not yet explored the impact of cost heterogeneity on collusion sustained
across multiple markets, separated by trade costs.
Another, relatively more distant, strand of the literature explores the effectiveness
of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation in deter-
ring multi-market collusion. Choi and Gerlach (2012a) use a two-country Bertrand
duopoly model and show that in the absence of any information-sharing between local
antitrust authorities, firms self-report less often and multi-market collusion becomes
easier to sustain. On the other hand, in the case of extensive information-sharing
16 The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize these (potential) positive effects of merg-
ers and stipulate: “a primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to
generate significant efficiencies” (https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/100819hmg.pdf)
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between antitrust authorities, the overall effect on self-reporting is rather ambigu-
ous. When fines and the conviction probability is sufficiently low, firms choose not
to self-report, while when fines and the conviction probability are sufficiently high,
firms self-report in both jurisdictions. Choi and Gerlach (2012b) focus on the same
problem, but in the case of markets being linked by an inverse demand relationship.
The authors show that in such a setting equilibrium antitrust enforcement is non-
monotonic in the degree of market integration. For instance, decentralized antitrust
enforcement is more likely to be realized when trade costs are either sufficiently low
or sufficiently high.
Roux and Von Ungern-Sternberg (2007) analyze the effects of the Amnesty Plus
and the Penalty Plus program, which encourage firms under investigation for collusion
in a given market to cooperate and reveal the full extent of their antitrust crimes, on
firms’ self-reporting incentives when they participate in two cartels simultaneously.
The authors use a static Bertrand-duopoly model and show that conditional on the
detection of one of these cartels, the policies enhance firms’ incentives to report the
remaining conspiracy. Lefouili and Roux (2012) show that the Amnesty Plus program
can have opposing effects on the sustainability of multi-market collusion. The authors
demonstrate that the Amnesty Plus policy can, on one hand, improve cartel stability
if firms choose to self-report following an initial cartel detection and, on the other
hand, it can diminish cartel duration or even deter cartel formation by enhancing
firms’ incentives to self-report following a cartel detection. In my dissertation, I
abstract from the possibility of cartel detection by the antitrust authorities and defer
such an extension of the theory for future work.
The work presented in my dissertation contributes to these strands of the related
literature by studying the implications of international cartels for trade and welfare
when firms face not only trade costs, but also different marginal costs of production.
It is through the interaction of these two sources of cost heterogeneity that my novel
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results arise. Furthermore, I also examine the effects of multi-market collusion for
optimal output and national welfare when firms exploit their market power in non-
cartel countries and when cartel behavior is endogenous. I present an endogenous
index of cartel discipline that links seemingly segmented markets strategically.
1.2 Empirical Literature
Despite the fact that private international cartels have remained functional and ever-
present in various industries around the world, empirical studies evaluating their
characteristics and effects on prices, quantities or bilateral trade have been quite lim-
ited, usually due to the lack of reliable data. Most of the related empirical work in the
literature has focused either on evaluating the determinants of cartel stability using
various hazard models, or on single episodes of collusion, where price and quantity
data are more readily available. There are also a number of papers that provide a
descriptive overview of various cartel practices and characteristics.17
Dick (1996) studies the determinants of cartel longevity by focusing on the legal
cartels formed under the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade act. The author employs
duration models - parametric and semi-parametric, for grouped and for continuous
data - and finds that price-fixing conspiracies tend to be relatively short-lived, while
cartels that control a large share of the market, export to small buyers, and use a
common sales agency exhibit a longer lifespan. Brenner (2005) analyzes the effec-
tiveness of the European Union’s corporate leniency program in diminishing cartel
stability. Brenner (2005) uses a Weibull hazard model and does not find the leniency
program to have a statistically significant impact on cartel duration.
Connor and Zimmerman (2005) also explore the determinants of collusive sustain-
ability using data on international cartels discovered between 1990 and 2004 and the
17 Of course, there is an additional strand of the literature which studies the impact of leniency
policies on the probability of cartel discovery and cartel duration, but, once again, I abstract
from the implications of leniency programs for collusion and defer it for future endeavors.
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Cox Proportional Hazard model. Their results show that cartels that use bid-rigging
strategies and have members from a large number of different countries exhibit a
longer lifespan, while cartels that affected a substantial portion of the sales in the in-
dustry tend to be short-lived. De (2010) focuses on cartels discovered by the European
Commission between 1990 and 2008 and also employs the Cox Proportional Hazard
model to examine the impact of various cartel and industry characteristics on collu-
sive stability. The author argues that organizational details such as the number of
cartel members, the nature of the agreements, and the market share controlled by the
cartel do not have a significant impact on its longevity. On the other hand, demand
fluctuations and changes in the antitrust policies tend to shorten cartel duration.
Levenstein and Suslow (2011) use a sample of 81 discovered and prosecuted in-
ternational cartels and the Cox Proportional Hazard model to study the factors that
affect cartel stability. The authors show that cartels tend to be less stable after 1995,
when antitrust authorities improved their enforcement efforts. Moreover, collusive
agreements with strict punishment strategies exhibit a shorter duration, while cartels
with elaborate compensation schemes tend to be more stable. Zhou (2012) analyzes
the effects of a particular collusive practice, adopted by a number of cartels, namely,
the sharing of private information and within-cartel transfers, on collusive sustain-
ability. Also using the Cox Proportional Hazard model, Zhou (2012) finds that such
an anticompetitive strategy has a positive and significant impact on cartel duration.
On the other hand, cartels that undertake retaliatory actions upon deviation by any
members or have a market leader tend to be relatively short-lived. Metz et al(2013)
employ a mixed proportional hazard model and data on 186 international cartels and
show that bid-rigging cartels are more stable, while cartels with members from many
different countries are less stable. Furthermore, their results suggest that collusive
agreements first detected by the E.U. or the U.S. antitrust authorities exhibit a longer
lifespan. In addition, the larger the amount of sales affected by the collusive agree-
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ment and the larger the amount of sanctions imposed upon discovery, the longer the
conspiracy tends to be. I have created a more recently updated and comprehensive
dataset on discovered and prosecuted international cartels, which includes informa-
tion on various cartel characteristics and collusive strategies not present in any of the
aforementioned studies.
For the analysis of the impact of collusion on trade I rely on the gravity model of
trade. However, I am only aware of one other related paper, which analyzes the effects
of cartels on trade. Levenstein et al. (2015) focus on only seven international cartels
and first study the effect of cartel break-up on prices and industry concentration
ratios, using a difference-in-difference estimation approach. Their results suggest that
following a cartel dissolution, prices decline in a statistically significant manner, but
there are no significant changes in market concentration. Moreover, Levenstein et al.
(2015) estimate the impact of cartel break-up on trade using the two-step estimation
procedure of Helpman et al. (2008). They find that collusive dissolution exerts little
or no significant effects on the spatial patterns of trade (i.e., on the impact of distance
on trade). Levenstein et al. (2015) argue that their results provide evidence of the
presence of cross-hauling even during periods of collusion. My analysis, on the other
hand, focuses on a sample of 173 international cartels and investigates the impact of
cartel existence and collusive discipline on bilateral trade using standard estimation
techniques.
Using data on discovered and prosecuted international cartels, a number of pa-
pers offer a descriptive analysis of their collusive practices and organizational features.
For instance, Connor (2003) employs data on 167 international cartels and finds that
the average cartel is comprised of 5 members, lasts for about 6 years, and generates
about $1.2 billion in sales over its lifetime. Moreover, Connor and Helmers (2006)
study cartel effectiveness and antitrust enforcement and provide a detailed survey of
the organizational characteristics of 283 contemporary private international cartels
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discovered between 1990 and 2005. In their sample, 25% of all cartels are global in
scope, while 47% operate only in Europe, and the majority of the cartels (79%) are
concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Bolotova et al. (2008) adopt Harrington’s
(2005) proposed methodology to check for signs of collusive behavior by performing
tests for structural breaks in the price distribution. The authors employ autoregres-
sive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) techniques and focus only the citric acid cartel and the
lysine cartel. Bolotova et al. (2008) find that prices are 9% to 25% higher in collusive
periods than in periods of price wars.
In addition, Harrington (2006) describes in great detail the organizational charac-
teristics of 20 international cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between
2000 and 2004. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) provide a comprehensive overview of
the theoretical literature on collusion and of several empirical studies on cartels. The
authors examine the determinants of cartel durability and the numerous challenges to
cartel success. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) also identify various industry character-
istics that facilitate collusion. Subsequently, Levenstein and Suslow (2008) trace the
evolution of anti-trust enforcement and prosecution of international cartels and, again,
descriptively analyze the prerequisites for successful cartel formation and longevity.
Other empirical studies on cartels have mostly focused on particular cases of discov-
ered and prosecuted cartels: Norwegian cement cartel (Roller and Steen, 2006), Polish
cement cartel (Bejger, 2011), Indian cement cartel (Bejger, 2012), German cement
cartel (Harrington et al., 2015), ysine cartel (Connor, 2001).
The empirical work in my dissertation not only studies the impact of a number
of organizational features, trade cost and trade liberalization proxies on collusive sta-
bility (controlling for additional industry and region-specific characteristics), but also
then examines the relation between cartel existence, collusive discipline and bilateral
trade. Further, my dissertation investigates the effect of multi-product cartels on
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trade and its dependence on the degree of product substitutability. Before presenting
the empirical analysis, the next section describes the theoretical models, their main
predictions along with the intuition behind these results.
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Part II. Theoretical Analysis
In this part of my dissertation I present two different models of multi-market col-
lusion. First, in Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels, I focus on interna-
tional cartels, comprised of multi-product firms with differing production efficiencies
that face per-unit costs of shipping goods internationally. Second, in Cartel Discipline
and Trade Costs, I introduce a model of multi-market collusion between two firms
that each produce a single, homogeneous good and exploit their market power not
only in each other’s home markets, but also in an outside country.
1 Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels
In this section I first present the model of two multi-product firms, which interact re-
peatedly in national markets separated by per-unit trade costs and face heterogeneous
marginal production costs. I define the global profit of the representative firm in the
case of Cournot-Nash competition, maximal collusion, and optimal deviation. Then,
I describe the conditions under which maximal collusion can promote trade relative
to Cournot competition. I also analyze the circumstances under which collusion can
welfare-dominate competition. Lastly, I discuss the validity of these results when the
goods are imperfect substitutes.
1.1 The Model
The model features two multi-product firms, which both produce two goods, indexed
k = 1, 2, for possible sale in two countries, labeled home (h) and foreign (f). The
domestic firm manufactures its products in the domestic market, while the foreign firm
produces its products in the foreign market. Henceforth, “∗” will denote all variables
pertaining to deliveries to the foreign market. Firms face marginal production costs
chk and c
f
k for k = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, suppose that the firms have ”mirror
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image” costs: that is, good 1 is less costly to produce for the domestic firm (ch1 < c
h
2),
while good 2 is less costly to produce for the foreign firm (cf1 > c
f
2). Also, assume that
ch1 = c
f
2 < c
h
2 = c
f
1 . For simplicity, define s ≡ ch2 − ch1 = cf1 − cf2 and let ch1 = cf2 = 0.
It follows that s = ch2 = c
f
1 . Let the other aspects of the two firms be identical. The
sunk costs that must be incurred in setting up production and exports are exogenous.
Let the per-unit trade costs, t, be the costs of delivering goods from one country to
the other. Firms interact in quantities and view markets as segmented.
Let Qk ≡ xk + yk be the total quantity of good k consumed in the home country,
where xk (x
∗
k) denotes the quantity supplied locally by the domestic (foreign) firm of
good k and yk (y
∗
k) denotes the quantity exported by the foreign (home) firm of good
k to the home (foreign) market. Each consumer in the domestic market has the same
quasi-linear utility function over the two goods: U = u(Q1, Q2)+q0, where q0 denotes
consumption of the numeraire good and u(Q1, Q2) takes the following form:
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u(Q1, Q2) = α(Q1 +Q2)− 1
2
(Q21 +Q
2
2)− γQ1Q2 (1)
where α > 0 and 0 ≤ γ < 1. In this setting, α denotes consumer’s maximum
willingness to pay, while γ is an index of degree of product substitutability: if γ = 0,
the products are independent, while if γ = 1, the products are perfect substitutes.
Optimization in consumption yields the following inverse demand functions for Qk ≥
0, k = 1, 2:
p1(Q1, Q2) = max(0, α−Q1 − γQ2)
p2(Q1, Q2) = max(0, α−Q2 − γQ1)
The inverse demand functions for the foreign market have the same functional form.
18 This utility function abstracts from industry income effects and allows for partial equilibrium
analysis.
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Let Π denote the global profit function of the domestic firm:19
Π = [p1(Q1, Q2)]x1 + [p1(Q
∗
1, Q
∗
2)− t]y∗1 + [p2(Q1, Q2)− s]x2 + [p2(Q∗1, Q∗2)− s− t]y∗2 (2)
To simplify the presentation, in the analysis to follow I assume the goods are com-
pletely unrelated (i.e., γ = 0).20 The representative firm’s best-response functions are
given by:21
x˜1 ≡ x˜1(y1, s) =
(
α− y1
2
)
(3a)
x˜2 ≡ x˜2(y2, s) = max
(
α− y2 − s
2
, 0
)
(3b)
y˜∗1 ≡ y˜∗1(x∗1, s, t) = max
(
α− x∗1 − t
2
, 0
)
(3c)
y˜∗2 ≡ y˜∗2(x∗2, s, t) = max
(
α− x∗2 − s− t
2
, 0
)
(3d)
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities in each market can be derived by solving
both firms’ first-order conditions simultaneously. Given the symmetry of the model
and the fact that firms regard national markets as segmented, it suffices to focus on
decisions only in one market. Henceforth, I study home production, xk, and home
imports, yk, of good k = 1, 2. Let subscript ‘N ’ identify ‘Nash’ quantities for the
domestic market and suppose, for a moment, that t and s are such that all output
levels are positive. Then,
xN1 =
α+ s+ t
3
(4a)
yN1 =
α− 2s− 2 t
3
(4b)
xN2 =
α− 2s+ t
3
(4c)
19 Given the symmetry of the model, the firm subscripts can be omitted to avoid cluttering the
notation.
20 The proofs in Appendix A allow for the possibility that goods may be imperfect substitutes.
21 Firm’s best response functions for good k do not depend on the quantity of the other good l 6= k,
as shown in (3a)-(3d), due to the assumption of a linear-quadratic utility in the non-numeraire
goods as in (1).
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yN2 =
α+ s− 2 t
3
. (4d)
Several observations regarding the Cournot-Nash deliveries stand out. First, trade
liberalization (a fall in t) leads to an expansion of imports and a reduction in domestic
production. Second, reciprocal reductions in trade costs t bring about an increase in
domestic availability of every good as ∂QNk /∂t < 0. Third, increases in cost differen-
tial, s, induce every firm to expand its production of the good in which it has a compet-
itive advantage (i.e., ∂(xN1 + y
N∗
1 )/∂s > 0 and ∂(x
N∗
2 + y
N
2 )/∂s > 0)
22 and reduce its
production of the other good (i.e., ∂(xN2 + y
N∗
2 )/∂s < 0 and ∂(x
N∗
1 + y
N
1 )/∂s < 0).
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However, inspection of the equilibrium output allocations in (4a)-(4d) reveals that
the firm might stop trading one or both goods if trade costs are prohibitively high.
Figure 1 helps to visualize this idea. For values of t and s in regions A and A′ all output
levels are positive. However, for t and s in regions B and B′ the cost-inefficient good
is no longer traded. Using (4b), it follows that yN1 = 0 for t ≥ ty ≡ α−2s2 .24 When the
firm ceases exporting its costlier good, the market structure changes to one where the
domestic supply of each firm’s low-cost product is shielded from foreign competition.
Taking this into account, each firm determines the new equilibrium output allocations
for intermediate levels of trade costs such that t ≥ ty. Setting y∗2 = 0 (by symmetry,
y1 = 0) in the global profit function in (10) and letting firms re-optimize generates the
equilibrium quantities: xN1 =
α
2
, xN2 =
α+t−2s
3
, and yN2 =
1
3
(α+ s−2t). Using this last
expression of yN2 , the prohibitive level of trade costs, such that even the cost-efficient
good is not traded is tx(s) =
α+s
2
with ty < tx.
25 Lastly, if trade costs are so high that
22 Recall that due to symmetry, yN∗1 = y
N
2 and x
N∗
2 = x
N
1 .
23 Due to the symmetry between firms in the model, it follows that x1 = x
∗
2, x2 = x
∗
1, y1 = y
∗
2 ,
y2 = y
∗
1 .
24 To ensure that ty is non-negative, s ≤ α2 . Otherwise, for s > α2 , yN1 = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
25 Given the pattern of competitive advantage, the value of t, which makes exports of the cost-
inefficient good unprofitable will be lower than the value of t, which makes exports of the
cost-efficient good unprofitable.
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neither good is exported as in region C ′ of Figure 1, t ≥ tx, the firm supplies both
goods only domestically and the new optimal output levels are given by: xN1 =
α
2
and
xN2 =
α−s
2
.
Moreover, the optimal output deliveries in (4a)-(4d) suggest that if the cost dif-
ferential is considerably large imports of foreign’s high-cost good and even local pro-
duction of home’s high-cost good can become unprofitable. Using (4b), I define the
threshold value of the cost heterogeneity such that the home country no longer imports
foreign’s cost-inefficient good, yN1 = 0: sy(t) =
α−2t
2
. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium
when s ≥ sy, illustrated by regions B and B′ of Figure 1, coincides with the case when
t ≥ ty with xN1 = α2 , xN2 = α+t−2s3 , and yN2 = 13(α + s − 2t). If the cost differential
is considerably high as in region C of Figure 1, even production of home’s high-cost
good for domestic sales is no longer profitable. Using the last expression of xN2 , this
higher prohibitive level of the cost asymmetry is sx(t) =
α+t
2
with sy < sx.
26 In
this case, home supply and imports from foreign of each country’s respective low-cost
goods are given by xN1 =
α
2
and yN2 =
α−t
2
.27 Note the symmetry between the relevant
regions with respect to the 45◦-degree line where t = s. This symmetry is only present
because the goods are completely unrelated, i.e., γ = 0, as in this case there is no
essential distinction between the two sources of heterogeneity within a firm.
Utilizing the equilibrium output allocations (4a) − (4d), the Nash profit of the
26 Clearly, the level of s, which makes exports of the costlier good unprofitable will be lower than
the level of s, which makes domestic production of the same good unprofitable.
27 The derivation of the Nash equilibrium for each possible range of trade cost and cost differential
values is described in more details in the beginning of Appendix A.
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representative firm in the home market takes the following form:
ΠN =

(
α+s+t
3
)2
+
(
α+s−2t
3
)2
+
(
α−2s+t
3
)2
+
(
α−2s−2t
3
)2
if t < ty(
α
2
)2
+
(
α+s−2t
3
)2
+
(
α−2s+t
3
)2
if ty ≤ t < tx(
α
2
)2
+
(
α−s
2
)2
if t ≥ tx(
α+s+t
3
)2
+
(
α+s−2t
3
)2
+
(
α−2s+t
3
)2
+
(
α−2s−2t
3
)2
if s < sy(
α
2
)2
+
(
α+s−2t
3
)2
+
(
α−2s+t
3
)2
if sy ≤ s < sx(
α
2
)2
+
(
α−t
2
)2
if s ≥ sx
(5)
ΠN(t, s) is non-monotonic in t (s) for t < ty and ty ≤ t < tx (s < sy and sy ≤
s < sx). Within each interval of t values, as trade costs rise, domestic profits for
the representative firm increase, while export profits decrease. The former effect
dominates at high initial values of t, while the latter effect prevails at low initial
values of t. Within each interval of s values, as the cost heterogeneity increases,
profits from each firm’s respective cost-efficient good rise, while profits from each
firm’s respective cost-inefficient good fall. The former effect is stronger at high levels
of s, while the latter effect is dominant at low levels of s. As Lemma 1 explains,
depending on the parameters, ΠN(t, s) can have multiple local minima.
Lemma 1. (Global Profit under Competition) The representative firm’s global profit under
Cournot-Nash competition, ΠN (t, s), has the following properties:
a) For any given level of cost differential, s ∈ [0, α],
i) there exists a tmin1 ≡ arg mint ΠN (t, s) = 2α−s10 ∈ [0, ty) if s < α3 and a tmin2 ≡
arg mint Π
N (t, s) = α+4s5 ∈ [ty, tx) if s ≥ α6 ;
ii) ∂Π
N
∂t Q 0 if t Q tmin1 ∈ [0, ty) or if t Q tmin2 ∈ [ty, tx). Moreover, ∂
2ΠN
∂t2
> 0 for
t ∈ [0, tx).
b) For any given level of trade costs, t ∈ [0, α],
i) there exists a smin1 ≡ arg mins ΠN (t, s) = 2α−t10 ∈ [0, sy) if t < α3 and a smin2 ≡
argmins Π
N (t, s) = α+4t5 ∈ [sy, sx) if t ≥ α6 ;
ii) ∂Π
N
∂s Q 0 if s Q smin1 ∈ (0, sx) or if s Q smin2 ∈ [sy, sx). Moreover, ∂
2ΠN
∂s2
> 0 for
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s ∈ (0, sx).
Next, I examine the profit under collusion, ΠC , of the representative cartel mem-
ber. Due to the symmetry of the model, the cartel can be viewed as making decisions
that aim to maximize profits in a given market. Thus, it suffices to focus on the home
market only:
ΠC = [α− (x1 + y1)](x1 + y1) + [α− (x2 + y2)](x2 + y2)− t× (y1 + y2)− s× (y1 + x2)
(6)
The cartel may be able to sustain the most collusive outcome and act as a monopolist
in both markets if they value future profits sufficiently. Moreover, as the Folk Theo-
rem stipulates, there always exist high enough discount factors that sustain maximal
collusion.
The monopolist decides how much of each good to produce in each market for
domestic consumption and for exports, taking into consideration cost asymmetries
and trade costs. Under the assumed structure of costs, the cartel will never find it
profitable to export the goods that either firm produces inefficiently. i.e., yM1 = 0 and
yM∗2 = 0. In the case of free trade, t = 0, the cartel will produce good 1 (2) only in
home (foreign) for domestic and export purposes and the output levels of both goods
will be equal: xM1 = y
M
2 =
α
2
. The monopolist will assign production according to
each country’s competitive advantage and complete specialization will be attained.
However, when trade costs are non-zero, the monopolist again rationalizes pro-
duction and trade and chooses to either produce both goods in both markets (if trade
costs exceed the cost heterogeneity as in regions A′, B′ and C ′ of Figure 1) or produce
good 1 in the domestic market and good 2 in the foreign market and export them to
the other country (if the cost differential exceeds trade costs as in regions A, B and
C of Figure 1). If t < s, the cartel will import the high-cost good from the country
that enjoys a competitive advantage in it rather than produce it domestically. In
that case, the cartel will manufacture good 1 only at home and good 2 only in foreign
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and trade them internationally. The optimal output allocations will be xM1 =
α
2
,
yM2 =
α−t
2
and xM2 = y
M
1 = 0. If s < t, then the cartel will foreclose on the costly in-
ternational exchange and complete geographic separation of markets will be attained.
The cartel will produce both goods domestically in both markets and the optimal
output levels will be: xM1 =
α
2
, xM2 =
α−s
2
and yM2 = y
M
1 = 0. Furthermore, from the
optimal output allocations, it follows that the prohibitive levels of t and s in the case
of maximal collusion are given by t¯M = α (y
M
2 = 0) and s¯M = α (x
M
2 = 0). When
t = s, the cartel is indifferent between producing the cost-inefficient good at home
or importing it from foreign and the optimal solution is a correspondence: xM1 =
α
2
,
xM2 + y
M
2 =
α−s
2
= α−t
2
and yM1 = 0. Regions A, B, and C of Figure 1 depict the case
of t < s, while regions A′, B′, and C ′ illustrate the case of s < t. The optimal global
profit for the monopolist is:
ΠM =

(
α
2
)2
+
(
α−t
2
)2
if t < s(
α
2
)2
+
(
α−s
2
)2
if s < t(
α
2
)2
+
(
α−t
2
)2
if t = s
(7)
as long as t < t¯M and s < s¯M . First, if t < s, then Π
M(t) is decreasing and
strictly convex in t and independent of s. Second, if s < t, then ΠM(s) is decreasing
and strictly convex in s and independent of t. Third, the minimum of ΠM(t) (resp.,
ΠM(s)) approaches min(s, α) (resp., min(t, α)). Profits under maximal collusion are
higher under free trade than under complete geographic separation, i.e., ΠM(t =
0, s) > ΠM(t = s, s) for any values of s. ΠM is at its highest level when t = s = 0.
Lemma 2 provides a more detailed characterization:
Lemma 2. (Global Profit under Monopoly) The global profit of the representative cartel
member under maximal collusion, ΠM , has the following properties:
a) If t < s, then ∂Π
M (t)
∂t < 0 and
∂2ΠM (t)
∂t2
> 0, with argmint Π
M (t)→ s and argmaxt ΠM (t) =
0. Moreover, ΠM is independent of s, ∂Π
M (t)
∂s = 0.
b) If s < t, then ∂Π
M (s)
∂s < 0 and
∂2ΠM (s)
∂s2
> 0, with argmins Π
M (s)→ t and argmaxs ΠM (s) =
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0. Moreover, ΠM is independent of t, ∂Π
M (t)
∂t = 0.
Suppose that home’s cartel partner supplies (x∗k, yk) for any good k = 1, 2. In that
case, the best-response component functions for the domestic firm are given in equa-
tions (3a)-(3d). The profit under an optimal deviation for the home firm consists of
the profit gain from deviating in home plus the profit gain from deviating in foreign.
To define home’s best-response global profit, Π˜ = ΠD (superscript ‘D’ for ‘deviation’),
one may (once again due to symmetry) focus solely on the domestic market:
ΠD =x˜21 + x˜
2
2 + y˜
2
1 + y˜
2
2 (8)
First, the deviation profit is decreasing and strictly convex in the outputs (xk, yk) for
the firm which abides by the cartel agreement. Second, ΠD is decreasing and strictly
convex in (t, s) in the individual regions identified in Figure 1, but not necessarily
convex for all (t, s) in (0, α) × (0, α). Third, decreases in trade costs, t, tend to
increase the best-response export volume of the deviating firm, while increases in the
cost differential, s, tend to increase (decrease) the best-response output of the cost-
efficient (cost-inefficient) good. Lastly, the best-response output levels as well as the
net prices are well-defined for all values of s and t described in Figure 1 when the
goods are completely unrelated.
Before presenting the main predictions of the model, it is useful to discuss whether
maximal collusion is even sustainable in this setting. Generally, cartel agreements are
unstable due to the tempting profits that any member could earn if he deviates from
the agreement. However, Friedman (1986) demonstrates that in the context of infinite
firm interactions, collusion is sustainable through ‘grim’ trigger strategies, stipulating
continued adherence to the prescribed output and reversion to the Cournot compet-
itive equilibrium upon violation of the agreement. As firms interact repeatedly over
time, they pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain collusion (Bern-
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heim and Whinston, 1990). Multi-market contact strengthens the cartel agreement
as it increases the frequency of firm interactions and alleviates any existing asymme-
tries between cartel members. The Folk theorem suggests that as long as firms value
future profits considerably, full collusion is sustainable and, therefore, the results that
follow hold true. Nevertheless, to verify the stability of the monopoly outcome and
the validity of these findings, I analyze the cartel’s constrained optimization problem.
I derive the minimum discount factor, capable of sustaining collusion, and then exam-
ine its dependence on trade costs and the cost differential. The analysis is provided
in Appendix A.
Using the main features of the model just described, I proceed to examine the
impact of unconstrained collusion on trade relative to Cournot-Nash competition.
Then, I study the levels of welfare under the two types of market structure and derive
conditions under which multi-product, multi-market cartels can improve national
welfare.
1.2 Collusion and Trade
A key characteristic of the model is that the cartel, by rationalizing production and
trade, may choose to shut down production of the inefficient good in the home country
and import it, while exporting the efficient good to the foreign market. Thus, maximal
collusion enhances production efficiency. But could it also promote trade relative to
the least collusive outcome? To address this question, I compare the volume of trade
under monopoly with the volume of trade under competition under the assumption
that the goods are completely unrelated. Depending on the initial level of trade costs
and the cost differential, collusion can lead to such an arrangement in which exports
of the cost-efficient good from the country, which has a competitive advantage in
it, be higher than if the firms act non-cooperatively. Proposition 1 summarizes the
conditions under which this result is valid.
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Proposition 1. (Volume of Trade) If the trade cost level t is less than the cost
differential s (i.e., t < s), then the volume of trade of the cost-efficient good under
maximal collusion will exceed the volume of trade of the same product under Cournot-
Nash competition (i.e., yM2 > y
N
2 and y
∗M
1 > y
∗N
1 ).
(Recall that for the time being, I establish this result under the assumption that
the goods are completely unrelated.) This finding stands in sharp contrast to pre-
vious models of multi-market collusion and offers a novel insight on the impact of
international cartels on trade. Essentially, the cartel weighs the cost of producing
the inefficient good domestically (i.e., s) and the cost of importing that good (i.e., t).
If the cost differential exceeds trade costs, under monopoly each country specializes
according to its competitive advantage, producing the cost-efficient good only and ex-
porting it to the other market. Moreover, when the goods are completely unrelated,
importing more of the cost-inefficient good exerts no negative effect on the marginal
revenue of the domestically produced good. On the other hand, under Cournot com-
petition, the duopolists produce and export both goods (unless trade costs or the
cost asymmetry exceed specific threshold levels) as they do not internalize the cost
inefficiency and thus also generate a pecuniary externality for each other.
How does the insight described in Proposition 1 change if the goods are imperfect
substitutes (i.e., γ > 0)? This novel result holds true even if the goods are imperfect
substitutes as long as the degree of product substitutability is not too high. More
specifically, in Appendix A, I show that there exists a threshold level of the degree
of substitutability, γ̂, such that for any γ ∈ [0, γ̂) exports of the cost-efficient good
are greater under collusion than under competition. As long as the goods are suf-
ficiently unrelated (i.e., γ < γ̂), importing more of the high-cost good will exert a
negligible negative effect on the marginal revenue of the domestically produced good.
On the other hand, under Cournot competition, the duopolists do not internalize the
negative price externality that they inflict upon each other as they engage in intra-
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industry trade. Thus, multi-product, multi-market cartels can enhance trade of the
competitive-advantage product relative to Cournot competition as long as the goods
are sufficiently distant substitutes.
Graphically, collusion improves trade relative to competition for values of t and s
in regions A and B of Figure 1. For any intermediate values of γ, this result continues
to be valid as long as the two goods are sufficiently unrelated, γ < γˆ. Otherwise,
the opposite result holds true. Further, under the same conditions, the value of
trade under maximal collusion can be greater than the value of trade under Cournot
competition, as shown in Appendix A. Thus, by rationalizing production and trade,
the cartel can enhance trade of the cost-efficient good relative to the least collusive
outcome.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first work to show that international
cartels can promote trade. However, this result depends crucially on the interaction
between trade costs, the cost heterogeneity and the degree of product substitutability.
Therefore, I also examine this possibility empirically, using a novel dataset on cartels
and trade. Defying the conventional wisdom, I find that multi-product cartels exert a
positive and significant impact on trade and that this effect is even more pronounced
for relatively unrelated goods. Before discussing the empirical analysis, I study the
welfare implications of multi-market, multi-product cartels and demonstrate that col-
lusion can also improve national welfare.
1.3 Collusion and Welfare
The model thus far shows that multi-product international cartels can enhance pro-
duction efficiency and promote trade. In this section, I examine the welfare effects of
such collusive agreements. First, I define national welfare and characterize it in the
case of Cournot-Nash competition and maximal collusion. Second, I compare welfare
under collusion with welfare under competition when the goods are completely un-
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related. Third, I provide a discussion of the validity of the results in the presence of
imperfect substitutes.
1.3.1 The Case of Unrelated Goods
To simplify the presentation of the results, henceforth I assume that trade costs take
the form of transportation costs.28 In this framework, welfare in the domestic country
is given by W = CS+Π, where CS and Π capture consumer surplus and global profit,
respectively. It is easy to verify that CS = 1
2
(Q21 + Q
2
2). Utilizing these observations
in the definition of welfare and simplifying expressions generates the welfare at home:
W = α (Q1 +Q2)− 1
2
(
Q21 +Q
2
2
)− s× (Q2)− t× (y1 + y2) (9)
I characterize the dependence of welfare under Cournot-Nash competition, de-
noted by WN , on trade costs t and the cost differential s.29 Welfare under competi-
tion, WN , is non-monotonic in t for 0 ≤ t < ty and ty ≤ t < tx, as trade costs are
resource-using (Brander and Krugman, 1983).30 When transportation costs are in the
neighborhood of the prohibitive level, the waste of resources due to cross-hauling of
goods dominates the reduction in prices due to more competition. If transportation
costs are in the neighborhood of free trade, the pro-competitive effect outweighs the
resource costs. Depending on the values of the parameters, WN can exhibit multiple
local minima in trade costs for t < tx.
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Welfare is non-monotonic in the production cost differential for 0 ≤ s < sy and
sy ≤ s < sx. Increases in the cost heterogeneity lead to higher production of the
28 Appendix A characterizes welfare under Cournot-Nash competition in the case of import tariffs.
29 By symmetry, the above expressions also describe welfare in the foreign country.
30 For low levels of t, ∂WN/∂t < 0, while for high levels of t, ∂WN/∂t > 0. This is driven by the
non-monotonicity of ΠN in t.
31 In contrast, in the standard model of reciprocal dumping, the welfare function under Cournot-
Nash competition does not exhibit multiple local minima. This novel finding is driven by the
interaction between the two sources of heterogeneity in the model.
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efficient good and lower production of the inefficient good, with the effect on total
output being negative. As the cost asymmetry expands, consumer surplus falls, while
profits fall (rise) if the initial level of s is low (high), hence the non-monotonicity of
WN in s.32 For values of s in the neighborhood of the prohibitive level, the waste
of resources due to inefficient production dominates the pro-competitive effect. For
values of s in the neighborhood of no cost asymmetries, the opposite result holds.
Lemma 3 describes that the welfare function can also be characterized by multiple
local minima in the cost differential, s.
Lemma 3. (Welfare in Nash Equilibrium) Under Cournot-Nash competition, national wel-
fare depends on transportation costs and the cost differential as follows:
a) arg mintW
N (t, s) = 2(2α−s)11 ∈ [0, ty) if s < α6 ; arg mintWN (t, s) = 4α+7s11 ∈ [ty, tx) if
s ≥ α12 ;
b) arg minsW
N (t, s) = 2(2α−t)11 ∈ (0, sy) if t < α6 ; arg minsWN (t, s) = 4α+7t11 ∈ [sy, sx) if
t ≥ α12 ;
c) WN (0, s, ) > WN (tx, s, ).
Welfare under Cournot-Nash competition can also attain its (local) minimum at
a corner point, t = ty (resp., s = sy) for certain values of the cost differential (resp.,
trade costs). The global minimum of WN in t (s) also changes depending on the cost
differential s (t). For instance, the larger the cost differential, the more likely it is that
WN reaches its global minimum at a value of t close to the prohibitive level tx. The
relations documented in Lemma 3 are driven by the main model assumptions: seg-
mented national markets, constant marginal costs, and firms interacting over a single
period. What is of greater interest, however, is how welfare under competition com-
pares to welfare under collusion. Before addressing this question, I first characterize
welfare under unconstrained collusion in the case of transportation costs.33
32 Similarly as for t, for low levels of s, ∂WN/∂s < 0, while for high levels of s, ∂WN/∂s > 0.
Again, this result is due to the non-monotonicity of ΠN in s.
33 In Appendix A, I characterize welfare under maximal collusion in the case of import tariffs.
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Lemma 4. (Welfare under Maximal Collusion) Under maximal collusion, national welfare
in the case of transportation costs, WM , has the following properties:
a) If t < s, then ∂W
M (t)
∂t < 0 and
∂2WM (t)
∂t2
> 0, with argmintW
M (t) → s and
argmaxtW
M (t) = 0. Moreover, WM (t) is independent of s, ∂W
M (t)
∂s = 0.
b) If s < t, then ∂W
M (s)
∂s < 0 and
∂2WM (s)
∂s2
> 0, with argminsW
M (s) → t and
argmaxsW
M (s) = 0. Moreover, WM (s) is independent of t, ∂W
M (s)
∂t = 0.
Lemma 4 first reveals that if t < s, then WM(t) is decreasing and strictly convex
in t and independent of s. Second, if s < t, then WM(s) is decreasing and strictly
convex in s and independent of t. Third, welfare under unconstrained collusion is
maximized under free trade or when there are no cost asymmetries. That is, welfare
under maximal collusion is maximized in t (s) at t = 0 (s = 0) for s ≥ 0 (t ≥ 0).
Next, I compare the levels of welfare under maximal collusion and Cournot com-
petition. The cartel internalizes the cost inefficiency and always produces the low-cost
good domestically, while shutting down trade of each country’s respective high-cost
good. Depending on the cost differential and the trade costs, under collusion, the cost-
inefficient product is either imported from the country that has a competitive advan-
tage in it or produced domestically. Thus, by rationalizing production of the costlier
good, the cartel increases profits and at the same time generates efficiency gains. This
raises the question of how collusion affects welfare relative to competition. Monopoly
can welfare-dominate competition if transportation costs are sufficiently larger than
the cost differential. Collusion can also welfare-dominate Cournot duopoly if the cost
heterogeneity is sufficiently greater than the trade costs, as described in Proposition
2:
Proposition 2. (Welfare Comparison – Transportation Costs) Suppose the two goods are
completely unrelated and trade costs take the form of transportation costs. Then, for any
t ∈ [0, α) (resp., s ∈ [0, α)), there exists a range of values of the cost differential s (resp.,
trade cost t), such that 0 ≤ t < s < sx (resp., 0 ≤ s < t < tx), which imply collusion
welfare-dominates competition (i.e., WM (t, s) > WN (t, s)). In the former case, under
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collusion, firms specialize completely in the good they produce most efficiently and trade
it internationally. In contrast, under competition firms may produce and trade even their
inefficient good. In the latter case, under collusion, firms produce both goods domestically
and do not engage in international trade. In contrast, under competition firms may again
produce and trade their inefficient good as well.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2. The regions in pink depict the combinations
of (t, s) under which collusion welfare-dominates competition, while the green sets
describe the combinations for which the opposite result holds true. The regions
in blue identify the (t, s) pairs for which welfare levels coincide. When goods are
unrelated and trade costs take the form of transportation costs, the behavior of welfare
is symmetric relative to the 45◦-line (where t = s) because there is no essential
distinction between the two sources of heterogeneity within a firm. The intuition
behind Proposition 2 can be summarized as follows. First, in region A of Figure
2, the differential in marginal costs s is so high as compared to the transportation
cost t that colluding firms find it appealing to replace domestic production of the
good they produce inefficiently with trade. The efficiency gains from shutting down
production more than offset the loss in consumer surplus due to higher prices. This
result is valid both when the firms trade both goods under competition (t < ty)
and when they trade only the cost-efficient good (ty ≤ t < tx), as long as the cost
asymmetry is substantially large. In this case, for any transportation cost, t ∈ [0, α),
there exists a sufficiently high value of the cost differential such that collusion welfare-
dominates competition.34 Second, for intermediate values of transportation costs and
the cost differential, as in region B of Figure 2, the monopolist’s efficiency advantage
is not strong enough to compensate for the greater consumer burden and competition
provides a greater level of welfare.
34 The exact threshold values of t and s, which allow maximal collusion to welfare-dominate
Cournot competition are derived in Appendix A in the proof of Proposition 2.
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Third, collusion can be welfare-superior to competition for any value of the cost
differential, s ∈ (0, α), as long as transportation costs are sufficiently high, as shown
in region A′ of Figure 2. In this case, the cost heterogeneity is negligible relative to
transportation costs and competition, albeit providing welfare gains in the form of
lower prices, is less cost-efficient than unconstrained collusion. The cartel eliminates
the waste of resources in the form of additional transportation costs and produces
both goods domestically in each market. As trade costs rise, exporting both products
becomes even costlier under competition and profits and consumer surplus decline.
Under collusion, however, profits and consumer surplus are independent of trans-
portation costs (provided s < t). For such high levels of trade costs relative to the
cost heterogeneity, the positive change in profits dominates the negative change in
consumer surplus as the market structure switches from competition to collusion, and
the cartel improves national welfare.35 When either transportation costs or the cost
asymmetry are prohibitively high (i.e., t ∈ [tx, α) or s ∈ [sx, α)), each firm is a mo-
nopolist in its own market and the levels of welfare are identical under both collusion
and competition.
Import Tariffs.So far, the welfare analysis rests on the assumption that trade costs
take the form of transportation costs. In the case of import tariffs, some of the welfare
results are still valid with crucial caveats. When trade costs take the form of tariffs,
collusion welfare-dominates competition if the cost heterogeneity is sufficiently greater
than the heterogeneity in trade policy. In this case, the cartel specializes completely
in the production of the low-cost good in each market and imports the high-cost one,
generating efficiency gains and enjoying larger profits. Moreover, if the initial tariff
level is not infinitesimal, collusion creates larger tariff revenues than competition.
Thus, under maximal collusion, the reduction in consumer surplus due to monopoly
35 This result holds true when both goods are traded under competition (t < ty) and when the
duopolists only export the cost-efficient good (ty ≤ t < tx), as long as transportation costs are
sufficiently high.
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prices is more than offset by the rise in profits and tariff revenues. Under competition,
on the other hand, the firms do not internalize the pecuniary externality that they
inflict upon each other and engage in intra-industry trade of either both goods or at
least of the cost-efficient one. Therefore, in this scenario, maximal collusion welfare-
dominates Cournot competition. In contrast, if tariffs exceed the cost asymmetry,
the cartel shuts down trade and produces both goods domestically and no longer
accumulates tariff revenues. Under competition, the firms continue cross-hauling at
least their respective low-cost good and earn tariff revenues. Thus, the lack of tariff
revenues and the loss in consumer surplus under the collusive regime outweigh the
gain in profits and collusion fails to enhance welfare relative to competition. Appendix
A provides a more detailed characterization of the welfare implications of collusion in
the presence of import tariffs.
1.3.2 The Case of Imperfect Substitutes
The analysis so far abstracts from the possibility that the goods can be imperfect
substitutes. However, imperfect substitutability has important implications for col-
lusive behavior and welfare. It is well-known from previous literature (Bond and
Syropoulos, 2008) that welfare under collusion does not dominate welfare under com-
petition for values of trade costs below the prohibitive level, if the marginal costs
of producing the two goods are identical and the goods are imperfect substitutes
(WM(t, s = 0, γ < 1) ≯ WN(t, s = 0, γ < 1)). Bond and Syropoulos (2008) find that,
depending on the degree of product substitutability, welfare under maximal collusion
in the case of free trade can be lower than at the prohibitive level of trade costs.
Deltas et al. (2012) show that collusion can improve not only national welfare, but
also consumer surplus in a model with horizontal differentiation a` la Hotelling.36 In
36 In standard segmented-markets duopoly models with perfect substitutes welfare under
monopoly can exceed welfare under competition if trade costs only take the form of trans-
portation costs, but not of import tariffs. In this model, the possibility of welfare-enhancing
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this framework, imperfect substitutability affects the cartel’s production decisions as
the colluding firms internalize the pecuniary externality that they inflict upon each
other.
Even when the assumption of unrelated goods is relaxed (i.e., γ > 0), welfare under
monopoly can still exceed welfare under competition for certain values of trade costs
and the cost differential. When trade costs take the form of transportation costs there
always exists a set of (t, s) that ensures monopoly welfare-dominates competition. In
this case, region A from Figure 2 disappears as the degree of substitutability rises, but
region A′ persists, as shown in Figures 3 − 4. Maximal collusion welfare-dominates
competition for any value of γ ∈ (0, 1) and any s ∈ (0, α), as long as transportation
costs are sufficiently higher than the cost differential. Under collusion no trade takes
place and both goods are produced only domestically. On the other hand, under
competition the duopolists trade either both goods (t < ty) or only the cost-efficient
good (ty ≤ t < tx) as they do not internalize the pecuniary externality they inflict
upon each other. Moreover, the higher the degree of product substitutability, the
stronger this negative price externality that producing more of one good exerts onto
the marginal revenue of the other and the lower the profits under competition. Thus,
the cartel generates efficiency gains, eliminates unnecessary transportation costs, and
enjoys higher profits, which more than compensate for the lower consumer surplus
(due to monopoly prices) at any degree of substitutability. Figures 3 − 4 provide a
graphical illustration of this interesting result for γ = 0.4 and γ = 0.9.
Import Tariffs. In contrast, when trade costs take the form of tariffs, there exists a
threshold value of the degree of substitutability, ̂̂γ ∈ (0, 1), beyond which competition
weakly welfare-dominates collusion for all values of the cost heterogeneity and all
tariff levels. As the goods become closer substitutes, producing more of any one good
collusion exists regardless of the type of trade costs considered, as shown in the text and in
Appendix A.
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inflicts a stronger negative externality onto the the marginal revenue of the other.
Therefore, profits, consumer surplus and tariff revenues fall, with the decline in cartel
profits and tariff revenues being much more pronounced. The exact threshold value
of ̂̂γ as well as a detailed analysis of welfare in the presence of imperfect substitutes
and import tariffs is provided in Appendix A.
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2 Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs
In the second part of the theoretical analysis, I describe the model of two single-
product firms, which interact repeatedly in three countries separated by per-unit trade
costs. I derive the global profit of the representative firm in the case of Cournot-Nash
competition, maximal collusion, and optimal deviation. Then, I solve the cartel’s con-
strained optimization problem and propose an endogenous index of cartel discipline.
Thus, I are able to examine the strategic linkages that arise between these seemingly
segmented markets and to characterize the spillover effects of economic shocks for
optimal shipments and national welfare.
2.1 The Model
Consider a world of three countries, indexed by j ∈ J ≡ 1, 2, ROW . Suppose that
each of two firms, labeled 1 and 2, produces a homogeneous good. Firm i is located in
country i ∈ I ≡ 1, 2. The rest-of-the-world (ROW ) market is only an importer of the
good. When firm i exports its product to country j it incurs a per-unit trade cost,
denoted by tij. I assume there are no costs of delivering the good to the domestic
market, i.e., tii = 0. Also, let the marginal cost of producing the good be constant
and, for simplicity, normalize it to zero.
Let qij denote the quantity supplied by firm i ∈ I to country j ∈ J and let
Qj ≡
∑
i∈I qij. Each consumer in market j ∈ J has the same quasi-linear utility
function: Uj = u(Qj) + q0, where q0 denotes consumption of the numeraire good
and u(Qj) = AQj − 12βjQ2j in country j ∈ J . A > 0 denotes consumer’s maximum
willingness to pay and βj reflects the slope of the inverse demand. Importantly, the
inverse of βj can be thought of as a measure of the number of identical consumers
in j having identical preferences and can be interpreted as the inverse of the size of
country j. Then, optimization in consumption yields the following inverse demand
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functions: pj(Qj) = max(0, A− βjQj).
Let Πi denote the global profit function of firm i ∈ I:
Πi =
∑
j∈J
pij(qij, Qj, tij) =
∑
j∈J
[pj(Qj)− tij]qij (10)
Denote the quantity of the product supplied by firm i’s ∈ I rival (−i) in country
j ∈ J as q−ij . Then, the best-response function of firm i in market j is given by:
q˜ij ≡ q˜ij(q−ij, tij) = max
(
A− tij − βjq−ij
2βj
, 0
)
(11)
Under the assumption of segmented national markets and constant marginal costs, q˜ij
depends only on the quantities supplied by the firms to market j. Solving both firms’
first-order conditions simultaneously, I derive the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output
levels and use superscript ‘N ’ to denote them.
qNij =

0 if A− 2tij + t−ij ≤ 0
A−2tij+t−ij
3βj
if A− 2tij + t−ij > 0 & A+ tij − 2t−ij > 0
A−tij
2βj
if A+ tij − 2t−ij < 0
(12)
To simplify the analysis, I assume that t12 = t21 = t (≥ 0) and t1ROW = t2ROW = τ
(≥ 0). Further, I let trade costs between the host countries of the cartel (1 and
2), t, take the form of either import tariffs or transportation costs, while the trade
costs between a cartel-country and ROW, τ , take the form of transportation costs
only. In the analysis that follows, I refer to t, the trade costs between the cartel
countries, as ‘internal’ trade costs and to τ , the trade costs between a cartel-country
and ROW, as ‘external’ trade costs. In addition, I assume that β1 = β2 = 1 and
βROW = β. Essentially, this implies that countries 1 and 2 are of equal size and that
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the inverse of β can be thought of as the relative size of the rest of the world.37 These
symmetric conditions on the demand functions and trade costs not only make the
analysis more tractable, but also allow us to solve the cartel constrained optimization
problem without resorting to side payments.
In the interest of notational simplicity, I define (xi, yi, zi) ≡ (qii, qij, qiROW ) for
i 6= j = 1, 2 as the output triple firm i supplies. Moreover, given the symmetry
of the model, the firm subscripts can be omitted to avoid cluttering the notation.
Thus, (xi, yi, zi) = (x, y, z) for every i = 1, 2. Let q
N ≡ (xN , yN , zN) denote the
equilibrium quantities under Cournot-Nash competition with xN = min
(
A+t
3
, A
2
)
,
yN = max
(
A−2t
3
, 0
)
and zN(τ, β) = max
(
A−τ
3β
, 0
)
. It follows that the prohibitive
level of internal trade costs and external trade costs are, respectively, t ≡ A/2 and
τ ≡ A. Several observations regarding the Cournot-Nash deliveries stand out. First,
internal (external) trade liberalization (↓ t (↓ τ)) leads to an expansion of internal
(external) trade (yN ↑ (zN ↑)). Second, internal trade liberalization (↓ t) also causes
a reduction in domestic production (xN ↓) and an expansion of the total domestic
output (QN ↑). Third, importantly, in this setting, reductions in t do not affect
output deliveries to ROW, while reductions in τ leave deliveries to the host countries
of the cartel unchanged. The equilibrium profit under Cournot-Nash competition for
the representative firm is given by:
ΠN =

1
9
(A+ t)2 + 1
9
(A− 2t)2 + 1
9β
(A− τ)2 if t ≤ t & τ ≤ τ
1
4
A2 + 1
9β
(A− τ)2 if t > t & τ ≤ τ
1
4
A2 if t > t & τ > τ
(13)
ΠN (t, τ, β) is strictly convex in t and non-monotonic in t for t ≤ t. Reductions in
internal trade costs raise the firm’s export profits in the other firm’s market, but lower
37 Similarly, β can be identified as a measure of the size of the cartel-countries 1 and 2 relative to
ROW.
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its profits in the domestic market. ΠN is minimized at t = A/5. In addition, profits of
each firm in the case of free trade under this symmetric, homogeneous-good duopoly
are lower than under geographic separation of markets and monopoly, ΠN (0, τ, β) <
ΠN
(
t, τ, β
)
.38 Further, external trade liberalization (↓ τ) or an expansion of ROW’s
market size (↓ β) leads to a higher global profit for the representative firm under
Cournot-Nash competition. That is, ΠNτ < 0 and Π
N
β < 0 for τ < τ with Π
N
ττ > 0
and ΠNββ > 0 for τ < τ .
The representative cartel member’s global profit under collusion, ΠC (using super-
script ‘C’ for ‘collusion’), is given by the sum of the profits gained in the cartel-member
countries and the profits gained in ROW:
ΠC = (A− x− y) (x+ y)− ty + (A− τ − 2βz) z for x, y, z ≥ 0. (14)
ΠC is concave in (x, y, z) (or, depending on trade costs, in (x, z) or x). In the ab-
sence of any concerns regarding possible deviation, the cartel members can sustain
maximal collusion or monopoly (which I denote by a superscript ‘M’). Then, if t = 0,
any combination of x and y that satisfies x + y = A
2
maximizes the profits of the
cartel. On the other hand, if t > 0, the cartel shuts down trade and produces the
good domestically in each country, xM = A
2
and yM = 0, and thus attains complete
geographic separation of the two markets. Lastly, if τ < τ , the optimal collusive
shipments to ROW are equal to zM = A−τ
4β
. Thus, the optimal global profit under
maximal collusion, ΠM , can be written as
ΠM =
1
4
A2 +
1
4β
(A− τ)2 (15)
for τ ≤ τ . ΠM is convex and decreasing in τ .
38 Intuitively, this is so because a monopolist internalizes the negative price externality present
under Cournot-Nash competition.
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However, what if firm i’s partner supplies the output triple (x, y, z), but firm
i decides to deviate? Then, from (11) it follows that firm i’s reaction functions
will be given by (using superscript ‘D’ for optimal ‘deviation’): xD = A−y
2
, yD =
max
(
A−t−x
2
, 0
)
, and zD = max
(
A−τ−βz
2β
, 0
)
. Thus, firm i’s global profit function
under optimal deviation, ΠD, is equal to
ΠD = (xD)
2
+ (yD)
2
+ β(zD)
2
. (16)
Some important properties of the best-response output levels and global profit under
optimal deviation deserve special attention. First, for a given output vector (x, y, z),
decreases in internal trade costs, t, or in external trade costs, τ , lead to an expansion
of the best-response shipments to the relevant market, which causes an increase in
profit in the given country. Second, ΠD is decreasing and strictly convex in the output
triple (x, y, z) (or, depending on the levels of trade costs, in (x, z) or just x) of the
firm that abides by the cartel agreement. Third, ΠD is decreasing and strictly convex
in t, τ and β as long as trade costs are below their prohibitive levels. Using these
optimal profit levels in the static game, I next proceed to study the stability of implicit
collusion, sustained through a grim-trigger strategy as firms interact repeatedly over
the infinite horizon.
2.2 Multi-Market Collusion
In the model, implicit collusion arises as a result of repeated firm interactions over
the infinite time horizon and in multiple markets. Firms sustain the cartel scheme
through a grim-trigger strategy, stipulating that any deviation from the collusive path
will be punished with a never-ending retaliation. Essentially, each firm is deterred
from breaking the cartel agreement by the fear of provoking Cournot competition.
Furthermore, when firms meet in multiple isolated markets, if any firm deviates in
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one market, it will deviate in all markets and this deviation will be met by punish-
ment in all markets as well (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). Multi-market contact
enables firms to pool their incentive constraints across markets and in this way to
transfer slack enforcement power from one market onto the next. Thus, multi-market
contact can improve collusive stability by relaxing a binding incentive-compatibility
constraint.
In this part of the analysis, I seek to identify and characterize the most profitable,
incentive-compatible cartel agreements. To do that, I first describe the incentive-
compatibility constraint of the representative cartel member. Second, I characterize
the dependence of maximal collusion on internal trade costs (t), external trade costs
(τ), and relative market size (β). Third, I solve the cartel’s constrained optimization
problem and propose an endogenous index of cartel discipline. Fourth, I study the
direct and indirect (channeled through cartel discipline) effects of trade liberalization
or changes in relative market size on the constrained optimal output allocations and
national welfare.
2.2.1 Cartel Problem
Recall that ΠC , ΠM , ΠD, ΠN denote the global profit of the home firm under the
cartel agreement, maximal collusion, optimal deviation, and Nash competition, re-
spectively. I use δ > 0 to capture the firms’ actual and common discount factor.
Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), I assume multi-market collusion entails
allocating to each firm an output triple q = (x, y, z). Collusion is sustainable as long
as the profit received by the representative cartel member under the agreement out-
weighs the one-period gain from deviation plus the discounted profit loss from the
ensuing punishment. Thus, the incentive-compatibility constraint, which ensures a
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sustainable cartel agreement, is given by:
Φ(q, t, τ, β, δ) ≡ ΠC(q, t, τ, β)− (1− δ)ΠD(q, t, τ, β)− δΠN(t, τ, β) ≥ 0 (ICC)
The above function is strictly concave in q because ΠC is concave in q and ΠD is
strictly convex in q. Then, the set of incentive-compatible cartel agreements can be
defined as
F (q, t, τ, β, δ) ≡ {q | Φ(·) ≥ 0 and q ≥ 0} .
which is convex in q due to the convexity of Φ (·) in q. The optimization problem of
the representative cartel member can then be written as:
max
q
ΠC(q, t, τ, β), subject to q ∈ F (q, t, τ, β, δ). (P )
Abstracting from the non-negativity of the output constraints, the solution to (P ) is
captured by the saddle point problem of the Lagrangian function
L (q, λ, t, τ, β, δ) = ΠC(q, t, τ, β) + λΦ(q, t, τ, β, δ) + µy (17)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint (ICC)
and µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity of internal trade constraint,
y ≥ 0. The necessary first-order conditions (FOCs) for an interior solution to (P ) are
Φ (q∗) ≥ 0, λ∗ ≥ 0, λ∗Φ (q∗) = 0,
y∗ ≥ 0, µ∗ ≥ 0, µ∗y∗ = 0, (18)
∇L (q∗, λ∗, µ∗) = ∇ΠC (q∗) + λ∗∇Φ (q∗) + µ∗ = 0.
Define θ ≡ λ(1−δ)
1+λ
∈ [0, 1), which captures the tightness of the ICC and is increasing
in λ. This variable represents a measure of the degree of competitiveness or an
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inverse measure of cartel discipline. To illustrate, consider the extremes: if θ = 0,
the ICC is inactive and firms can sustain maximal collusion, q∗ = qM ; if θ → 1,
then the constraint-efficient cartel agreement actually converges to the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, q∗ → qN . An important contribution of the work is that I allow the
inverse index of cartel discipline, θ, to be endogenously determined as a function of
all trade costs and market size. And it is through this index of cartel discipline that
all markets in the model become strategically linked, despite their segmentation in a
static setting.
2.2.2 Stability of Maximal Collusion
Next, I examine the stability of the monopoly outcome and its dependence on the
variables of interest. To this end, I let the no-deviation constraint defined in (ICC)
= 0 and solve for δM , which ensures that Φ(qM , t, τ, β, δ) = 0. Then, the minimum
discount factor capable of sustaining maximal collusion, δM , is given by:
δM (t, τ, β) =
ΠD(qM (τ, β), t, β)−ΠM (τ, β)
ΠD(qM (τ, β), t, β)−ΠN (t, τ, β) (19)
To understand the intuition behind the dependence of the minimum discount factor
on the parameters, I need to first examine how they affect the relevant profit func-
tions: ΠM , ΠN , ΠD. In the previous section, I already discussed the relation between
trade costs and relative market size and ΠM and ΠN . Next, I turn the attention to
ΠD(qM(τ, β), t, β).
In the case of free internal trade, t = 0, under unconstrained collusion, the cartel
is indifferent between producing the good domestically and importing it from the
foreign country, so any combination of outputs that satisfies xM +yM = QM = A/2 is
optimal. When internal trade is costly, t > 0, however, the cartel prefers to shut down
exports and to only supply the good domestically, xM = QM = A/2 and yM = 0.
The optimal deviation payoffs, on the other hand, are minimized when both cartel
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members share equally each market due to the strict convexity of ΠD in (x, y). Thus,
when t = 0, each firm will choose to maintain its presence in its rival’s market and the
optimal output allocation is xM = yM = A
4
. Therefore, the minimum discount factor,
δM , is discontinuous in t at t = 0. This discontinuity has important implications for
the links between internal trade costs and collusive discipline.
Proposition 3 below characterizes the dependence of δM on (t, τ, β) and thus un-
veils the relation between (internal and external) trade costs and market size and
collusive stability. To emphasize the significance of trade with third-country markets,
I focus on the case of τ ≤ τ , while I describe the case of no trade with ROW, τ ≥ τ ,
in Appendix A.39
Proposition 3. (Stability of Maximal Collusion) The minimum discount factor that
sustains the monopoly outcome, δM(t, τ, β), has the following properties:
a) Internal trade costs (t)
i) δM(0, τ, β) = δM(t¯, τ, β) = δ < δ̂ ≡ limt→0 δM
ii) t S t1 =⇒ δM T δ, where t1 = A14
iii) t S t2 =⇒ dδM/dt S 0, where t2 ≡ arg mint δM
b) External trade costs (τ)
◦ t S t1 =⇒ dδM/dτ T 0.
c) Market size (β)
i) t S t1 =⇒ dδM/dβ T 0.
ii) limβ→0 δM = δ and limβ→∞ δM =
18(t¯−t)
13A+22t
I illustrate the dependence of the minimum discount factor, δM , on internal trade
costs, t, as summarized in Proposition 3 with the help of Figure 5. Several key points
described in Proposition 3 deserve additional emphasis. First, when internal trade is
39 The case of no trade with the outside country, τ ≥ τ , reduces the model to a two-country
duopoly and has already been studied in depth in Bond and Syropoulos (2008). I describe that
case in Proposition A4 of Appendix A.
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free, the minimum discount factor is discontinuous in internal trade costs. As pre-
viously explained, this discontinuity is due to the strict convexity of the deviation
payoffs in (x, y), which implies that cartel members’ incentives to deviate are min-
imized when they share equally both markets. Second, cartel stability and internal
trade costs are non-monotonically related. Since ΠM is independent of t, the impact
of internal trade costs on the minimum discount factor is driven by the dependence
of ΠD and ΠN on t. At initially low levels of t, higher internal trade costs decrease
deviation payoffs, ΠD, as this makes internal trade costlier. The reduction in the de-
viation profits causes δM to decline and thus facilitates unconstrained collusion. On
the other hand, at high levels of internal trade costs, i.e., t→ t, the non-monotonicity
of the punishment payoffs ΠN in t dominates the negative effect of t on ΠD. This
novel result stands in sharp contrast to the case of a two-country, segmented-markets
Cournot duopoly as in Bond and Syropoulos (2008), where the minimum discount
factor is always decreasing in internal trade costs. The black, solid-line curve in
Figure 5 depicts the non-monotonic relation between collusive stability and internal
trade liberalization when the cartel is free to exploit its market power in the outside
country (τ = 0).
Third, Proposition 3 stipulates that there exists a pivot point, t1, such that in-
creases in external trade costs impede collusive stability for t < t1, but enhance
collusive stability for t > t1, as explained in part b). Figure 5 illustrates the depen-
dence of δM on τ by highlighting its shape for two extreme values of τ : τ = 0 and
τ = τ . The impact of market size β on δM is qualitatively similar to the impact
of τ , as described in part c).40 Lastly, Proposition 3 stipulates that the incentive-
compatibility constraint is inactive for δ > δ when t = 0 and for δ ≥ δM when t > 0.
40 Importantly, an expansion of the number of non-cartel countries exploited by the cartel could
be modeled in this setting as a decrease in β. Proposition 3 illustrates the dependence of the
effect of β on δM on the initial level of internal trade costs, t, and thus implies that it is in fact
erroneous to assume that the greater the number of markets served by the cartel, the greater
the stability of the collusive agreement.
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The ICC is inactive also when δ ∈ [δ, δ) and t takes on intermediate values due to the
non-monotonic relation between δM and t. In these cases, maximal collusion is sus-
tainable without any concerns regarding potential deviation by the cartel partners.
On the other hand, the no-deviation constraint is active (θ > 0) when δ < δ and
t = 0 and when δ < δM and t ∈ (0, t). In the next section, I characterize the efficient
collusive agreement in the presence of a binding incentive-compatibility constraint.
2.2.3 Cartel Discipline
Next, I explore the optimal solution to (P ) when the no-deviation constraint (ICC)
binds. I solve the cartel optimization problem in two steps. First, I consider the case
when internal trade costs are sufficiently low so that intra-industry trade is present
between the host countries of the cartel, y > 0. Second, I explicitly consider the pos-
sibility of no internal trade between the cartel-member countries due to prohibitively
high internal trade costs, y = 0. I denote the solutions to (P ) in these two cases with
superscripts “1” and “2”, respectively. Then, to derive the endogenous index of cartel
discipline, I substitute the optimal output levels (as functions of cartel discipline, θ)
into the (ICC) and solve for θ∗ implicitly. Thus, I are able to characterize the de-
pendence of collusive discipline on internal trade costs, external trade costs, relative
market size, and time preferences.
Denote with Φ1 = Φ1 (θ, δ, t, τ, β) = 0 and Φ2 = Φ2 (θ, δ, t, τ, β) ≥ 0 the cartel’s
incentive-compatibility constraints when y > 0 and when y = 0, respectively. More-
over, as previously established, unconstrained collusion is sustainable for any δ ≥ δ̂.
Therefore, in the analysis to follow, I focus on discount factor values such that δ < δ̂.
When y ≥ 0, I can rewrite the FOCs in (18) as
L1j = ΠCj + λΦ1j = 0 ⇒ ΠCj = θΠDj < 0, j ∈ {x, y, z} , (20)
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where subscript j now denotes a partial derivative (e.g., L1x = ∂L1/∂x). The equality
in the far right-hand side of (20) is obtained by utilizing the definition of θ
(
≡ λ(1−δ)
1+λ
)
and the fact that Φ1j = Π
C
j − (1− δ) ΠDj = (1− δ − θ) (−ΠDj ) > 0, which follows from
the properties of the deviation payoffs, ΠD. It is straightforward to verify that the
solution to the system of equations in (20) is
Q1 (θ, t) =
(2A− t) (2 + θ)
8 + θ
(21a)
x1 (θ, t) =
1
2
(
Q1 +
2− θ
θ
t
)
(21b)
y1 (θ, t) =
1
2
(
Q1 − 2− θ
θ
t
)
(21c)
z1 (θ, τ, β) =
(A− τ) (2 + θ)
β (8 + θ)
, (21d)
From these optimal output allocations, it follows that Q1, y1 and z1 are increasing
and concave in θ, while x1 is strictly quasi-convex in θ with x1θ T 0 for t S td, where
td ≡ 3Aθ22(16+4θ+θ2) < to (θ). This last observation implies that domestic production of the
non-numeraire good declines when cartel discipline rises for a sufficiently low t, while
it increases when cartel discipline rises for a sufficiently high t. The more disciplined
the cartel, on the other hand, the lower the total domestic supply, Q1. Improvements
in cartel discipline also bring about a reduction in shipments to the partner’s market
(y1 ↓) and to the outside country (z1 ↓). Further, equations (21a)-(21c) indicate that
Q1 and y1 are linear and decreasing in internal trade costs, t, while x1 is linear and
increasing in internal trade costs, t. From (21d), I can verify that exports to ROW
are linear and decreasing in external trade costs, τ .
A closer examination of (21c) reveals that there exists a positively-sloped schedule
to (θ) ≡ Aθ(2+θ)2(4−θ) , such that y1(θ, to (θ)) = 0 for θ ∈ [0, 1], which has the following
properties: to (0) = 0 and to (1) = t¯; t
′
o (θ) > 0 and t
′′
o (θ) > 0. For convenience, from
now on, I employ the inverse function θo (t) ≡ t−1o (θ) for t ∈ [0, t¯], which is increasing
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and concave in t and is depicted in Figure 6. This function θo (t) separates the space
of (t, θ) pairs, given by [0, t¯] × [0, 1], so that y1 T 0 if θ T θo (t). Importantly, the
optimal output allocations in (21a)-(21d) are only valid for θ ≥ θo (t) (or, equivalently,
for t ≤ to (0)).
Next, I proceed to derive implicitly the endogenous index of cartel discipline. To
that end, I substitute the optimal solutions from (21a)-(21d) in Φ1 = 0 and solve
for θ1∗ ≡ θ1∗ (δ, t, τ, β). It is straightforward to verify that θ1∗ = 1 for t ∈ [0, t¯] is
a generic solution, in which case constrained collusion converges with Cournot-Nash
competition, q1 = qN . More interestingly, however, there exists another solution of
θ1∗ ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 5. (Cartel Discipline 1) Suppose δ < δ̂ ≡ limt→0 δM and β < ∞. Then
Φ1 (θ, ·) = 0 has a unique interior solution θ1∗ ≡ θ1∗ (t, ·) with the following properties:
If t = 0, then θ1∗ = max(θg, 0), where θg ≡ 17(δ−δ)9+δ . If t ∈ (0, t¯), then θ1∗ ∈ (0, 1− δ)
and
a) dθ1∗/dδ ≤ 0 (with equality if δ ≥ δM), limδ→0 θ1∗ = 1 and limδ→δM θ1∗ = 0
b) dθ1∗/dt > 0
c) sign (dθ1∗/dτ) = sign (dθ1∗/dβ) ≥ 0, with equality if t = 0.
Figure 6 illustrates the intuition behind Lemma 5 by portraying several families
of θ∗ at three different values of the discount factor: high, intermediate and low. The
different curves within each family of θ∗ reflect a different value of the external trade
costs, τ . These curves depict the relation between internal trade costs and cartel
discipline. Interestingly, when the value of δ rises, the curves become steeper, which
suggests that cartel discipline becomes more responsive to internal trade liberaliza-
tion. In addition, as the weight on the value of future profits increases, the curves
spread apart from each other, indicating a stronger impact of external trade costs on
cartel discipline.
Part a) of Lemma 5 is depicted in Figure 6 by a downward shift of a family of
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curves due to an increase in δ. This relation is driven by the fact that ΠD−ΠN > 0, so
a higher value of δ creates a slack in the ICC and, thus, enhances collusive discipline.
Part b) of Lemma 5 stipulates that internal trade liberalization (t ↓) enhances
cartel discipline (θ1∗ ↓). The direct relation between t and θ is illustrated in Figure
6 by the upward-sloping curves. From the implicit function theorem, it follows that
dθ1∗/dt = −Φ1t/Φ1θ. Given that Φ1θ > 0, integration between the host countries of the
cartel (t ↓) improves collusive discipline (θ1∗ ↓) only if Φ1t < 0. A decrease in internal
trade costs leads to an increase in cartel profits (ΠC) as well as in deviation payoffs
(ΠD) because the cost of intra-industry trade falls. The rise in (ΠC) relaxes the ICC,
while the rise in (ΠD) tightens the ICC. In addition, recall that ΠN is non-monotonic
in t and the effect of a reduction in t on Φ1 is to tighten (relax) the ICC at low
(high) internal trade costs. Moreover, internal trade liberalization also affects the
no-deviation constraint through (x1, y1). The presence of cross hauling (y1 > 0) and
the fact that reductions in t increase intra-industry trade bring about a slack in the
ICC (Φ1t < 0). This is the intuition behind the direct link between internal trade
costs, t, and the inverse index of cartel discipline, θ.
Lastly, part c) of Lemma 5 states that external trade liberalization (τ ↓) strength-
ens cartel discipline (θ1∗ ↓) because Φ1τ < 0. Reductions in τ loosen the ICC and lead
to improvements of collusive discipline. This relation is illustrated in Figure 6 by the
downward shift of the curves within a family. An increase in ROW’s relative market
size (β ↓) has a similar effect on cartel discipline, driven by the fact that Φ1β < 0.
Next, I examine the incentive-compatibility constraint Φ2 ≥ 0 in the absence of
intra-industry trade between the host countries of the cartel. Focusing on (t, θ) ∈
[0, t¯]× [0, 1], the relevant FOCs associated with y = 0 are:
L2j = ΠCj + λΦ2j = 0 ⇒ ΠCj = θΠDj < 0, j ∈ {x, z}. (22)
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These first-order conditions generate the following solution:
Q2 (θ, t) = x2 (θ, t) =
A (2 + θ)− θt
4 + θ
(23a)
z2 (θ, τ, β) =
(A− τ) (2 + θ)
β (8 + θ)
. (23b)
The solution to the cartel’s constrained optimization problem indicates that in this
case x2 (z2) is decreasing in t (τ). Moreover, now, improvements in cartel discipline
(θ ↓) result in lower domestic supply (x2 = Q2 ↓) as long as t < t. Similarly to the
previous case (in the presence of cross-hauling between the cartel-member countries),
shipments to the outside country (z2) are increasing in cartel discipline (θ).
To complete the characterization of cartel discipline, I again substitute the optimal
output allocations given in equations (23a)-(23b) in Φ2(θ, t, ·). Then, I restrict the
attention to the relevant pairs of (θ, t) in [ty, t¯] × [0, 1] such that Φ2 = 0. Lemma 6
below summarizes the dependence of cartel discipline on (internal and external) trade
costs and relative market size in the absence of intra-industry trade between the host
countries of the cartel.
Lemma 6. (Cartel Discipline 2) For δ < δ̂ ≡ limt→0 δM , β <∞, and t ∈ [ty, t¯], cartel
discipline is captured by θ2∗ ≡ max(θs, 0), where θs ≡ θs (t, ·) solves Φ2(θ, t, ·) = 0.
Cartel discipline θ2∗ does not rise with increases in δ (i.e., dθ2∗/dδ ≤ 0). Moreover,
θ2∗ depends on trade costs and market size as follows:
a) Internal Trade Costs (t)
i) If δ ≤ δ, then θ2∗ = θs and dθ2∗/dt S 0 for t S tmin ≡ arg mint θs (t, ·).
ii) If δ ∈ (δ, δ], there is a subset [tm, tm] ⊂ (ty, t¯) such that
◦ θ2∗ = θs and dθ2∗/dt < 0 for t ∈ (ty, tm)
◦ θ2∗ = 0 for t ∈ [tm, tm]
◦ θ2∗ = θs and dθ2∗/dt > 0 for t ∈ (tm, t¯].
iii) If δ ∈ (δ, δ̂], there is a t′m ∈ (ty, t¯) such that
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◦ θ2∗ = θs and dθ2∗/dt < 0 for t ∈ (ty, t′m)
◦ θ2∗ = 0 for t ∈ [t′m, t¯].
b) External Trade Costs (τ ) and Market size (β)
i) dθ2∗/dγ > 0 for t < min(tg, t′m) and dθ
2∗/dγ ≤ 0 for all other t, with
γ ∈ {τ, β}.
ii) Increases in τ or β expand the range of internal trade costs that imply
θ2∗ = 0.
Figure 7 illustrates some of the key points of Lemma 6 with several contours
associated with Φ2 = 0 under the assumption of equally sized countries (β = 1).
Panel (a) depicts the effect of the weight on the value of future profits when trade
with the outside country is free (τ = 0), while panel (b) demonstrates the link between
cartel discipline and external trade costs when δ < δ (≡ inft δM (t, ·)). In both panels
of Figure 7 only the thick, solid-lines of the curves are relevant.41
Naturally, when t = ty, θ
2∗ = θ∗1. Moreover, even though now I focus on the case
of no intra-industry trade between the cartel members, t ≥ ty, internal trade costs
still affect cartel discipline through the punishment profits and the deviation profits.
However, in contrast to the previous case, the relation between cartel discipline and
internal trade costs is no longer monotonic. More specifically, when internal trade
costs are initially close to ty, increases in internal trade costs (t ↑) strengthen cartel
discipline (θ2∗ ↓). On the other hand, when internal trade costs are higher, the effect
of t on θ2∗ depends on external trade costs τ , relative market size β, and the common
discount factor δ.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 illustrates the relation between θ2∗ and t when τ = 0, for
three different levels of the discount factor: (i) (0, δ), (ii) [δ, δ), and (iii) [δ, δ̂). In
case (i), the inverse index of cartel discipline θ2∗ is U-shaped in t. The same non-
41 Points on the Φ2 = 0 contour that are above θo (t) have to be ruled out because they violate
the y = 0 constraint. Points below the horizontal axis must also be ignored because they are
associated with t values that sustain the fully collusive outcome (so θ2∗ = 0 in this case).
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monotonic relation between θ2∗ and t persists in case (ii), but it differs from case (i) as
θ2∗ = 0 for an intermediate range of t values when maximal collusion is sustainable.
In case (iii), raising internal trade costs t beyond ty do not diminish cartel discipline.
Overall, the higher the weight placed on the value of future profits, the smaller the
range of internal trade costs under which cartel discipline varies with internal trade
costs. Furthermore, on average, an increase in δ enhances collusive discipline.
Next, I examine the dependence of cartel discipline on external trade costs as
illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 7 under the assumptions that β = 1 and δ < δ.42
The three contours in panel (b) of Figure 7 depict the link between θ2∗ and t in the
case of free external trade (τ = 0), costly external trade (0 < τ < τ¯), and no external
trade (τ = τ¯). I find that ∂θ2∗/∂t < 0 at t = ty and at point G, which is a pivot with
θ2∗ rotating clockwise around it when external trade costs τ rise.43 Further, increases
in external trade costs (and, similarly, in the relative market size, β) limit the range of
internal trade costs for which cartel discipline varies with t. Contrary to increases in
the discount factor values, increases in external trade costs or in the relative market
size actually diminish collusive discipline for t < tg but not for t ∈ [tg, t¯].
Next, in Proposition 4 below, I summarize the discussion of the dependence of car-
tel discipline on internal trade costs, external trade costs, and market size, presented
in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6:
Proposition 4. (Equilibrium Cartel Discipline) For δ < δ̂, β < ∞, and t ∈ [0, t¯],
42 In Lemma A4 in the Appendix A I prove that, for δ < δ, the Φ2 = 0 contours go through four
stationary points (captured by D, E, F , and G) that are independent of the levels of external
trade costs τ and market size β.
43 θ = θg at points A, G and D. In the absence of internal trade (i.e., t ≥ t¯ and τ < τ), θ∗ = θg.
When both internal and external trade are absent, all points in [t¯,∞)× [0, 1] are acceptable as
they imply Φ2 ≥ 0.
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equilibrium cartel discipline is defined as
θ∗ ≡
 θ
1∗ (t, ·) if t ∈ [0, ty)
θ2∗ (t, ·) if t ∈ [ty, t¯]
.
a) Cartel discipline is increasing in firms’ valuation of future profits (i.e., ∂θ∗/∂δ <
0) when maximal collusion is initially unsustainable; it is
i) weakest at t = ty
ii) strongest at
◦ tmin ∈ (ty, t¯) for δ < δ
◦ t ∈ [tm, tm] for δ ∈ (δ, δ]
◦ t = 0 and t ≥ t′m for δ ∈ (δ, δ̂].
b) Intra-regional trade cost reductions (t ↓) boost cartel discipline when cross
hauling is present. If cross hauling is absent, such trade cost reductions weaken cartel
discipline at initially low t levels and strengthen it at sufficiently high t levels.
c) Expansion of extra-regional trade opportunities (τ ↓ or β ↓) weakens cartel dis-
cipline for t < min(tg, t
′
m) and strengthens (or does not affect) it for t > min(tg, t
′
m).
Figure 8 illustrates the main ideas described in Proposition 4. The thick, solid-
line curve depicts the relation between the equilibrium cartel discipline and internal
trade costs under the assumption of free external trade (τ = 0) and δ < δ. The curve
reaches a maximum at t = ty, which is the level of internal trade costs at which cartel
discipline is the weakest, as summarized in part a.i). Moreover, the global minimum
of the curve is attained at tmin, as described in part a.ii). Figure 8 also clearly
captures the ideas summarized in part b) of Proposition 4. When internal trade costs
are sufficiently low as to allow for intra-industry trade, trade liberalization between
the host countries of the cartel actually improves collusive discipline. However, once
t exceeds the prohibitive level, ty, and cross-hauling is shut down, internal integration
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impedes cartel discipline as long as t < tmin. In this case, reductions in internal trade
costs increase the deviation payoff more than they diminish the punishment payoff.
Once t > tmin and approaches t¯, the magnitude of these opposing effects gets reversed
and now internal trade liberalization again strengthens cartel discipline. Importantly,
this qualitative relation between cartel discipline and internal trade costs does not
depend on the values of parameters δ, τ , and β.44 Part c) of Proposition 4 summarizes
the impact of external trade costs and relative market size on the equilibrium cartel
discipline. External trade liberalization (or an expansion of the outside country’s
market) enhances collusive discipline when internal trade costs are sufficiently low
(t < tg and δ < δ).
Proposition 4 highlights a key contribution of the work: the strategic linkages that
arise between seemingly unrelated markets when incentive-compatibility constraints
on collusion are explicitly taken into consideration. In the analysis, trade costs and
market size affect all equilibrium outcomes both directly and indirectly through the
endogenous index of cartel discipline. Next, I briefly summarize the overall, net effect
of changes in trade costs, relative market size, and time preferences on the optimal
output allocations. Proposition A5 in Appendix A provides more details.
The impact of internal trade liberalization on the total domestic output, x∗+y∗ =
Q∗ depends on the magnitude of the discount factor, δ, and the relative market size,
β. For instance, when there is intra-industry trade between the host countries of the
cartel, i.e., t ∈ [0, ty), and cartel members value future profits highly, i.e., δ ∈ [δ, δˆ),
then reductions in internal trade costs (t ↓) actually decrease total domestic output
(x∗+ y∗ = Q∗ ↓). This result is driven by the fact that the negative, indirect effect of
internal trade liberalization on domestic output, channeled through cartel discipline,
outweighs the favorable, direct effect of changes in t on Q∗. On the other hand, this
44 However, as explained earlier, the values of these parameters affect the nature of θ∗ when there
is no intra-industry trade (i.e., t ∈ (ty, t¯)).
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ordering can be reversed if the value that firms attach to their future profits is rather
low. Moreover, the larger the size of the outside market, when the discount factor is
at some intermediate level, the more likely it is that internal integration will enhance
total domestic output. The discount factor, the relative size of ROW and external
trade costs also affect total home output through cartel discipline and these effects
can be understood with the help of Proposition 4.
In addition, internal trade liberalization exerts both a direct effect and an indirect
effect on internal trade, y∗. It turns out that the direct, positive effect of reductions in
internal trade costs dominates the indirect, negative effect through cartel discipline.
Thus, internal integration in fact improves trade between the cartel-member countries.
Further, a fall in internal trade costs also affects external trade indirectly through
cartel discipline. When there is intra-industry trade between the cartel countries,
internal integration diverts shipments away from ROW, while if internal trade costs
are greater than but close to the level ty, decreases in t promote external trade.
Using the intuition provided above on the overall (combined direct and indirect)
impact of economic integration on optimal deliveries, I next proceed to examine the
novel implications of economic integration for welfare in such a setting.
2.3 Welfare Effects of Economic Integration
In this section, I focus on the effects of trade liberalization (both internal and external)
on welfare. For simplicity, I assume that internal trade costs take the form of either
import tariffs or transportation costs. In addition, I interpret external trade costs as
transportation costs.
In the case of transportation costs, I define national welfare in any of the cartel-
member countries as V = CS + Π, where CS and Π respectively capture consumer
surplus and the global profit of the representative firm. VROW = CSROW for the
outside country as there are no local firms producing the good in ROW. It is easy
to verify that CS = 1
2
(x + y)2, whereas CSROW = 2βz
2. Substituting the relevant
61
expressions and simplifying, I obtain V = u(Q) − ty + piROW (z) and VROW = 2βz2,
where u(Q) = AQ− 1
2
Q2 with u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0 and piROW (z) = (A− τ − 2βz)z
with pi′ROW (z) < 0 for z > z
M = arg maxz piROW and piROW (z)
′′ < 0. In contrast,
when t is identified with an import tariff:
W = u(Q) + piROW (z) (24a)
WROW = 2βz
2 (24b)
W is increasing in Q, decreasing in z for z > zM , and concave in Q and z. WROW
coincides with the consumer surplus in the outside country and is convex and in-
creasing in z. Clearly, welfare under import tariffs weakly dominates welfare under
transportation costs, W ≥ V , for the cartel countries, while WROW = VROW . To
study the welfare implications of (internal and external) trade integration, I need to
examine the dependence of Q and z on t and τ .
Using the above definitions, in Appendix A, I characterize and compare the welfare
levels under Cournot-Nash competition and unconstrained collusion. Here, I briefly
highlight some of the key findings stemming from the analysis. Since internal trade
liberalization (t ↓) causes an expansion of domestic output in the host countries of the
cartel (Q ↑), this type of economic integration always improves welfare under Cournot-
Nash competition, (WN ↑).45 On the other hand, in the case of transportation costs,
welfare, V N , depends non-monotonically on t as these trade costs are now resource-
using.46 In the single-period game, WNROW is unaffected by economic integration
between the host countries of the cartel as zN does not depend on t. In the case
45 Bond and Syropoulos (2008) also establish this result in their two-country, segmented-markets,
duopoly model.
46 See Brander and Krugman (1983) which develop a model of reciprocal-dumping and show
that reductions in transportation costs stimulate competition and reduce prices, but also cause
domestic production to be replaced by more expensive foreign imports. In Appendix A I show
that V N (t, τ, β) is strictly convex in t and minimized at t = 4A/11.
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of maximal collusion, I know that if internal trade costs are non-zero, the cartel
shuts down trade and attains complete geographic separation of markets. Therefore,
V M = WM and V MROW = W
M
ROW under monopoly.
Before I analyze welfare under constrained collusion, I summarize some important
points regarding the comparison of welfare under Cournot-Nash competition and
under maximal collusion. In contrast to the two-country duopoly analysis of Bond
and Syropoulos (2008)47, when firms exploit their market power in outside countries
(i.e., τ < τ), they can recoup larger profits in ROW under collusion than under
competition (i.e., piMROW > pi
N
ROW ) as long as z
N > zM . This implies that now the host
countries of the cartel can enjoy a greater welfare under unconstrained collusion than
under Cournot-Nash competition, provided that the ROW’s market is sufficiently
large (i.e., β is sufficiently low).
The folk theorem stipulates that if firms value future profits highly, maximal
collusion is sustainable and the above observations hold true. The main focus of
the analysis, however, is on the welfare effects of trade liberalization in the case
of constrained collusion. Therefore, I now examine how the above welfare results
might change if incentive-compatibility constraints interfere with the cartel members’
willingness to abide by the cartel agreement and sustain unconstrained collusion.
Before I establish several novel results about the consequences of regional integra-
tion for welfare in all markets, I first explore the link between internal trade costs, t,
and welfare in the outside country, WROW . Proposition 5 describes the mechanism of
transmission of the impact of internal trade cost on welfare in the non-cartel country
(channeled through cartel discipline):
Proposition 5. (Spillover Effects of Regional Integration). A reduction in internal
trade costs t affects the volume of a cartel member’s exports to ROW, profits obtained
47 As in Bond and Syropoulos (2008), when τ ≥ τ , WN (t, τ , β) ≥WM (τ , β) and WNROW (t, τ , β) =
WMROW (τ , β) for all t ≤ tN .
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there, and welfare in ROW solely through the impact of t on cartel discipline θ∗.
Noting that z∗θ > 0, ∂piROW/∂z ≤ 0 and ∂WROW/∂z ≥ 0 for z ≥ zM , I find
sign (dW ∗ROW/dt) = −sign (dpi∗ROW/dt) = sign (dz∗/dt) = sign (θ∗t ) .
Since θ∗t > 0 when internal trade costs are sufficiently low (or, in other words,
when intra-industry trade is present), internal economic integration diverts external
trade and hurts the outside country, but, simultaneously, improves profits of the
cartel in ROW. The same result arises when internal trade costs are considerably
high (close to the prohibitive level t). Exactly the opposite is true, however, when
internal trade costs are higher than, but close to the level ty. Interestingly, in the
latter two cases, internal trade costs are so high as to deter cross-hauling between the
cartel’s home markets. Therefore, the impact of internal trade liberalization under
these circumstances is channeled solely through the deliveries to the local market
and to the outside country. Importantly, welfare in the non-cartel country (which is
equivalent to the consumer surplus there) and profits enjoyed by the cartel in ROW
actually move in opposite directions as a result of changes in internal trade costs.
Next, I summarize several novel results regarding the implications of integration
between the host countries of the cartel for national welfare in all markets. First, I
show that depending on the initial level of internal trade costs, additional economic
integration between the cartel-member countries might adversely affect welfare in all
markets.
Proposition 6. (Welfare Changes) If internal trade liberalization has already ad-
vanced significantly, then pursuing more liberalization at the regional level may hurt
all countries (i.e., reduce national welfare levels in the Pareto sense). It is possible
that dW ∗/dt > 0 and dW ∗ROW/dt > 0.
Proposition 6 suggests that when the initial level of internal trade costs is suffi-
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ciently low (i.e., t < ty), pursuing additional economic integration may be welfare-
decreasing for all countries. Internal trade liberalization increases total domestic
output, but reduces shipments to the outside country. The former effect enhances
national welfare in the home countries of the cartel, while the later reduces it. How-
ever, in the setting, there is an additional, indirect effect of reductions in t on total
domestic output, Q∗ = x∗ + y∗, channeled through cartel discipline, θ∗. Specifically,
when cross-hauling is present, t < ty, internal trade liberalization (t ↓) strengthens
cartel discipline (θ∗ ↓) as θ1∗t > 0 and decreases total domestic output, (Q∗ ↓). There-
fore, the net effect of decreases in internal trade costs on welfare is ambiguous and
actually depends on the exact level of cartel discipline, θ1∗. This interesting finding
is depicted by Figure 9.48 For instance, the dark blue curves in both panels of Fig-
ure 9 show that if internal trade costs are sufficiently low (t < ty) and if firms are
sufficiently patient (δ is high), then internal trade liberalization can actually reduce
welfare in the cartel countries.
Furthermore, welfare in the non-cartel member is unambiguously increasing in
internal trade costs when these trade costs are initially sufficiently low (i.e., t < ty)
as discussed in Proposition 5. Internal trade liberalization lowers national welfare in
ROW as it diverts output away from that market and towards the host countries of
the cartel. This leads to a decrease of consumer surplus and, therefore, of welfare
in that country. Importantly, the possibility of welfare-reducing regional integration
arises here due to the relation between cartel discipline and trade costs. Next, in
Proposition 7, I focus on the implications of changes in internal trade costs for world
efficiency.
Proposition 7. (World Efficiency) The absence of internal trade (i.e., prohibiting
regional integration) may be welfare superior to all countries as compared to free
48 Panel a) of Figure 9 illustrates the case of no ROW (τ = τ or β → ∞), while panel b) shows
how the dependence of welfare on internal trade costs changes in the presence of a non-cartel
market.
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internal trade.
Interestingly, I establish that, depending on the initial level of internal trade costs,
welfare in the absence of any internal trade might be superior to welfare under free
trade. Figures 9-10 illustrate this novel result. When trade costs exceed the pro-
hibitive level ty, but are not too high, i.e., t ∈ [ty, tg), to maintain incentive com-
patibility each cartel member directs more output towards the domestic market than
under free internal trade, i.e., t = 0. This increase in domestic deliveries improves
consumers’ utility, but lowers the profits gained by the cartel members in ROW. And,
as long as the former positive effect on welfare outweighs the latter negative effect,
the absence of internal trade can be welfare-enhancing for the host countries of the
cartel than free internal trade. As Figures 9-10 show, this possibility arises if the
value that firms attach to their future profits is sufficiently high (high δ).
Furthermore, for t ∈ [ty, tg), cartel discipline is lower than under free internal trade
and to maintain incentive compatibility cartel members need to ship more output to
the outside country. In addition, welfare in ROW is increasing in shipments to that
market. Therefore, in the absence of internal trade between the host countries of the
cartel (as long as t ∈ [ty, tg)), cartel members will export more to the non-member
country, which raises consumer surplus and welfare in that market. Thus, all countries
can enjoy a greater level of welfare if there is no intra-industry trade between cartel
countries than in the presence of free internal trade, as long as the firms are sufficiently
patient.
It is clear from the definition of welfare that the host countries of the cartel are
more likely to benefit from reciprocal internal economic integration when they have
access to non-cartel markets. This is so because the cartel members can exploit their
market power in ROW and to enjoy higher profits in those countries as a result of
internal trade liberalization. More specifically, Proposition 8 explains:
Proposition 8. (Presence of Outside Markets) The possibility of trade with ROW
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makes it more likely that cartel-member countries will benefit from regional integration
if internal trade costs are sufficiently low.
Proposition 8 follows directly from the definition of welfare, which features promi-
nently the profits made by the cartel members in the outside country. Profits in ROW,
piROW , are decreasing in internal trade costs and this effect is channeled through the
endogenous index of cartel discipline. Therefore, further regional integration between
the host countries of the cartel increases profits in ROW and, thus, increases the pos-
sibility for welfare-enhancing internal trade liberalization. This result is again clearly
illustrated by comparing both panels of Figure 9.
Interestingly, I find that in this setting the constrained efficient cartel agreement
can welfare-dominate both Nash competition and maximal collusion for the cartel-
member countries, as I describe in Proposition 9:
Proposition 9. Constrained collusion may generate higher welfare for the home
countries of the cartel as compared to maximal collusion and Cournot-Nash com-
petition. That is, I may have W ∗ > max(WN ,WM).
In Appendix A, I show that the unconstrained collusive outcome can welfare-
dominate the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. This novel finding is driven by
the opportunity for the cartel to shift rents by exploiting its market power in the
non-cartel country. This possibility arises if the outside market is sufficiently large
relative to the host countries of the cartel or if internal trade costs are excessively
high. Further, and even more interestingly, I find that constrained collusion can be
welfare-superior to pure monopoly for the cartel-member states. This possibility arises
here if the welfare gain due to higher consumer surplus under constrained collusion
more than offsets the welfare loss due to lower cartel profits (relative to unconstrained
collusion). More specifically, this outcome is likely when the relative size of the host
countries of the cartel is sufficiently larger than the size of the outside market and
when the firms are patient enough.
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3 Theoretical Analysis: Concluding Remarks
In this section of my dissertation, I present two different models of international car-
tels. In Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?, I build a duopoly model
of multi-product firms which interact repeatedly in national markets separated by
trade costs to study the impact of collusion on trade and welfare. Each firm pro-
duces two goods but has a competitive cost advantage in one. In this framework,
an international cartel can reduce costs by shutting down production of the cost-
inefficient good and importing it instead, or by shutting down trade and producing
both goods domestically. At the same time, a cartel can extract surplus by exploiting
its market power. The efficiency gains from rationalizing production and trade can
dominate the deadweight losses due to monopoly pricing. There always exists a set
of marginal cost differences and transportation costs under which maximal collusion
welfare-dominates Cournot competition. Furthermore, depending on costs and the
degree of product differentiation, collusion can promote trade relative to competition.
In Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs, I study the implications of (constrained)
collusion for optimal shipments, profits and welfare when cartel members can exploit
their market power in non-cartel countries. I develop a symmetric, multi-market
duopoly model, in which firms interact repeatedly in quantities in each other’s home
markets as well as in outside markets. Firms pool their incentive constraints across all
markets to sustain collusion. I show that in this setting seemingly unrelated markets
become strategically linked through the endogenous index of cartel discipline. In
addition to analyzing the dependence of collusive stability and cartel discipline on
trade costs, I characterize the impact of cartel discipline on optimal output levels.
Then, I study the spillover effects of various economic shocks on cartel shipments and
national welfare. I derive several novel results regarding the welfare implications of
economic integration.
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Part III. Data
1 Data Overview
The focus of this dataset is on discovered and prosecuted private international car-
tels defined by Connor (2006) as “... a conspiracy in restraint of trade that has or
is alleged to have one or more corporate or individual participants with headquar-
ters, residency, or nationality outside the jurisdiction of the investigating antitrust
authority.” Private international cartels exclude government-sponsored cartel organi-
zations and are characterized with participants from more than one country.49 Most
recently, enforcement activities aimed at discovering and prosecuting international
cartels have revealed useful information about the structure, conduct, and operations
of cartel members. Various illegal collusive practices, such as allocation of consumers
and/or markets, price-fixing, and bid-rigging, have been uncovered in numerous sec-
tors: agriculture, food and beverages, products of chemicals, basic metals, plastic and
rubber, construction, cargo shipping, and others.
The initial data on private international cartels have been kindly provided by John
M. Connor and Jeffrey E. Zimmerman. In order to fit the purpose of this study, I
have substantially modified and expanded Connor and Zimmerman’s original dataset.
For instance, I have included additional information on the countries of nationality,
residence, or headquarters of the firms and/or individuals that have participated in
those cartels. Following Levenstein and Suslow (2010), I use the nationality of the
parent company to identify the country of origin for each cartel member, unless any
foreign subsidiaries were actually convicted of violating antitrust laws. So, in the
49 The current study does not focus on legal state-run cartels, such as the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as their objectives are usually more complex than
just joint profit maximization and usually involve economic growth and/or political stability.
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Vitamin B4 cartel, for example, the U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese firm was charged
for its participation in this antitrust conspiracy (not the Japanese firm itself) and
in that case Japan is not deemed to have taken part in the cartel.50 On the other
hand, in the Spanish Raw Tobacco cartel, the European Commission found that the
parent companies exercised decisive influence on their subsidiaries and were therefore
held jointly and severely liable. In that case, the nationality of the parent company
is also considered.51 52 In addition, I have further extended the data to incorporate
information on international cartels discovered and prosecuted after 2004.53
Furthermore, I have created several variables that describe the instruments of
collusion, i.e., price fixing, customer and/or market share allocation, sales quotas,
sharing of commercially important and confidential information, bid-rigging, recidi-
vism, guaranteed buy-back.54 My main sources of information include (but are not
limited to) the Department of Justice, the European Commission, the Canadian Com-
petition Bureau, U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading, books, different journal articles and/or
newspaper articles. The data contain the specific duration of each of the cartels as
reported by the available sources and the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product
code corresponding to each of the cartelized products. Additional variables such as
the number of firms, subsidiaries, and/or individuals that participated in each cartel
and the country of discovery are also provided. I have also verified and continuously
50 For more information: http : //www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f211800/211870.htm and http :
//europa.eu/rapid/press− releaseIP − 04− 1454en.htm?locale = en
51 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38238/38238 249 1.pdf
52 The information provided by the European Commission, in particular, has proven to be ex-
tremely valuable in this regard. The European Commission meticulously lists the number and
the names of all firms that participated in each cartel (and quite often the country of origin
of each company), even if some of the firms were not actually fined (as per the European
Commission’s leniency program).
53 The original cartel data set as per John M. Connor and Jeffrey E. Zimmerman covers interna-
tional cartels discovered and prosecuted up until 2004.
54 More details on each of these additional variables is provided in the next section.
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updated information regarding the market share controlled by the cartel members, the
existence of a dominant cartel-member, and the number of buyers in the industry.55
More details on each of these additional variables is provided in the next section.
Thus far, my cartel dataset covers 173 private international cartels that existed
between 1958 and 2010. A total of 48 countries (28 of which are OECD members) have
participated in at least one of these cartels.56 However, due to limitations imposed
by the trade data, I have to drop all cartels that were functional exclusively prior to
1988 (which amounts to about 2% of all cartels in my sample). Also, any cartels that
operated in the services sectors (transportation, insurance, banking, cargo shipping,
etc.) are deleted due to the lack of reliable (and disaggregated) trade services data.
Table (B.1) lists all cartels in my sample along with the duration of the infringe-
ment and the number of participating firms. Then, Table (B.2) expands on Table
(B.1) by providing the relevant HS product codes that apply to each cartel. In nu-
merous cases, the firms colluded in the production and distribution of more than one
product type and therefore more than one HS product code is assigned to the same
(multi-product) cartel. Table (B.2) lists not only the period of duration, but also all
of the HS product categories that apply to each episode of collusion. For instance, in
the Bromines cartel, the firms colluded in the production and sale of three different
types of bromines - methyl bromide (HS code: 290329), Decabromodiphenyl Ether
(HS code: 290930), and Tetrabrombisphenol-A (HS code 290723). Therefore, in my
dataset, three different HS codes are applied to this one period of collusion. Find-
ing the correct HS product category (categories) that applies (apply) to each cartel
proved to be the most difficult task of the data construction. And although I have
55 Which could be thought of as a proxy for buyer concentration.
56 The countries present in my cartel dataset are: Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Is-
rael, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Niger, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovak Republic Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Togo, United Kingdom, United States.
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high confidence in the accuracy of the data, I have been unable to ascertain the HS
product code with absolute certainty for some types of goods. Therefore, I have also
created a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 whenever the HS product code
has not been verified with complete confidence and might turn out to be problematic.
2 Description of Variables
2.1 Cartel Duration
The dataset includes information about the span of each of the cartels as reported
by the anti-trust authorities or in any of the supporting documents. However, an
important caveat applies here: the exact dates marking the beginning and the end of
the collusive period of each cartel as reported by the anti-trust authorities might not
be absolutely accurate. This potential issue has been pointed out by Miller (2009):
“For example, conventional wisdom holds that the start and the end dates of collusive
activity reported by the DOJ may be negotiated as part of a plea agreement.” Of
course, in all cartel cases, it is also possible that any acts of collusion might have
commenced long before the official start date (or might have continued after the
official end date), but the authorities simply lack sufficient evidence to prove that.
The documents provided by the European Commission on numerous cartel cases
usually state “... cartel existed from as early as ...” or “... colluding at least from ...”
Furthermore, in some cases (usually, for long-lasting cartels), the anti-trust authorities
suspected, but did not have sufficient evidence to prove that the collusive activities
had began (ended) years prior to (after) the official start (end) date reported in the
investigating authorities’ decisions.57
For instance, in the Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel, the European Commission charged
57 For example, the European Commission could not establish with absolute certainty the official
end date of the Cement (EU) Cartel and, therefore, used the date of liquidation of one of the
cartel members as a reference for the period of collusion.
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the participants for collusion for the period 01/31/1994-12/31/2000, but the Com-
mission decision of 03/05/2006 (Case COMP/F/38.620 - Hydrogen Peroxide and
Perborate) states: “Although it is likely that discussions continued in 2001, the
available evidence does not support the conclusion that an agreement was reached
for 2001. Nor does it clarify whether the effects on prices were actually prolonged
until 2001.”58 On the other hand, the Department of Justice found two of the
participants in the Hydrogen Peroxide cartel guilty of price-fixing for the period
06/01/2000-12/01/2001. Therefore, in the data I have coded the duration of the
cartel as 01/31/1994-12/31/2000 for all participants except the two firms that were
also charged by the Department of Justice. For them, the duration of the cartel
recorded in the data is 01/31/1994-12/01/2001. Also, in very few cases (only 2 to
be precise), the investigating authorities provided evidence of the existence of several
separate cartel episodes involving the same group of firms in a particular sector. In
the Steel (flat stainless) cartel, the firms colluded first between 5/1986-10/1988 and
then again between 1/1994-11/1996, while the Stamp Auctions cartel initially existed
for the period 1/1980-11/1997 and then again during the year 1999 only.
Using the span of each cartel case I have calculated the duration period measured
in both years and months. Thus, MONTHS denotes the duration of the collusive
period measured in months, while Y EARS denotes the duration of the collusive
period measured in years. The average duration for the cartels in my final sample
is 7.786 years or 95.478 months. The substantial variation in duration across cartel
episodes is evidenced by the large standard deviation values of 6.581 years or 79.391
months, respectively.
58 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38620/38620 380 4.pdf
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2.2 Firms and Subsidiaries
In the dataset I have also recorded the number of cartel members for each of the col-
lusive episodes. However, it is important to distinguish between two different types
of participants: groups of firms (i.e., a parent company and its multiple subsidiaries)
and just single firms. Therefore, in the data, I have included not only the number of
participating groups of firms, but also the total number of cartel members, including
the subsidiaries of these firms that have also been addressees to the authorities’ deci-
sions. In cases where the parent company participated in a cartel, but no subsidiaries
did, or a subsidiary took part in the infringement, but the parent company did not,
the two variables have the same value.
Thus, FIRMS denotes the total number of groups of firms that participated in
the cartel, while SUBSIDIARIES denotes the total number of subsidiaries that
participated in the cartel. The mean number of firms and subsidiaries involved in
collusive activities is 6.434 and 9.263, respectively. Once again, there is a consider-
able variation in the number of participants across cartels as evidenced by the large
standard deviations: 5.692 and 7.502, respectively.
2.3 Harmonized System (HS) Product Codes
In order to combine the cartel data with the most disaggregated international trade
data available, I have matched each cartel case with the relevant 6-digit Harmonized
System (HS) product code. However, in a few instances, firms colluded in the produc-
tion or distribution of an entire line of products and I had to use a more aggregated HS
product category (such as 2-digit HS product codes or 4-digit HS product codes).59
Furthermore, often a single cartel affected more than one disaggregated product cat-
59 Some examples include the Automobile Parts cartel (HS code - 8708), the Ferrosilicon cartel
(HS code - 7202), the Haberdashery Products cartel (HS codes - 7319, 9606, 9607), and a few
more. Only in the Toys and Games (UK) cartel, I had to use the 2-digit HS product code as no
specifics regarding the cartelized products were provided by the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading.
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egory and in those cases I have matched the particular cartel with all relevant HS
products codes. Unfortunately, not all cartelized goods/services could be matched
with the applicable HS codes with absolute certainty. Therefore, I have also created
a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if there is any doubt that the reported HS
code is incorrect, and is 0 otherwise. The HS product codes will also prove valuable
in accounting for the level of product homogeneity across cartels.
2.4 Market Share
Theoretical models of collusion have emphasized the importance of market concentra-
tion for the existence of cartels. In order to take this into account, I have created two
variables that capture the level of competitiveness in the industry. LGMRKSHR
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the market share of the cartel in
the relevant sector exceeds 50%, while MRKSHR reports a precise estimate of the
cartel’s share of the appropriate geographic market. Nonetheless, such an estimate
was reported by the anti-trust authorities only in a minority of the cases and these
numbers usually correspond to a given year only. Therefore, LGMRKSHR is used
as a proxy and is the preferred measure of market concentration in this study.
2.5 Recidivism
The dummy variable RCDV ST takes the value of 1 if at least one of the members of
the cartel has also participated in a different cartel episode and is 0 otherwise. This
variable captures the experience of cartel members in engaging in collusive activities.
Firms that have been found guilty of participating in multiple cartels, usually received
larger fines from the anti-trust authorities. On the other hand, in some cases, recidi-
vists provided the investigating authorities with information regarding other cartels
in which they were involved and had their fines reduced. Therefore, the involvement
of a firm in multiple cartels might have actually contributed to the death of some of
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these episodes of collusion. For instance, if the antitrust authorities begin investigat-
ing a group of firms for collusion and if one of these firms currently participates in
another cartel, this firm has an incentive to apply for exemption of fines under the
leniency policy in exchange for its collaboration in proving the existence of the other
cartel.
2.6 Guaranteed Buy-Back
Some cartel agreements were based on the determination of sales quotas and promoted
compliance to these quotas using “guaranteed buy-backs”: a firm that exceeded its
quota in the previous period had to buy output from the cartel member who was
below the quota. This was the compliance procedure followed in the Lysine cartel
and in the Citric Acid cartel, for instance. In the Lysine cartel every member had to
report its sales to Kanji Mimoto of Ajinomoto, who kept track of them in a monthly
spreadsheet. Then, this spreadsheet was distributed to all participants during the
cartel members’ quarterly meeting and a firm that was above the assigned quota
had to buy output from the firm that was below the quota.60 The Department of
Justice also explains that “any firm that had sold more than its allocated or budgeted
share of the market at the end of the calendar year would compensate the firm or
firms that were under budget by purchasing that quantity of lysine from any under-
budget firms. This compensation agreement reduced the incentive to cheat on the
sales volume-allocation agreement by selling additional product, which, of course, also
reduced the incentive to cheat on the price-fixing agreement by lowering the price on
the volume allocated to each conspirator firm.”61
In addition, in the Citric Acid cartel firms had to submit monthly sales reports to
the executive of F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. Then, all cartel sales were reported to
60 http : //eur − lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = OJ : l : 2001 : 152 : 0024 :
0072 : en : PDF .
61 http : //www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/212266.htm.
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each member by telephone and, again, a firm that was above the agreed-upon quota
had to buy goods from the member that was below the quota for that particular
period: “A compensation scheme was agreed to as a corollary to the quota agreement
and in order to penalise those companies selling above their assigned sales quota and
at the same time compensate those that did not reach it. If a company went over
its assigned quota in any one year, it would be obliged to purchase product from the
company or companies with sales below their quota during the following year.” 62
Although this “guaranteed buy-back” strategy was implemented in order to ensure
compliance with the collusive agreement, there is evidence that in some instances firms
underreported their sales to avoid being punished. In the data, the implementation
of such a punishment strategy by a cartel is captured by BUY BCK - an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 when the agreement stipulated guaranteed buy-backs
and is 0 otherwise.
2.7 Price-Fixing
PRCFIX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if cartel members fixed prices
or agreed upon simultaneous price increases.
2.8 Customer Allocation
ALLCTN is another indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if cartel members
allocated customers and/or market shares among each other.
2.9 Sales Quota
QUOTA is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if cartel members assigned
production quotas.
62 http : //eur − lex.europa.eu/legal − content/EN/ALL/?uri = CELEX : 32002D0742 and
http : //eur − lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = OJ : l : 2002 : 239 : 0018 :
0065 : en : PDF
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2.10 Sharing of Information
INFRMN is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if cartel members shared
commercially important and confidential information.
2.11 Bid-Rigging
BIDRG is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if cartel members rigged bids.
2.12 Cartel Leader
In some instances, a single firm took the responsibility of scheduling secret meet-
ings, monitoring the adherence to the cartel agreement, and initiating punishment
if necessary. Usually, such firms received larger sanctions by the anti-trust authori-
ties. In order to capture this cartel characteristic, I have created a dummy variable
DOMFIRM , which takes the value of 1 if there was a dominant firm (or a leader)
in the cartel.
2.13 Cultural Diversity
Following Connor and Zimmerman (2005), I have also included a variable that cap-
tures the cultural diversity of each cartel. CLTRDV is defined as the ratio of the
number of countries over the number of firms that participated in each cartel. Thus,
this variable reflects the difficulty of sustaining collusion when all cartel members are
from different countries and exhibit diverse cultural characteristics, work ethic, and
customs.
2.14 Reason for Break-Up
In addition, I have kept track of the reasons for cartel death using five possible indi-
cators: L stands for cartel death due to a leniency application by one of the members;
78
US stands for a cartel break-up due to an investigation by the United States’ Depart-
ment of Justice; EU stands for cartel death due to an investigation by the European
Commission; C stands for cartel death due to a complaint by an affected buyer or
a non-cartel competitor; ND stands for natural death of the cartel; and OTHER
stands for cartel death due to other reasons (investigation by the Competition Bu-
reau of Competition, for instance).
3 Details on Selected Individual Cartel Cases
In this section I provide additional details on selected cartel cases and collusive prac-
tices that I deem deserve special attention. For instance, in some cases the different
anti-trust authorities reported different periods of cartel duration; the cartels included
several different groups of firms that covered several different products; the firms had
production facilities in multiple countries; the cartel members employed interesting
strategies to ensure the stability of the agreement.
3.1 Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel
Hydrogen peroxide is a chemical compound with strong oxidizing properties that is
mainly used as a bleaching agent. Hydrogen peroxide has uses in various industries
such as cosmetics, electronics, food processing, textiles, energy production, mining,
and pulp and paper manufacturing. The Department of Justice found Solvay S.A.
(Belgium) and Akzo Nobel Chemicals International (Netherlands) guilty of partici-
pating in an international price-fixing cartel in the hydrogen peroxide sector between
July 1, 1998 and December 1, 2001. “... Solvay and Akzo Nobel were charged with
conspiring with their competitors to fix the price of hydrogen peroxide sold in the
United States and elsewhere from July 1, 1998 to December 1, 2001.” 63 The de-
cision of the Department of Justice regarding Akzo Nobel Chemicals International
63 http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/06 at 137.html
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B.V. states “For purposes of this Plea Agreement, the “relevant period” is that pe-
riod beginning on or about July 1, 1998 and continuing until on or about December
1, 2001. During the relevant period, the defendant was a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Netherlands.”64
On the other hand, as per the decision of the European Commission of 03/05/2006:
“The addressees of this Decision participated in a single and continuous infringement
of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement regarding hydrogen
peroxide and its downstream product sodium perborate, covering the whole EEA
territory, hereinafter “the infringement”. The infringement started at least on 31
January 1994 and lasted at least until 31 December 2000 and consisted mainly of
competitors exchanging commercially important and confidential market - and/or
company relevant information, limiting and/or controlling production as well as po-
tential and actual capacities, allocating market shares and customers, and fixing and
monitoring (target) prices.”’65 Therefore, in the data, I have coded the duration of the
Hydrogen Peroxide cartel as 01/31/1994-12/31/2001 for Solvay S.A. (Belgium) and
Akzo Nobel Chemicals International (Netherlands), and as 01/31/1994-12/31/2000
for the remaining cartel members.
3.2 Industrial Bags Cartel
The Industrial Bags cartel is a special case as it included five distinctive regional sub-
groups as well as a cartel group devoted to the production and distribution of block
bags. In the data, I have separately coded each of these six collusive episodes along
with an entry for the general Industrial Bags cartel that incorporates all of relevant
cartel sub-groups. As per the decision of the European Commission of 30.11.2005
(Case COMP/38354 - Industrial bags) “the evidence in the Commission’s file demon-
64 http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f216100/216122.htm
65 http : //ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38620/38620 380 4.pdf
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strates that the industrial bag producers concerned together adopted anticompetitive
practices affecting the German, French, Spanish and Benelux markets. Although some
evidence appears to show that arrangements occasionally concerned other countries,
the Commission does not have any evidence in its possession suggesting that these
were anything but isolated instances. On the basis of the evidence in the file, the Ger-
many, French, Spanish and Benelux markets constitute the relevant territory for the
purposes of this Decision... The five main manufacturers of industrial bags in 2001 in
the territory concerned by this Decision, namely Bischof + Klein, RKW, Nordenia,
BPI (Combipac and Francepac) and Armando Alvarez, are estimated together to ac-
count for between 42% and 60% of the total turnover achieved in the industrial bags
sector in the territory covering France, Germany, Benelux and Spain... In September
1999 around 25% of the total volume of valve bags sold by the cartel members on
the French and Benelux markets was imported. In the case of FFS bags, the propor-
tions for those two markets were approximately 49% and 38% respectively. On the
German market, the import figures were 28% for FFS bags and 13% for valve bags.
On the Spanish market, they were 3% and 10% respectively (see also the analysis in
subsection 2.2) ”66
The detailed documents provided by the European Commission explain further:
“The oldest evidence found during the inspections that points to meetings held be-
tween a number of the undertakings in question dates from 1982. However, such
contacts appear to date back to the 1970s. They were established under the auspices
of the European plastic valve bag manufacturers association, whose initial statutes
were registered in July 1970 in Luxembourg.”67 Later, this association was replaced
by a new organization called “Valve-Plast” (hereinafter, “Valveplast”) and the Eu-
ropean Commission found evidence of the existence of five distinctive regional sub-
66 For more information of Commission Decision of 30.11.2005 (Case COMP/38354 - Industrial
bags): http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38354/38354 527 4.pdf
67 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38354/38354 527 4.pdf
81
groups within Valveplast: the Benelux subgroup, the Germany subgroup, the France
subgroup, the Belgium subgroup and the Teppema group. Moreover, within the
Valveplast structure there was an additional subgroup concerned with the produc-
tion and distribution of block bags exclusively. The block bag subgroup was initiated
in the early 1990s and had 9 members: Saint-Freres, Silvallac (Trioplast Witten-
heim), Sacherie de Pont-Audemer, Nordenia, RKW, Wavin (BPI Indupac), Bischof &
Klein, Aspla and Fardem. The decision of the European Commission regarding Case
COMP/38354 - Industrial bags states: “Like the other subgroups analysed earlier
(except for Teppema), the block bags subgroup operated under the auspices of Valve-
plast. It covered France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands and, marginally,
Spain, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden and Italy.”68
3.3 Washing Powder Cartel
In the Washing Powder cartel, I again used the nationality of the company to identify
the country of origin for each cartel member, despite the fact that the documents pro-
vided by the European Commission clearly state that Italy, Greece, Germany, France,
Belgium, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands were among the affected countries. As
per the decision of the European Commission (European Commission - IP/11/473
13/04/2011): “The cartel concerned powder detergents used in washing machines.
The Commission has evidence showing that the cartel existed at least between 7 Jan-
uary 2002 and 8 March 2005. The cartel started when the companies implemented
an initiative through their trade association to improve the environmental perfor-
mance of detergent products. The environmental objective, however, did not require
them to coordinate prices or other anti-competitive practices. The cartel covered
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and The Netherlands.”69
68 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38354/38354 527 4.pdf
69 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-11-473 en.htm
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However, in my data, the relevant cartel-member countries are the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, the U.S., Luxembourg, and Germany.
3.4 Vitamins Cartel
The collective term ‘Vitamins cartel’ is hereby used to refer to a series of cartels, which
involved a different number and groups of vitamins manufacturers and existed for dif-
ferent periods of time in the 1990s. Producers were charged for illegal price-fixing,
allocation of sales quotas, agreed-upon price increases and price announcements, mon-
itoring of these agreements, and regular meetings by multiple anti-trust authorities -
the European Commission, the Department of Justice, the Canadian Bureau of Com-
petition, etc. However, the existence of some of the cartels was only proved by the
Department of Justice (Vitamin B3 (Niacin), Vitamin B12 and Vitamin Premixes,
for example) and the participating firms were only fined by the U.S. anti-trust body.
As per the decision of the European Commission (European Commission - Case
COMP/E-1/37.512 - Vitamins - 21/11/2001): “Five other companies were not fined
because the cartels in which they were involved ended five years or more before the
investigation. They were identified as Lonza of Germany and four Japanese com-
panies: Kongo Chemical, Sumitomo Chemical, Sumika Fine Chemicals and Tanabe
Saiyaku.”70 71
3.5 Citric Acid Cartel
As per the decision of the European Commission (European Commission - COMP/E-
1/36 604 - Citric acid - 05/12/2001): “After a careful investigation which started in
1997, the European Commission has found that US companies Archer Daniels Mid-
land (ADM) and Haarmann & Reimer (H&R), the latter ultimately owned by Bayer
70 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2002 1 29.pdf
71 http://books.google.com/books/about/Global Price Fixing.html?id=7M8n4UN23WsC
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AG, Dutch company Cerestar Bioproducts B.V., Hoffmann-La Roche and Jungbun-
zlauer (JBL), both Swiss, participated in a worldwide cartel between 1991 and 1995,
through which they fixed the price and shared out the market for citric acid.
Citric acid is one of the most widely used additives in the food and beverage
industry both as an acidulent and preservative. It is found in non-alcoholic beverages
as well as in jams, gelatine-based deserts and tinned vegetables and fruit. Citric acid
is also used in household detergent products especially as a substitute for phosphates
considered harmful for the environment. Citric acid also enters in the composition
of dissolving tablets in the pharmaceuticals industry and is used in the cosmetics
industry.”72 However, regarding Jungbunzlauer (JBL) the European Commission
also explains that “... Before 1993, the whole group was directed by Jungbunzlauer
Ges.m.b.H, Vienna, Austria.” Given that the period of infringement is 03/06/1991-
05/22/1995, I include Austria as a country-cartel member in this case.
Moreover, following the decision of the Department of Justice, I list Germany
as a country-cartel member: “Beginning with the first round of charges in October
1996, the citric acid investigation has resulted in convictions against five corporations,
including U. S., German, Swiss, and Dutch firms, and four of their executives. In
addition, over $100 million in criminal fines - including a $50 million fine imposed on
Haarmann & Reimer Corporation, the U. S. subsidiary of the German pharmaceutical
giant Bayer AG - have been obtained against the convicted defendants.’73
In fact, all companies that participated in the Citric Acid cartel are multi-product
global manufacturers that own production facilities in various countries around the
world. However, due to the complexity of their production and distribution arrange-
ments, I only include the country of headquarters as a country-cartel member (unless
otherwise explicitly specified by the anti-trust authorities).
72 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32002D0742
73 http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/4523d.htm
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3.6 Butadiene Rubber (BR) Cartel and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene
Rubber (ESBR Synthetic Rubber) Cartel
As per the the decision of the European Commission (European Commission - Case
COMP/F/38.638 - Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber -
29/11/2006): “Both Butadiene Rubber (BR) and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rub-
ber (ESBR) are primarily used in tire production. The main customers for BR and
ESBR are the major tire producers (such as Michelin, Pirelli and Goodyear). Other
customers for BR and ESBR are producers of various types of consumer goods such
as shoe soles, floor coverings and golf balls. While ESBR was produced or traded by
all companies addressed by the Decision, BR was only produced by Eni, Bayer, Shell
and Dow.”74 Thus, fewer firms took part in the BR cartel than in the ESBR cartel.
Further, the documents provided by the European Commission state that most of
these cartel members had production facilities in multiple countries: “BR is produced
in three Bayer factories in Germany, France and the U.S. The main ESBR types (1500,
1712 and 1721) are produced in one factory in France. For reasons of clarity, the
name “Bayer” will be used in this decision to refer to any company owned by Bayer
AG.”75 Similarly, the Dow Group had multiple production facilities across Europe
in Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands, and U.S. And regarding the Eni Group, the
document explains: “The name “EniChem” will be used in this decision to refer to
any company owned by Eni S.p.A. BR and ESBR are produced at plants in Ravenna,
Italy, and Hythe, United Kingdom.”76 For this reason, in the data, I have included the
countries where the firms had production facilities (but not necessarily headquarters)
as country-cartel members.
74 For more information regarding the decision of the European Commission (European Commis-
sion - Case COMP/F/38.638 - Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber -
29/11/2006): http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-06-1647 en.htm?locale=en
75 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38638/38638 826 1.pdf
76 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/38638/38638 826 1.pdf
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3.7 Monochloroacetic acid (MCAA) Cartel
Participants in the Monochloroacetic acid (MCAA) cartel implemented the use of
guaranteed buy-backs as a punishment strategy against deviation from the collusive
agreement. As per the decision of the European Commission (European Commission -
Case No COMP.37.773 - MCAA - 19/01/2005): “Compensation would either consist
of the company who oversold buying product from a company who had undersold
at the then-market price or, alternatively, producers would sometimes agree on a
customer-specific remedy, meaning that the producer who oversold could offer to sell
less to a specific customer account or agree that the competitor who had undersold
could take the account for the next quarter”.77
3.8 Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT) Glass Cartel
As per the decision of the European Commission (European Commission - IP/11/1214
19/10/2011): “Overall, the cartel lasted from 23 February 1999 until 27 December
2004 and coordinated the prices for CRT glass in the European Economic Area (EEA).
The product concerned, also known as bulb glass, was bought by producers of cathode
ray tubes to use in traditional TVs and computer screens. The investigation started
in the end of 2008. The cartel was operated on the basis of bilateral or trilateral
meetings, organized at the request of the members. The cartel members supple-
mented their price coordination activities with the exchange, on an ad hoc basis, of
confidential and sensitive market information.”78
77 For more information:http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec docs/37773/37773 143 1.pdf
78 For more information regarding the decision of the European Commission - IP/11/1214
19/10/2011: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-11-1214 en.htm
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4 Final Sample
This data set covers 34 trading partners, which are all members of the Organization
of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the period from 1988 until
2012.79 The current study focuses on cartels comprised of OECD country members
only because 1) trade data at such a high level of disaggregation are likely to be more
reliable for more developed economies; 2) trade between OECD members represents
about two-thirds of the total world trade; 3) 165 of the 173 cartels in my sample
are comprised of participants exclusively from OECD countries. Moreover, 28 of
the 34 OECD nations have taken part in at least one of the cartels in my data,
which implies that there are 6 countries that have not participated in any of the
cartel organizations in my sample.80 Data on bilateral trade flows, measured in
thousands of current U.S. dollars, disaggregated on the basis of the 6-digit Harmonized
System (HS) classification are obtained from the United Nation’s Statistical Division’s
COMTRADE Database. Due to the lack of readily available international trade data
at the firm level, I use the most disaggregated international trade data available,
namely 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level. Unfortunately, bilateral trade flows
data at the 6-digit HS level of aggregation are not available for years prior to 1988.
Table B.3 and Table B.4 provide summary statistics.
Bilateral Trade Flows. Data on bilateral trade flows at the 6-digit HS level for the
period between 1988 and 2012 come from the United Nation’s COMTRADE database.
I employ cif imports, which is the theoretically correct trade variable, as the base
for the empirical analysis. Import data are available for 42% of the observations.
79 The 34 trading partners and OECD members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States.
80 These six OECD member countries are Chile, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, New Zealand, and
Turkey.
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However, in order to improve the number of non-missing observations, I use a mirror
procedure to map bilateral exports to imports. This further increases the percentage
of data coverage to 53%.
Bilateral Trade Costs. Following the theoretical models presented in the previous
section and the extensive empirical gravity literature, I proxy for bilateral trade costs
using standard gravity variables such as the logarithm of bilateral distance between
trading partners i and j, lnDISTij; a binary variable, which takes the value of one
if i and j share a common language, LANGij; a binary variable, which takes the
value of one if i and j share a contiguous border, CNTGij; a binary variable, which
takes the value of one if i and j share a colonial ties, CLNYij; a binary variable,
which takes the value of one if i and j have a regional trade agreement at time t,
RTAij,t. Data on the standard gravity proxies for trade costs are from the CEPII
database. Data on regional trade agreements are from Mario Larch’s Regional Trade
Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008).
Product Substitutability. Rauch (1999) develops a classification of SITC Rev 2
goods into differentiated, reference-priced, and those that trade on organized ex-
changes (homogeneous goods). Rauch (1999) argues that homogeneous goods are the
ones sold on organized markets such as corn, wheat, etc. On the other hand, prod-
ucts not sold on organized markets, but whose benchmark prices are listed in trade
journals and industry guides he classifies as referenced-priced goods. Such goods
are more likely to exhibit some unique attributes, but are somewhat substitutable.
The remaining goods he considers differentiated. Rauch’s (1999) classification offers
several advantages - 1) it is at a relatively disaggregated level, 4-digit SITC, which
could be matched to the 6-digit HS codes; 2) the classification of commodities into
the aforementioned three categories is quite intuitive and generally conforms to the
economic definition of product substitutability; 3) the classification is comprehensive.
Alternatively, I employ the elasticity of substitution estimates of Broda et al. (2006).
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The authors provide estimates of the elasticity of import demand at the 3-digit HS
level for 73 countries for the period 1994-2003. Unfortunately, not all of the OECD
member countries are included in their sample. Belgium, Estonia, Israel, Luxem-
bourg and the Czech Republic are the ones missing from Broda et al. (2006) data.
For those five countries for which elasticity estimates are unavailable, I experiment
by 1) obtaining the average product elasticity across exporters; 2) dropping these
countries from the sample.
The current analysis is subject to at least two important caveats. First of all,
the exact dates marking the beginning and the end of the collusive period of each
cartel as reported by the anti-trust authorities might not be absolutely accurate. This
potential issue has been pointed out by Miller (2009): “For example, conventional
wisdom holds that the start and the end dates of collusive activity reported by the
DOJ may be negotiated as part of a plea agreement.” Of course, in all cartel cases, it is
also possible that any acts of collusion might have commenced long before the official
start date (or might have continued after the official end date), but the authorities
simply lack sufficient evidence to prove that. Moreover, the documents provided by
the European Commission on numerous cartel cases usually state “... cartel existed
from as early as ...” or “... colluding at least from ...”
Second, due to the nature of the question at stake the analysis inherently suffers
from a sample selection bias. That is, I can only use data on international cartels
that have been discovered and prosecuted by the anti-trust authorities and I have
no information about any cartels that were never caught. This, of course, poses the
question of what are the characteristics that determine cartel success and protect the
participants from any legal repercussions. Is it really the case that only less effective
cartels get caught? If this is in fact true, then the average effect of international
cartels on trade will generally be underestimated. On the other hand, it could be
the case that only the most effective cartels are caught as the least efficient ones fall
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apart shortly after their agreement is put in place. In that case, the average impact
of cartels on bilateral trade flows will be overestimated. Thus, the reader should keep
in mind that my dissertation includes information only on discovered and prosecuted
international cartels.
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Part IV. Empirical Analysis
In this part of my dissertation I present the empirical analysis complementing the
theoretical models previously described. In Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing
Cartels?, I test whether it is indeed the case that multi-product cartels promote
trade and whether this positive effect becomes more pronounced the more distant
substitutes the goods are. In Cartel Discipline and Trade costs, I present a two-stage
empirical analysis where I first examine the impact of (internal and external) trade
costs on cartel discipline. Second, I test whether cartel discipline negatively affects
both internal trade and external trade.
1 Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?
The theoretical model presented in Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Car-
tels? offers a testable prediction about the impact of multi-product cartels on trade.
Proposition 1 stipulates that depending on the initial levels of trade costs and the cost
differential, it is possible for collusion to enhance the value of trade of the cost-efficient
good relative to competition as long as the goods are sufficiently distant substitutes.
Specifically, when trade costs are lower than the cost heterogeneity and the goods are
sufficiently unrelated, trade of the cost-efficient good under the collusive regime can
be greater than trade of the same good under the competitive regime. In this case,
the conspirators do not produce the high-cost good in their respective home markets
and do not export it at all, so the value of trade of that product would be greater
under competition than under collusion. Therefore, the possibility that collusion en-
hances trade relative to competition depends crucially on the values of trade costs,
the cost heterogeneity, and the degree of product substitutability. Thus, whether
multi-product cartels promote bilateral trade or not is really an empirical question,
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which I seek to address in this part of the analysis. Proposition 1 characterizes this
result in more details and translates into the following testable hypotheses:
H1: Multi-product cartels enhance the value of bilateral trade of their
cost-efficient product relative to the absence of collusion.
H2: The positive effect of multi-product cartels on trade is more pro-
nounced, the more distant substitutes the goods are.
In the empirical analysis, I focus on the realistic case of positive trade flows between
country-cartel-members, which corresponds to the situation of trade costs being lower
than the cost asymmetry in the theoretical model. The theory also predicts that
when the above conditions are satisfied, neither country exports its cost-inefficient
product under collusion. Taking this result at face value implies that the data should
contain only exports of cartel members’ competitive-advantage goods. Moreover, the
empirical test of the hypotheses needs to be performed with data that: 1) include
multi-product cartels; 2) focus on exports of cost-efficient goods, comparing changes
over time in the presence and absence of collusion; 3) distinguish between unrelated
and substitutable products. Next, I summarize the econometric approach and then
offer empirical evidence that multi-product cartels indeed enhance trade between
partners when the goods are sufficiently distant substitutes.
1.1 Econometric Strategy
To examine the relation between multi-product collusion and bilateral trade, I employ
an augmented version of the gravity equation, which provides a systematic way of
removing sources of unobserved heterogeneity81:
Xk,gij,t = exp[β1CARTEL MLTPRD
k,g
ij,t + β2CARTEL SNGLPRD
k,g
ij,t +GRAVij,tθ˜ + FES
g
ij,t] + 
k,g
ij,t (25)
81 Head and Mayer (2014) provide a detailed description of the theoretical foundations and the
empirical applications of the gravity model.
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where Xkij,t represents the nominal bilateral trade flows between i and j at time t
for cartel k in product category g. I test hypothesis H1 by estimating equation (29),
where the binary variable CARTEL MLTPRDk,gij,t takes the value of 1 when country
i and country j both participate in a multi-product cartel k, whereas the binary
variable CARTEL SNGLPRDk,gij,t takes the value of 1 when country i and country
j both participate in a single-product cartel k in sector g. I expect the coefficient
estimate of β1 to be positive and significant, but I have no ex-ante expectations about
the estimate of β2 based on the theoretical model.
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GRAVij,t represents the vector of standard proxies for bilateral trade costs used in
the gravity literature. These include the logarithm of bilateral distance between i and
j, DISTij; a dummy variable for the existence of a common language between i and
j, LANGij; another dummy variable for the presence of a contiguous border between
i and j, CNTGij; a binary variable for the existence of colonial ties between i and
j, CLNYij. In addition, I also control for the existence of regional trade agreements
between country i and country j also with a binary variable, RTAij,t. These variables
do not vary across cartels and product categories.
FESgij,t denotes the vector of fixed effects that control for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. ηi,t denotes time-varying source country dummies; δj,t denotes time-
varying destination country dummies; µg,t denotes product-year fixed effects. Ideally,
I need to include sector-exporter-time and sector-importer-time fixed effects as the
theoretical gravity model indicates. However, due to the large number of countries,
years, and products, I encounter computational issues and therefore I experiment
with various sets of fixed effects.
Next, I interact the above binary variables for multi-product and single-product
collusion with proxies for the degree of product substitutability to test hypothesis
82 Bond and Syropoulos (2008) build a single-product multi-market Cournot-duopoly model of
collusion and show that in that case monopoly always hinders trade relative to competition.
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H2. The theoretical model predicts that multi-product cartels can enhance trade
as long as the degree of substitutability is sufficiently low. I employ Rauch’s (1999)
classification of goods to proxy for the degree of product substitutability. More details
about the data are provided in Part 3. Building on (29), the next estimating equation
becomes:
Xk,gij,t = exp[β1CARTEL MLTPRD
k,g
ij,t + β2CARTEL SNGLPRD
k,g
ij,t + (26)
+β3CARTEL MLTPRD
k,g
ij,t × SUBSTIT g + β4CARTEL SNGLPRDk,gij,t × SUBSTIT g +
+β5SUBSTIT
g +GRAVij,tθ˜ + FES
g
ij,t] + 
k,g
ij,t
The main coefficient of interest in specification (26) is β3. The theory predicts that
multi-product cartels enhance trade (of the cost-efficient good) as long as the degree
of product substitutability is sufficiently low. That is, the higher the degree of sub-
stitutability between goods, the lower the positive impact of multi-product collusion
on trade. Therefore, I expect the estimate of β3 to be negative and significant, while
the estimate of β4 to be either insignificant or of lower order of magnitude. However,
the interpretation of the estimate of β3 (and the estimate of β4) depends crucially on
the particular proxy used for the elasticity of substitution. The additional variable
SUBSTIT g denotes a proxy for the degree of substitutability and is included to avoid
omitted variable bias.
To proxy for the degree of substitutability between products, I use Rauch’s (1999)
categorical variable, which classifies goods into homogeneous, reference-priced, and
differentiated. I create three separate binary variables based on Rauch’s classifica-
tion of goods - one for homogeneous products, one for reference-priced products,
and another one for differentiated products. Then, I interact each one of these vari-
ables with CARTEL MLTPRDk,gij,t. To avoid perfect collinearity, I omit the most
substitutable category - the one for homogeneous goods. I compare the estimates
94
of CARTEL MLTPRDk,gij,t × SUBSTIT g for differentiated goods and for reference-
priced products. Given the prediction of Proposition 3, the coefficient estimate on the
interaction between CARTEL MLTPRDk,gij,t and the dummy for differentiated prod-
ucts, SUBSTIT g1 should be positive and significant. In the sensitivity experiments,
I employ the elasticity of substitution estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006) as an
alternative proxy for the degree of product substitutability.
As recommended by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), I estimate specifications
(29)-(26) in multiplicative form using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML)
estimator, which accounts for both the heteroskedasticity present in the trade data
and the existence of zero trade flows. OLS estimations of the log-linearized grav-
ity equation produce inconsistent parameter estimates, while ignoring the zero trade
flows will bias the estimated coefficients.
1.2 Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the main results based on specification (26). In column (1), I first
estimate the effects of standard gravity proxies for trade costs on bilateral trade using
exporter fixed effects, importer fixed effect, product fixed effects and time fixed ef-
fects. As is common in the trade literature, distance exerts a negative and significant
impact on trade, while the existence of common language tends to facilitate trade be-
tween partners. The estimates of the rest of the gravity variables are not statistically
significantly different from zero, which could be due to the fact that the data are at
the most disaggregated level available.
Next, in column (2), I examine the average partial effect of cartels on trade.
The positive and significant estimate of the cartel binary variable (which takes the
value of 1 if both country i and country j participate in cartel k in sector g at time
t) indicates that the existence of collusion promotes bilateral trade between cartel-
members. I further investigate this finding in column (3) by differentiating between
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multi-product and single-product cartels. Thus, I test hypothesis H1 described above.
The results show that indeed multi-product collusion exerts a positive and significant
impact on bilateral trade. The effect of single-product cartels is similarly positive and
significant, but of lower magnitude. Moreover, a statistical test of the hypothesis that
the two coefficients are equal, rejects the null with a p-value of 0.0041. In column
(4), I experiment with the set of fixed effects and now use exporter-year, importer-
year, and sector-year fixed effects instead of the previously included set of dummy
variables. The results remain qualitatively unchanged with the impact of multi-
product collusion still being positive and statistically significant. These interesting
findings provide empirical support for the existence of trade-promoting international
cartels.
In column (5), I test hypothesis H2 by estimating specification (26) using Rauch’s
(1999) classification of goods to proxy for the degree of substitutability. As ex-
plained earlier, I employ Rauch’s (1999) categorical variable to create three binary
indicators - for differentiated goods (DFRNT GOODS), for reference-priced goods
(RFRNCPRC GOODS), and for homogeneous goods (HMGNS GOODS). Then,
I interact each of these variables with the multi-product and single-product binary
indicators. To avoid perfect collinearity, I omit the interaction with the dummy for ho-
mogeneous goods, which, therefore, represents the reference group. The results show
that the more differentiated the products are, the higher the positive impact of multi-
market collusion on trade. The estimate on CARTEL MLTPRD DFRNT GOODS
is positive and significant. This finding is in line with the prediction of Proposition
3, which stipulates that multi-product cartels enhance trade relative to competition
as long as the goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. Furthermore, the estimate
on CARTEL MLTPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS is positive but insignificant, sug-
gesting that multi-product cartels do not improve trade for reference-priced goods
relative to homogeneous goods. Moreover, none of the interaction terms with the
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single-product cartel variable are statistically significant. Overall, the results based
on specification (26) offer empirical support for the possibility that international car-
tels can enhance trade and are in line with the theoretical model.
1.3 Robustness Checks
Table 2 presents some additional tests, which ascertain the robustness of the aforemen-
tioned results. First, in column (1) of Table 2, I include country-pair time-invariant
symmetric fixed effects, which control for all unobservable factors that might affect
trade between an exporter and an importer symmetrically and also capture all bilat-
eral time-invariant trade costs. Moreover, these bilateral fixed effects also account for
any potential linkages between the cartel variables and the error term. The results
remain qualitatively unchanged. The coefficient estimate on CARTEL MLTPRD
is positive and significant and the estimate on the interaction between this variable
and the proxy for differentiated goods is also positive and significant. On the other
hand, the coefficient on CARTEL MLTPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS, the variable
that captures the effect of multi-product collusion on trade for reference-priced goods,
is positive, but not statistically significantly different from zero. In addition, the in-
teraction terms between CARTEL SNGLPRD and the proxies for the degree of
product substitutability are all insignificant. These results are in line with the main
findings in Table 1 and show that multi-product cartels improve trade especially when
the goods are relatively differentiated.
Second, in column (2) of Table 2, I repeat the test of hypothesis H1, but now
I include directional pair fixed effects. These time-invariant bilateral fixed effects
capture all observable and unobservable sources of directional heterogeneity between
any pair of exporters and importers. They also control for any unobservable het-
erogeneity in the cross-section that is correlated with the presence of cartels. The
results in column (2) of Table 2 are not qualitatively different from the main find-
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ings in column (3) of Table 1. The coefficient on the multi-product cartel variable
is positive, statistically significant, and of larger magnitude than the coefficient on
the single-product cartel variable. Note that the results in column (2) are obtained
with the use of exporter, importer, sector, and year fixed effects. Therefore, in col-
umn (3) of Table 2, I substitute these fixed effects with exporter-time, importer-time,
and sector-time dummies, keeping the directional pair fixed effects. Again, the re-
sults remain qualitatively unchanged. Lastly, I test the robustness of specification
(26) by substituting the standard gravity variables with directional pair fixed ef-
fects. Once again, the main results remain qualitatively the same. The coefficient
on CARTEL MLTPRD DFRNT GOODS, the variable that captures the effect of
multi-product collusion on trade for differentiated goods, is positive and statistically
significantly different from zero and so is the coefficient on the multi-product cartel
variable, CARTEL MLTPRD. These findings still support the theoretical model.
Third, as an alternative to Rauch’s (1999) classification of goods, I employ the
elasticity of substitution estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006). The authors pro-
vide estimates of the elasticity of import demand at the 3-digit HS level for 73 coun-
tries. Unfortunately, not all of the OECD member countries are included in their
sample.83 Nonetheless, given that in the theoretical model the degree of substi-
tutability is not country specific, I use Broda and Weinstein’s (2006) data to create
an average product elasticity across all importers. Then, I interact this proxy for
product substitutability with the cartel indicator variables. The results are presented
in columns (5)-(6) of Table 2. When using Broda and Weinstein’s (2006) proxy for
the degree of product substitutability, the coefficient estimates should be interpreted
differently. Namely, the higher the elasticity of substitution, the lower the positive ef-
fect of multi-product collusion on trade should be. Therefore, I expect the coefficient
83 Belgium, Estonia, Israel, Luxembourg and Czech Republic are missing from Broda et al. (2006)
data.
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estimate of β3 from specification (26) to be negative and significant. The results in
column (5) show that the estimate of CARTEL MLTPRD×SUBSTIT is actually
negative and significant in accordance with the theory. Moreover, the coefficient on
CARTEL MLTPRD remains positive and significant and even increases in magni-
tude. Lastly, in column (6) of Table 2, I test the robustness of these findings more
stringently by including bilateral asymmetric fixed effects. The results are qualita-
tively similar to the ones presented in column (5) of Table 2. The coefficient on the
interaction term between multi-product collusion and the elasticity of substitution,
CARTEL MLTPRD × SUBSTIT , is negative and significant.
Lastly, I experiment with the sample size by using various time-intervals: 2-year,
3-year, and 5-year. The results are presented in columns (7)-(9) of Table 2. Over-
all, the main findings from column (5) of Table 1 remain robust to variations of the
sample size. Again, the coefficient on CARTEL MLTPRD DFRNT GOODS, the
variable that captures the effect of multi-product collusion on trade for differenti-
ated goods, is positive and significant and so is the coefficient on the multi-product
cartel variable, CARTEL MLTPRD. These findings suggest that multi-product
cartels enhance trade and that this positive impact is even more pronounced when
the goods are differentiated. The only substantial change is that the coefficient on
CARTEL SINGLEPRD DFRNT GOODS, the variable that captures the effect
of single-product collusion on trade for differentiated goods, also gains some signifi-
cance when I use 2-year and 5-year intervals. The theoretical model, however, makes
no specific prediction about the impact of single-product international cartels on
trade.
Overall, the results presented in Table 2 remain in line with the main findings from
Table 1 and are in support of the theoretical model. Thus, both theory and empirics
suggest that it is possible for international cartels to enhance the value of bilateral
trade. This positive and significant effect of multi-product cartels on trade is even
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more pronounced when the goods are differentiated as opposed to referenced-priced
or homogeneous.
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2 Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs
The theoretical model presented in Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs offers a rich
set of predictions regarding the interaction between internal (external) trade costs
and cartel discipline as well as between cartel discipline and internal (external) trade.
Besides the standard effects of trade costs on trade, the model unveils additional
indirect links that arise when I solve the cartel’s constrained optimization problem.
Lemma 5 summarizes the impact of internal trade costs and external trade costs on
cartel discipline (also illustrated by Figure 6), while equations 21c-21d reveal the
relation between cartel discipline and internal trade and between cartel discipline
and external trade, respectively. These novel theoretical findings translate into the
following testable hypotheses:
• H1: Larger internal cartel trade costs (t ↑) should weaken cartel discipline
(θ ↑).
• H2: Larger external cartel trade costs (τ ↑) should weaken cartel discipline
(θ ↑).
Furthermore, the impact of cartel discipline on (internal and external) trade is cap-
tured by the optimal output allocations to the constrained optimization problem of
the cartel as shown in equations 21c-21d. The optimal shipments under constrained
collusion imply that:
• H3: Stronger cartel discipline (θ ↓) should lead to less internal cartel shipments
(y ↓).
• H4: Stronger cartel discipline (θ ↓) should lead to less external cartel shipments
(z ↓).
The key predictions of the theory, as summarized in hypotheses H1-H4, translate
naturally into an econometric model that captures and decomposes the interactions
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between trade costs, cartel discipline, and trade flows in two stages. To analyze these
effects in the data, I adopt a two-stage estimation approach. In the first stage, I focus
on hypotheses H1 and H2 and study the effects of (internal and external) trade costs
on cartel discipline. In the second stage, I turn the attention to hypotheses H3 and
H4 and study the impact of cartel discipline on (internal and external) trade.
2.1 Stage 1: Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs
One of the main contributions of the theoretical model is the introduction of the en-
dogenous index of cartel discipline, which links seemingly unrelated markets strate-
gically. Cartel discipline in the theory is a function of trade costs, relative market
size, and time preferences and determines output deliveries to all countries. However,
I are unaware of any direct measure of cartel discipline in the empirical literature.
Therefore, in the econometric analysis, I proxy for cartel discipline using cartel dura-
tion (or the age of the cartel) and I also construct several different measures of cartel
discipline, which I describe below.
The creation of the proxy for cartel discipline rests on the intuitive assumption
that stronger cartel discipline is associated with greater cartel duration or with a
lower probability of a cartel death. Thus, I view cartel discipline as one of the im-
portant factors affecting cartel duration and cartel dissolution. Moreover, given the
predictions of the theory, internal trade costs as well as external trade costs are major
determinants of cartel discipline and therefore should also affect the probability of
a cartel death. Essentially, in the first-stage of the empirical analysis I examine the
effects of trade costs on the hazard of cartel dissolution and then use these estimates
to construct measures of cartel discipline, which I employ in the second-stage estima-
tions. This approach also alleviates any concerns regarding potential endogeneity of
cartel discipline (when proxied by cartel duration) due to the existence of exclusion
restrictions. That is, in the first stage, I include various (potential) determinants of
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the probability of a cartel death, which should not affect bilateral trade flows.
The first-stage empirical analysis, which studies the relations between (internal
and external) trade costs and cartel discipline, contributes to the relatively scant
literature which analyzes the determinants of cartel “success.”84 I follow the standard
practice in this strand of the literature and adopt the Cox Proportional Hazard model
as the estimator of choice.85 In the context of the model, the hazard at time T , which
denotes the elapsed time since the start date of the collusive period for cartel k in
sector g, is given by:
hgk(T |COSTSgk,DSPLNk,Xgk) = h0(T )× exp[COSTSgkα+DSPLNkβ +Xgγ]. (27)
Here h0(T ) denotes the baseline hazard function that is common to all units in the
population, while the exponential term captures the relative risk, a proportionate
increase or decrease in risk, associated with the set of characteristics COSTSgk,
DSPLNgk, Xg.
COSTSgk denotes the vector of internal and external trade costs, which are in-
tended to capture the key predictions of the theory. As summarized in hypotheses
H1 and H2, I expect larger (internal and external) trade costs weaken cartel disci-
pline and, therefore, to likely contribute to cartel dissolution. Accordingly, guided by
Lemma 5, I expect to obtain positive estimates, αˆ, of the effects of the covariates in
vector COSTSk. The most preferred trade cost proxy is distance and I distinguish
between internal (DIST INTRL) and external (DIST EXTRL) cartel distance.86
84 Representative studies from this literature include Connor et al (2013), Zhou (2012), Levenstein
and Suslow (2010), De (2010), and Dick (1996). I discuss these studies in the literature review.
85 The Cox’s (1972) Proportional Hazard model is appealing because it allows the effects of the
predictor variables to be estimated rather generally without making any distributional assump-
tions about the hazard function. Due to this appealing property, the Cox model is the most
widely used estimator in the cartel duration literature (e.g., Zhou (2012), Levenstein and Suslow
(2010), De (2010), Dick (1996)).
86 There are at least six good reasons to use distance as the preferred proxy for trade costs. First,
distance is the most widely used (Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)), and often exclusive
proxy (Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)) for bilateral trade
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In addition to distance, in the empirical analysis I also experiment with appropriately
aggregated internal tariffs (TRFF INTRL), external tariffs (TRFF EXTRL), in-
ternal tariff percentage changes (∆%TRFF INTRL) and external tariff percentage
changes (∆%TRFF EXTRL) as other proxies for trade costs and trade liberaliza-
tion. A list of all trade cost covariates is reported in the first column of Table 3.
DSPLNk denotes a vector of various cartel characteristics and collusive practices,
which I believe may impact cartel discipline in addition to trade costs. A list of these
variables appears in the first column of Table 3. Some of them have been used in
the cartel duration literature. A detailed description of each of these variables, their
use in the literature, as well as their particular construction, can be found in Part 3.
Finally, Xg denotes the vector of additional control variables, which are not related to
cartel discipline but may influence cartel duration. In the empirical analysis I account
for such additional controls with industry fixed effects, which capture all observable
and unobservable sources of heterogeneity at the industry level.
I use the estimates of {α, β, γ} along with data on the corresponding covariates
to construct several measures of cartel discipline that I then employ in the second-
stage analysis. The most preferred measure of cartel discipline is constructed from
the covariates that I believe have a direct impact on collusive sustainability. Since
the predicted hazard indexes in the model reflect the probability of cartel dissolu-
tion, which is inversely related to cartel discipline, I take the inverse of the hazard
predictions to construct the proxy for discipline:
DISCIPLINEgk = 1/exp[COSTS
g
kαˆ+DSPLNkβˆ] (28)
costs. Second, distance is highly correlated with and absorbs the effects of many other potential
determinants of trade flows (Head and Mayer (2013)). Third, trade economists are in agreement
that the effects of distance on trade are the strongest and most robust across all other potential
candidates to explain trade flows (Head and Mayer (2014)). Fourth, by definition, distance
is exogenous. This is an important advantage in the current context because, as discussed in
Zhou (2012), many of the variables used the cartel duration literature are subject to endogeneity
concerns and critique. Fifth, distance data is widely available, complete, and easy to access.
Finally, there are well-established and successful methods to construct average and aggregate
distance measures within and across regions. These methods are particularly useful for the
study, because I need to construct consistent measures for internal and for external cartel
distance. To do this, I follow Mayer and Zignago (2011).
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I employ this measure of discipline to obtain the main results. In addition, I
experiment with several other proxies for discipline. One of them is a ‘conservative’
measure, which omits DSPLNkβˆ from specification (28). Thus, in effect, this proxy
for discipline is constructed exclusively based on the theoretical predictions. I also
construct a second measure of discipline, which only takes into consideration the
significant regressors from equation (28). Third, I construct a ‘liberal’ proxy for
discipline, which adds the effects of the additional covariates Xg from the duration
estimating equation to the discipline formula (28). Finally, as discussed earlier, I
employ directly the measure of cartel duration from the raw data as an additional
proxy for cartel discipline. Using these proxies for cartel discipline, I proceed to the
second-stage econometric specification.
2.2 Stage 2: Trade Flows, Cartels, and Cartel Discipline
To study the effects of cartel discipline on trade flows, I amend the most successful
empirical model in trade, the gravity equation, to capture the predictions of the
theory:
lnXk,gij,t = CARTEL
k,g
ij,t α˜ + CARTEL DISCIPLINE
k,g
ij,t β˜ + GRAV
k,g
ij,t γ˜ + FES
g
ij,t + ˜
k,g
ij,t . (29)
Here, Xk,gij denotes bilateral trade flows between exporter i and importer j in year t for
cartel k in product category g. CARTELk,gij,t denotes the vector of indicator variables
that captures the presence of cartels. While the theory does not model cartel forma-
tion and does not generate predictions about the effects of the existence of cartels on
trade flows, cartels are assumed to be present in the theoretical model and, therefore, I
explicitly control for that in the econometric specifications. In the empirical analysis,
I experiment with several cartel variables, including: CARTEL INTRNLk,gij,t, which
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if country i and country j both
participate in cartel k in sector g at time t; CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t is an indicator
equal to one for exports from cartel member i to a non-cartel market −j in sector g
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at time t; and CARTELk,gij,t, which is defined as the sum of CARTEL INTRNL
k,g
ij,t
and CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t.
CARTEL DISCIPLINEk,gij,t represents a vector of covariates, which capture the
effects of cartel discipline on trade. In the empirical analysis I distinguish between
three alternative measures of cartel discipline, including: CARTEL DSCPLN INTRNLk,gij,t,
defined as the product of the measure of discipline, DISCIPLINEk, and the indica-
tor variable CARTEL INTRNLk,gij,t; CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRNL
k,g
i−j,t, defined
as the product of the measure of discipline, DISCIPLINEk, and the binary variable
CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t; and CARTEL DSCPLN
k,g
ij,t , which is defined as the sum
of CARTEL DSCPLN INTRNLk,gij,t and CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRNL
k,g
i−j,t. The
theory predicts that the estimates of the effects of each of the discipline covariates
should be negative, reflecting the inverse relation between cartel discipline and both
internal and external international cartel trade flows.
GRAVk,gij,t denotes a vector of standard proxies for trade costs from the empirical
trade literature (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). These include: the logarithm of
bilateral distance between trading partners i and j, DISTij; a binary variable, which
takes the value of one if i and j share a contiguous border, CNTGij; a binary variable,
which takes the value of one if i and j have common colonial ties, CLNYij; a binary
variable, which takes the value of one if i and j share a common language, LANGij; a
binary variable, which takes the value of one if i and j have a regional trade agreement
at time t, RTAij,t; and a measure of bilateral tariffs TARIFFS
g
ij,t = ln(1+τ
g
ij,t), where
τ k,gij,t is the ad-valorem tariff on imports of goods in class g in country j from country i
at time t. Finally, FESgij,t represents the vector of fixed effects that will be employed
in the estimations. I experiment with the set of fixed effects included and describe
these additional specifications in more details below.
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2.3 Estimation Results
Following the development of the econometric model, I present the empirical findings
in two stages. First, I discuss the estimates of the relation between trade costs and
cartel discipline. Then, I focus on the results describing the effects of cartels and
cartel discipline on trade.
2.3.1 Effects of Trade Costs on Cartel Discipline
A natural starting point of the analysis is to construct Kaplan-Meier curves, which
provide an overview of the shape of the survival functions and their relation to each
other as influenced by the categorical predictors from the theory. However, since all of
the trade cost measures are continuous, I transform each of them into indicator vari-
ables that take the value of one for values above the mean for each of the trade costs
measures and are zero otherwise. The findings are presented in Figure 11. Panels A
and B of the figure report the findings for internal trade costs as measured by internal
distance (DIST INTRL) and internal tariffs (TRFF INTRL), respectively. Panels
C and D present estimates for external trade costs as measured by (DIST EXTRL)
and external tariffs (TRFF EXTRL).
As evident from Panel A and Panel C, the curves for internal distance and external
distance are rather parallel, except in the very beginning and toward the end of the
period. These visual results are reinforced by the p-values from log-rank tests of
equality across strata: 0.0227 for internal distance and 0.0003 for external distance.
The graphs for internal tariffs and external tariffs are not as parallel and in fact
the curves overlap at some points in time. See Panel B and Panel D of Figure 11.
However, the p-values of the log-rank tests are 0.0544 and 0.0492 for internal tariffs
and for external tariffs, respectively, and thus reject equality across strata. In sum,
the preliminary analysis offers encouraging evidence that trade costs, as proxied by
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distance and tariffs, are important predictors of cartel discipline and, therefore, should
be included as predictors in the econometric model.
Estimates from a series of Cox proportional hazard regressions that gradually
introduce the main regressors and complement the theoretical predictions with ad-
ditional covariates from the related literature are presented in Table 3. In the first
four columns of the table, I experiment by sequentially introducing the proxies for
trade costs. In column (1), I use the logarithm of internal distance, DIST INTRL,
as the only covariate. The positive and significant estimate DIST INTRL = 0.141
(std.err. 0.044) suggests that larger internal trade costs contribute to the dissolu-
tion of international cartels. This result is exactly in accordance with the theory,
which predicts that larger internal trade costs are associated with weaker cartel disci-
pline. Similar results are obtained in column (2) of Table 3, where I also add internal
tariffs, TRFF INTRL. Larger tariffs on trade between cartel members diminish
cartel discipline. The estimates of the effects of external trade costs, as measured by
external distance, in column (3), and by external distance and external tariffs, in col-
umn (4), are also consistent with the theory. The positive and significant estimates
on DIST EXTRL and TRFF EXTRL suggest that higher external trade costs
weaken cartel discipline and, therefore, increase the probability of cartel dissolution.
I combine all trade cost measures in a single specification in column (5) of Table
3. Three of the four trade costs estimates are positive and statistically significant as
predicted by theory. The only estimate that loses significance is on external tariffs. A
possible explanation for this result is that tariffs are no longer such a prominent deter-
minant of trade costs as they were in the past. Nevertheless, I still obtain a positive
and significant effect of internal tariffs on cartel discipline. This motivated us to push
the analysis further by including two additional covariates, ∆%TRFF INTRL and
∆%TRFF EXTRL, which are constructed as percentage changes in internal and
external tariffs, respectively. The estimates in column (6) reveal that the changes
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in internal and external tariffs are not significant determinants of cartel discipline.
As noted above, the explanation is that tariffs and tariff changes are no longer such
important trade policy tools and their impact on trade costs has decreased signifi-
cantly in recent years, especially among the OECD countries in the sample. Despite
the insignificant estimates on the effects of the percentage changes in internal and
external tariffs, I find it appropriate to keep all tariff covariates as control variables
in the remaining specifications.
In column (7) of Table 3 I introduce a series of cartel characteristics, some of which
have been used in the related literature, while others are novel contributions of the
rich cartel data. I believe these collusive covariates may be important determinants of
cartel discipline in addition to trade costs. And, I do in fact find evidence that some of
the estimates on these cartel variables exert a significant effect on the hazard of cartel
death. For instance, the results suggest that cartels which adopt price-fixing collusive
strategies exhibit a weaker cartel discipline. This finding is consistent with Dick
(1996) who reports a positive, but insignificant estimate on price-fixing on the risk of
cartel death. Furthermore, the more pronounced the cultural diversity of a cartel, the
higher the hazard of dissolution. This is in accordance with Connor et al. (2013) who
show that a cartel’s cultural diversity exerts a positive impact on the hazard rate in
most of their estimation specifications. On the other hand, setting up sales quotas or
using market allocation are both negatively related to the risk of cartel break-up, in
accordance with Levenstein and Suslow (2010)87 Similarly to the existing literature,
e.g., Connor et al. (2013), I find that cartel discovery varies by region.88 Finally,
bid-rigging exerts a positive and significant impact on the hazard of dissolution. This
result is in sharp contrast to the findings of Connor et al. (2013) who report a negative
estimate on their bid-rigging variable. The remainder of the cartel controls from the
87 Although their coefficient estimate on market allocation is not statistically significant.
88 Connor et al. (2013) include only three dummy variables to control for the region of discovery -
U.S., E.U., and other in their case - and find them all to decrease the risk of cartel dissolution.
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specification do not have a statistically significant effect on cartel discipline.89 Most
importantly for the purposes, the estimates from column (7) reveal that the effects
of trade costs on cartel discipline remain positive and statistically significant even in
the presence of a large number of (potential) determinants of cartel stability.
Overall, the first-stage analysis presented in this section offers robust empirical
evidence that both internal and external trade costs are positively related to the
hazard of cartel dissolution and, therefore, lends strong support for the theoretical
predictions about the relation between trade costs and cartel discipline. Encouraged
by these findings, I adopt the methods from Section 2.1 to construct several measures
of cartel discipline. Then, I employ these proxies of collusive discipline to study the
impact of cartels and cartel discipline on (internal and external) trade.
2.3.2 Effects of Cartel Discipline on International Trade
Column (1) of Table 4 reports estimates of the effects of a set of proxies for trade
frictions that are standard in the empirical trade literature. These OLS estimates are
obtained with exporter, importer, sector, and time fixed effects.90 Standard errors
are clustered by exporter-importer pair. The results from column (1) are as expected
and as they have been consistently documented in the trade literature. I obtain
a negative and significant estimate of the effect of bilateral distance (DIST ), and
positive and significant estimates of the effects of contiguity (CNTG), sharing a colo-
nial relationship (CLNY ), and membership to a common regional trade agreement
(RTA). The only insignificant estimate in column (1) is on the effect of common
89 This is not surprising as it is often the case in the cartel duration literature that different studies
find opposing effects for the same covariate. For example, Connor et al (2013), Levenstein and
Suslow (2010), De (2010) find the number of cartel members to exert a positive, but mostly
insignificant, impact on the hazard rate. On the other hand, Dick (1996) and in Zhou (2012),
find that the number of cartel members has a negative and statistically significant impact on
the hazard of dissolution.
90 Later in this section and in the robustness analysis I experiment with alternative sets of fixed
effects and with an alternative estimator.
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language (LANG). In terms of magnitude, the estimates are comparable to the sum-
mary meta-analysis indexes from Head and Mayer (2014). Finally, I note that with
an R2 = 0.78, the trade model delivers a strong fit. Overall, I find the estimates from
column (1) to be plausible and in accordance with the expectations. This is evidence
of the representativeness of the sample and gives us confidence to proceed with the
main analysis.
In column (2) Table 4, I introduce two additional covariates to the specification
from column (1). CARTEL is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for
exports by cartel members to other cartel members and also for exports by car-
tel members to non-members. In effect, this specification imposes a common effect
of cartels on internal and external trade. CARTEL DSCPLN is the interaction
between CARTEL and the most preferred measure of cartel discipline, which is con-
structed from the trade cost covariates and from the other determinants of cartel
discipline using the first-stage estimates from column (7) of Table 3 and actual data.
Since CARTEL DSCPLN is a generated covariate, the standard errors from the
specification in column (2), as well as the standard errors in all remaining columns of
Table 4, are bootstrapped.
Two results stand out from the estimates in column (2). First, I obtain a large,
positive, and highly statistically significant estimate on the variable CARTEL. This
result suggests that international cartels promote internal and external cartel trade.
Even though the theory treats cartel presence as exogenously given and does not
generate predictions about the effects of cartel existence on international trade, I
find this result quite intriguing because it reveals a potential channel through which
international cartels may in fact be welfare improving by stimulating trade. Second,
I obtain a negative and also very precisely estimated effect of cartel discipline on
internal and external cartel trade. This finding is exactly in accordance with the
predictions of the theory. Finally, I note that the estimates of all standard trade
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cost covariates (e.g., distance, colony, etc.) are robust to the introduction of the new
cartel variables.
I investigate separately the effects of cartels and cartel discipline on internal and
external trade in column (3) of Table 4. All four cartel variables are statistically
significant at any conventional level. The positive estimates on CARTEL INTRNL
and CARTEL EXTRNL suggest that the presence of international cartels promotes
internal as well as external trade. In accordance with the theory, I obtain negative
estimates of the effects of cartel discipline both on internal cartel trade, as evident
from the estimate on CARTEL DSCPLN INTRNL, and on external cartel trade,
as supported by the estimate on CARTEL DSCPLN INTRNL. Finally, the esti-
mates reveal that the effects of cartels and cartel discipline are three times stronger
on internal trade than on external trade.
I view the estimates from column (4) of Table 4 as the main results because these
indexes are obtained with a rich set of importer-time, exporter-time, and sector-time
fixed effects that control for any observable and unobservable characteristics at these
particular dimensions.91 The magnitude of the key cartel estimates from column (4)
declines slightly as compared to the corresponding numbers from column (2), but the
two sets of estimates are not statistically different from each other. More importantly,
all four cartel covariates retain their signs and remain statistically significant. Finally,
I note that the fit of the model improves only marginally.
Finally, in column (5) of Table 4, I introduce tariffs as an additional trade policy
covariate that is measured and constructed at the most disaggregated 6-digit HS level
of aggregation, which coincides with the sectoral dimension of the dependent variable.
The reason for not including tariffs in the previous specifications is that data on
tariffs are patchy and limited. This is confirmed by the number of observations that
91 In the robustness analysis, I also experiment by adding symmetric and asymmetric pair-fixed
effects as well as exporter-product time and importer-product-time fixed effects.
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I report in the bottom of column (5), which reveals that the introduction of tariffs
results in a loss of more than 20 percent of the observations in the main sample.
Despite the smaller sample size, I find that the effects of tariffs on trade are negative
and statistically significant as expected. In addition, and more important for the
purposes, I see that the estimates of all cartel covariates remain unchanged. In fact,
the effects of each of the cartel variables are more precisely estimated in column (5)
as compared to the main estimates from column (4).
I finish this section with a battery of sensitivity experiments. First, I reproduce the
results from columns (2)-(5) of Table 4 after employing cartel duration, as measured
directly from the data, as a proxy for cartel discipline. The estimates from columns
(6)-(9) are qualitatively identical to the corresponding numbers from columns (2)-(5).
Notably, the effects of cartel discipline, as proxied by cartel duration are about twice
stronger.
The analysis in this section supports several robust relations between cartels, cartel
discipline, and international trade. In accordance with the theory, I obtain negative
and statistically significant effects of cartel discipline on both internal and external
trade. The effects of cartel discipline on internal trade are significantly stronger as
compared to the corresponding effects on external trade. I estimate robust and large
positive effects of cartel presence on internal and on external trade. Overall, I find
the results from this stage encouraging, because they confirm the predictions of the
theoretical model.
2.4 Robustness Checks
2.4.1 On the Effects of Trade Costs on Cartel Discipline
To examine the robustness of the first-stage results, I perform a series of sensitivity
experiments. To ease the comparison with the main results, I include in column (1)
of Table 5 the main estimates presented in column (7) of Table 3.
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Distance Aggregates: To verify the robustness of the results to the use of var-
ious proxies for trade costs and different aggregation methods, I experiment with
two additional constructs of internal and external distance. First, instead of using
population-weighted distance as a proxy for trade costs, I obtain an aggregate of
bilateral distance using GDP weights. The results are presented in column (2) of
Table 5 and remain in line with the main estimates and in support of the theoretical
model. Both internal and external trade costs have a positive effect on the hazard
of cartel dissolution and therefore are inversely related to cartel discipline. Next, I
construct the distance aggregates using population weights again, but multiply them
with bilateral distance, instead of the inverse of bilateral distance. The estimates of
both internal and external trade costs in column (3) of Table 5 are still positive and
highly statistically significant.
CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t Definition: The theory is quite specific about the def-
inition of a cartel outsider. However, given the flexibility of the cartels dataset, I
experiment with several different possible definitions of an external market, ranging
from ‘liberal’ to ‘conservative’, to test the robustness of the main results. The results
are presented in columns (4)-(6) of Table 5. First, I use a quite liberal definition of
CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t, where the variable takes the value of 1 as long as country
i is a member of cartel k in sector g, but country −j is not. The results in column
(4) remain qualitatively unchanged. Then, in column (5) I use a more conservative
definition of an outsider, such that CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t takes the value of 1
as long as the non-cartel importer −j trades with 3 or more of the cartel exporters
i. Essentially, now I define the importer −j as a market where 3 or more cartel
members meet. Again, the estimates of both internal trade costs and external trade
costs remain positive and significant. However, the coefficient on TRFF INTRL,
although still positive, is no longer statistically significant. Lastly, in column (6), I
use an even more restrictive definition of CARTEL OUT k,gi−j,t, which now takes the
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value of 1 as long as country i is a member of cartel k in sector g, but country −j
is not and all outsiders import from all cartel members. The results in column (6)
show that internal trade costs continue to exert a positive and statistically significant
impact on the risk of cartel death, whereas the estimates on external trade costs and
on internal tariffs remain positive, but lose their statistical significance. This could be
explained by the fact that moving from the liberal to the most conservative definition
of CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t leads to a loss of 60% in the non-zero observations of
external distance.
Tariffs: Having experimented with different distance aggregates for the proxies
for internal and external trade costs, it is only natural that I do the same with the
internal and external tariff constructs. Thus, I examine the sensitivity of the main
estimates not only to changes in the trade costs and trade liberalization proxies, but
also to changes in the number of observations in the sample (due to the relatively
sparse tariff data). Therefore, in column (7), I proceed by including only the proxies
for internal trade costs and external trade costs without any of the tariff-related
variables to employ the maximum number of observations in the sample. Again,
the results show that both DIST INTRL and DIST EXTRL have a positive and
significant impact on the risk of cartel death and are, therefore, inversely related to
cartel discipline. Next, in column (8) of Table 5 I use the initial tariff level to proxy
for trade liberalization and while the results are unchanged for internal and external
distance, TRFF INTRL loses its statistical significance, but remains positive. In
column (9), I use most favored nation (MFN) weighted average tariffs instead of the
effectively applied weighted average tariff rates to proxy for trade liberalization and
the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Industry Fixed Effects: Lastly, I control for various observable and unobservable
sector-specific characteristics that could potentially affect the duration of collusion by
including industry fixed effects to the main specification from column (8) of Table 3.
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The results presented in column (10) of Table 5 show that both internal and external
distance have a positive and significant effect on the hazard ratio. Overall, the sen-
sitivity experiments show that the first-stage estimates are qualitatively unchanged
and robust to the use of various proxies for trade costs and trade liberalization and
the inclusion of controls for unobserved sectoral heterogeneity.
2.4.2 On the Effects of Cartel Discipline on International Trade
Table 6 and Table 7 present a series of robustness checks for the second-stage esti-
mates. In both tables, I include in column (1) the main estimates from column (4)
of Table 4 to ease comparison.
Cartel Discipline Definition: Although the definition of the inverse index of cartel
discipline, θ, presented in the theoretical model is quite precise, due to the lack of data
on cartel discipline in the empirical analysis I experiment with several such proxies,
constructed using the first-stage estimates. The results are presented in columns (2)-
(4) of Table 6. In column (2) of Table 6 I use a more conservative measure of cartel
discipline, constructed using only the first-stage estimates of and actual data on the
proxies for trade costs and trade liberalization (distance and effectively applied tariff
rates) without including any of the cartel controls. The estimates remain qualitatively
similar to the main findings. Quantitatively, I find that the effects of cartels and
cartel discipline have doubled in magnitude to the extent that the estimate of the
presence of cartels on internal trade is implausibly large. This result casts doubt on
this specification. Then, in column (3) of Table 6, I construct the proxy for cartel
discipline using only the estimates of and data on the controls for cartel discipline
for which I obtained significant estimates. Once again I confirm the main findings.
Next, I use a more liberal proxy for discipline – the predicted hazard ratio from the
first-stage estimation including the effects of the industry fixed effects. I still find that
the estimates of the presence of cartels and cartel discipline are significant and with
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expected signs. However, the estimates on external trade are no longer significant.
CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t Definition: Similarly to the robustness experiments for
the first-stage analysis, I also experiment with various definitions of a cartel outsider
in the creation of CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRL for the second-stage estimations.
In columns (5)-(7) of of Table 6, I use alternative definitions of a cartel non-member
country. First, I define the external market −j as a market where at least one of the
cartel members exports to. The results in column (5) remain qualitatively unchanged.
Then, in column (6) I use a more conservative definition of a cartel outsider and re-
quire it to trade with 3 or more of the cartel exporters. Again, the estimates of both
CARTEL DSCPLN INTRL and CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRL remain negative
and significant and all the other coefficients are qualitatively unchanged. Lastly, in
column (7), I use an even more restrictive definition of CARTEL EXTRNLk,gi−j,t,
which now takes the value of 1 as long as all members of cartel k in sector g ex-
port to the same outsider simultaneously. This is the most restrictive definition of
a cartel non-member, yet I still find that both CARTEL DSCPLN INTRL and
CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRL have a negative and significant impact on bilateral
trade.
PPML: In column (2) of Table 7 I employ the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Like-
lihood (PPML) technique to verify the robustness of the main results. The use of
the PPML estimator has been advocated by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) as it
accounts for the heteroskedasticity present in the trade data as well as for the exis-
tence of zero trade flows and thus delivers unbiased and consistent estimates of the
variables of interest. Once again, the results shown in column (6) remain qualita-
tively in line with the main findings and support the predictions of the theoretical
model. Namely, CARTEL DSCPLN INTRL and CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRL
both affect bilateral trade in a negative and statistically significant manner.
Fixed Effects: In column (3) of Table 7, I estimate the main model again with OLS,
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but now I also include symmetric bilateral fixed effects, which not only control for
any country-pair-specific unobserved sources of heterogeneity, but also account for all
bilateral time-invariant trade costs.92 More importantly for the purposes, the bilateral
fixed effects also control for any potential endogeneity in the cartel variables. Again,
the results show that cartel discipline is inversely related to both internal and external
trade. In column (4) of Table 7 I allow these pair fixed effects to also be asymmetric
across exporter-importer pairs. The results remain qualitatively unchanged and again
support the theoretical predictions. The specification in column (5) of Table 7 uses
exporter-sector-time and importer-sector-time fixed effects. These fixed effects will
account for any sector-country-time characteristics that may affect trade but have
been omitted from the model. Most of the estimates in column (5) are similar to
the main results. Importantly, I find that the effects of cartels and cartel discipline
on internal trade remain significant and with expected signs. However, I note that
the effects of cartels and cartel discipline on external markets become insignificant.
This result is consistent with the finding that the effects of cartels on exports to third
markets are smaller as compared to the impact on internal trade. Finally, in column
(6) I allow for the effects of trade costs to vary at the most disaggregated 6-digit HS
product level. The new results are virtually identical to those from column (5).
Sample Size: Next, I test the sensitivity of the main results to the sample selec-
tion. First, I expand the sample by including all cartels, where the cartelized product
was assigned a 4-digit HS code, which increases the number of observations by about
37%, and present the results in column (7) of Table 7. I still find that cartel discipline
is inversely related to internal and external trade, but the estimate on internal trade,
CARTEL DSCPLN INTRL, is no longer significant. These findings remain intact
when I focus on the entire sample of cartels and even include the only 2-digit cartel
92 Note that these bilateral time-invariant fixed effects absorb the standard gravity proxies for
trade costs used in the previous specifications (distance, contiguity, common language, etc).
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(“Toys and Games Cartel”) in the data. This exercise increases the number of obser-
vations in the sample by about 39% relative to the main specification in column (1).
Still, the effect of discipline on internal trade remains negative and insignificant, while
CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRL is negative and significant, as shown in (8) of Table
7. In columns (9)-(11) of Table 7 I experiment with different time intervals: 2-year,
3-year, and 5-year intervals, respectively. Cheng and Wall (2005) advise against the
use of fixed effects with “... data pooled over consecutive years on the grounds that
dependent and independent variables cannot fully adjust in a single year’s time.”(p.8).
The main results remain robust throughout with the only exception being the fact
that the estimate of CARTEL DSCPLN INTRL loses its significance, but remains
negative, when I employ 5-year intervals, as shown in column (11). This could be
explained by the significant number of observations lost when I switch from 4-year
intervals to the more sparse 5-year intervals.
Overall, the second-stage estimates do not seem sensitive to the use of various
proxies for cartel discipline, different definitions of a cartel outsider, the estimation
procedure, the set of fixed effects, or the sample size.
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3 Empirical Analysis: Concluding Remarks
In the empirical analysis presented in this section of my dissertation, I test some of
the theoretical predictions of the models described in Part II: Theoretical Analysis.
In Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?, I test whether multi-product
collusion actually enhances trade by employing the empirical gravity model of trade.
First, I analyze the average effect of cartels on trade and find it to be positive and
significant, suggesting that on average the existence of cartels promotes trade between
cartel-member countries. Second, I focus specifically on the impact of multi-product
cartels and offer evidence that collusion between multi-product firms exerts a positive
and significant effect on trade. This effect is statistically larger (at the 1% confidence
level) than the impact of single-product cartels on trade. Third, I test whether the
effects of multi-product cartels (and single-product cartels) differ depending on the
degree of product substitutability. In line with the theory, I find that the positive
and significant effect of multi-product cartels on trade becomes more pronounced for
differentiated goods relative to homogeneous goods. On the other hand, the impact
of multi-product collusion on trade when the goods are relatively closer substitutes
is still positive, but insignificant. The effect of single-product cartels on trade does
not vary with the degree of substitutability. These results are robust to a series of
sensitivity experiments, where I use different sets of fixed effects, an alternative proxy
for product substitutability, as well as different year intervals. The results are consis-
tent with the model’s predictions and provide empirical evidence that multi-product
international cartels can promote trade between members, especially when the goods
are sufficiently unrelated.
In Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs, I use the same dataset on cartels and trade
to test some of the relations documented in the theoretical model. To that end, I
adopt a two-stage estimation approach. In the first-stage, I test the hypothesis that
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(internal and external) trade costs (as proxied by geographic distance and import
tariffs) are inversely related to cartel discipline using a Cox Proportional Hazard
model of cartel duration. The results reveal that internal trade costs have a positive
and statistically significant effect on the hazard of cartel break-up, supporting the
theoretical prediction that internal trade costs are inversely related to cartel discipline.
Moreover, the effect of external distance on the hazard of collusive dissolution is also
positive and highly significant, suggesting that external trade costs are indirectly
related to cartel discipline, as predicted by the theoretical model. Then, I employ the
first-stage estimates to construct several measures of cartel discipline. I employ these
proxies for cartel discipline in the second-stage analysis, where I test the hypothesis
that stronger cartel discipline impedes (both internal and external) trade. To that
end, I employ the empirical gravity model of trade and in line with the theory, I
find that the effect of cartel discipline on both internal trade and external trade
to be negative and statistically significant. These results imply that indeed stronger
collusive discipline obstructs trade both between cartel members and between a cartel
exporter and a non-cartel importer. In addition, in the second-stage analysis, I control
for the existence of cartels and find that on average collusion promotes trade. Overall,
the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
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Part V. Concluding Remarks
My dissertation studies the links between international cartels and international
trade both theoretically and empirically.
In Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?, I build a segmented-markets
Cournot-duopoly model, where each firm produces two goods, but enjoys a compet-
itive cost advantage in the production of one of them. The interaction between the
difference in marginal production costs and the trade costs is central to the analy-
sis. I show that the opportunity for rationalization of production and trade under
collusion can increase trade flows of the cost-efficient good relative to competition.
This possibility arises when the production cost asymmetry is sufficiently greater than
the trade costs and the goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first work to present a model, where cartels promote trade
between members. Using a novel, hand-collected dataset on international cartels,
I test this prediction empirically. I find that the average effect of cartels on trade
is positive and significant. Moreover, multi-product collusion exerts a positive and
significant effect on bilateral trade and this effect is statistically stronger than the
impact of single-product cartels. Further, the positive effect of multi-product cartels
on trade becomes more pronounced, the more unrelated the goods are, in line with
the theoretical model.
Due to the cartel’s enhanced production efficiency, collusion can welfare-dominate
competition. Specifically, there always exists a set of transportation costs and cost
differential values for which collusion provides a greater level of welfare relative to
competition regardless of the degree of substitutability. In the case of import tariffs,
this possibility arises only if the goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. In Ap-
pendix A, I verify that in this framework maximal collusion is indeed a sustainable
outcome of the repeated game and I also show that trade liberalization (or a reduc-
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tion in the cost heterogeneity) can enhance cartel stability and thus further strengthen
the efficiency gains noted above. Overall, the novel results in Trade-Promoting and
Welfare-Enhancing Cartels? demonstrate that international cartels need not neces-
sarily be considered “a true scourge of the world economy.”
In Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs, I examine the implications of collusion for
output and welfare when cartel members are able to exploit their market power in
outside countries. I develop a three-country, quantity-setting, homogeneous-good
duopoly model, where each of the firms has production facilities in one country only,
with the third market being just an importer of the good. Firms interact repeatedly
over the infinite time horizon and pool their incentive constraints across markets to
sustain collusion. The countries are separated by per-unit internal (between cartel
hosts) trade costs and external (between a cartel country and a third market) trade
costs.
Nevertheless, when I solve the cartel’s constrained optimization problem, all mar-
kets become strategically linked. I derive an endogenous index of cartel discipline as
a function of (internal and external) trade costs, relative market size, and time pref-
erences. Reciprocal reductions in these costs enhance cartel discipline. Thus, trade
liberalization (between any two countries) actually affects output deliveries, profits
and welfare in all markets (both directly and indirectly through cartel discipline).
Then, I derive several novel results regarding the effects of economic integration on
welfare. Overall, the presence of third-country markets alters the implications of
trade liberalization for collusive stability, optimal shipments and welfare.
I use the same dataset on cartels and trade to test some of the relations docu-
mented in the theoretical model. I adopt a two-stage econometric method, where in
the first stage I analyze the effects of (internal and external) trade costs on cartel
discipline, using a Cox Proportional Hazard model. Consistent with the theory, I
find that both internal trade costs and external trade costs, as proxied by geographic
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distance and import tariffs, are inversely related to cartel discipline. Encouraged by
the first-stage results, I use these estimates to create several measures for cartel dis-
cipline and use them to test the hypothesis that stronger cartel discipline impedes
(internal and external) trade. In the second-stage analysis, I employ the empirical
gravity model of trade and in support of the theoretical model, I find that the impact
of cartel discipline on both internal trade and external trade is negative and sta-
tistically significant. These results imply that stronger collusive discipline obstructs
trade both between cartel members and between a cartel exporter and a non-cartel
importer. The empirical results thus support the predictions of the theoretical model.
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Tables
Table 1: Multi-Product Cartels and International Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GRAV CARTEL MULTIPRD FES RAUCH (1999)
DIST -0.588** -0.592** -0.592** -0.630** -0.679**
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068)
CNTG 0.433** 0.448** 0.451** 0.425** 0.433**
(0.128) (0.130) (0.130) (0.127) (0.135)
CLNY 0.093 0.071 0.069 0.097 -0.120
(0.110) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.114)
LANG 0.067 0.077 0.080 0.052 0.091
(0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099)
RTA 0.626** 0.607** 0.605** 0.575** 0.603**
(0.139) (0.137) (0.136) (0.146) (0.156)
CARTEL 1.027**
(0.149)
CARTEL MLTPRD 1.119** 1.356** 0.434*
(0.159) (0.219) (0.191)
CARTEL SNGLPRD 0.634** 0.914** 0.444+
(0.172) (0.194) (0.250)
CARTEL MLTPRD DFRNT GOODS 1.127**
(0.224)
CARTEL MLTPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS 0.336
(0.232)
CARTEL SINGLEPRD DFRNT GOODS 0.348
(0.262)
CARTEL SINGLEPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS 0.118
(0.244)
p-value
βˆC MLTPRD = βˆC SNGLPRD 0.0105 0.0609 0.9238
Fixed Effects:
Exporter Yes Yes Yes No No
Importer Yes Yes Yes No No
Sector Yes Yes Yes No No
Year Yes Yes Yes No No
Exporter-Year No No No Yes Yes
Importer-Year No No No Yes Yes
Sector-Year No No No Yes Yes
Observations 312,207 312,207 312,207 312,207 293,917
Notes: This table reports estimates of the relation between multi-product cartels and bilateral trade obtained with the
PPML estimator. Column (1) presents the estimates of the standard gravity variables. Columns (2) tests the impact
of collusion on trade. Column (3) focuses on the effect of multi-product cartels and single-product cartels on trade.
Column (4) repeats the exercises from Column (3), but now using exporter-time, importer-time and sector-time fixed
effects. Column (5) studies the impact of multi-product cartels on trade for differing degrees of product substitutability,
using Rauch’s (1999) classification of goods. The estimates of the fixed effects are omitted for brevity. See text for
further details. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2: Multi-Product Cartels and International Trade - Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
SYMM ASYMM ASYMM ASYMM B&W B&W 2-Year 3-Year 5-Year
PAIR FEs PAIR FEs PAIR FEs PAIR FEs (2006) (2006) Intervals Intervals Intervals
DIST -0.678** -0.664** -0.722** -0.673**
(0.067) (0.066) (0.057) (0.065)
CNTG 0.449** 0.442** 0.422** 0.424**
(0.132) (0.132) (0.127) (0.127)
CLNY -0.123 -0.136 -0.150 -0.155
(0.114) (0.112) (0.121) (0.110)
LANG 0.078 0.086 0.098 0.102
(0.099) (0.098) (0.100) (0.100)
RTA -0.105 0.416* -0.126 -0.151 0.570** -0.162 0.621** 0.508** 0.595**
(0.098) (0.191) (0.114) (0.112) (0.150) (0.112) (0.158) (0.133) (0.155)
CARTEL MLTPRD 0.433* 1.102** 1.337** 0.434+ 2.707** 2.593** 0.371* 0.353+ 0.362+
(0.195) (0.156) (0.217) (0.195) (0.489) (0.474) (0.187) (0.187) (0.190)
CARTEL SNGLPRD 0.581* 0.678** 0.946** 0.578* 0.710* 0.602+ 0.423 0.459+ 0.354
(0.267) (0.166) (0.189) (0.268) (0.303) (0.363) (0.267) (0.276) (0.286)
CARTEL MLTPRD DFRNT GOODS 1.093** 1.100** 1.097** 1.175** 1.121**
(0.228) (0.228) (0.210) (0.221) (0.209)
CARTEL MLTPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS 0.364 0.373 0.436+ 0.480+ 0.323
(0.237) (0.237) (0.236) (0.245) (0.218)
CARTEL SINGLEPRD DFRNT GOODS 0.234 0.246 0.346 0.343 0.388
(0.289) (0.287) (0.284) (0.284) (0.316)
CARTEL SINGLEPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS -0.039 -0.035 0.157 0.081 0.151
(0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.275) (0.268)
CARTEL MLTPRD SUBSTIT -0.311** -0.287**
(0.086) (0.083)
CARTEL SNGLPRD SUBSTIT -0.010 0.020
(0.065) (0.080)
Fixed Effects:
Exporter No Yes No No No No No No No
Importer No Yes No No No No No No No
Sector No Yes No No No No No No No
Year No Yes No No No No No No No
Exporter-Year Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-Year Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No
Observations 298,858 318,753 318,753 298,858 305,677 305,677 556,728 403,907 249,642
Notes: This table reports estimates of the relation between multi-product cartels and bilateral trade obtained with the PPML estimator. Column (1) reproduces
the results from column (5) of Table 1 with symmetric pair fixed effects. Columns (2)-(4) employ asymmetric fixed effects and reestimate columns (3)-(5) of Table
1. Column (5) and Column (6) employ Broda and Weinstein’s (2006) elasticity estimates as proxy for the degree of product substitutability. In Column (5), I use
an average product elasticity across importers. In Column (6), I test the results from column (5) more stringently by including bilateral asymmetric fixed effects.
In Columns (7)-(9), I use 2-year, 3-year, and 5-year intervals in the data, respectively. The estimates of the fixed effects are omitted for brevity. See text for further
details. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3: Cartel Discipline and International Trade Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLE INTRNL INTRNL EXTRNL EXTRNL ALL TRADE DISCPLN
NAMES COSTS I COSTS II COSTS I COSTS II COSTS LBRLZN CNTRLS
TRADE COSTS
DIST INTRA 0.141 0.470 0.369 0.416 0.525
(0.044)∗∗ (0.083)∗∗ (0.095)∗∗ (0.109)∗∗ (0.157)∗∗
TRFF INTRA 0.263 0.472 0.524 0.642
(0.103)∗ (0.236)∗ (0.286)+ (0.367)+
DIST EXTRL 0.242 0.471 0.308 0.299 0.546
(0.063)∗∗ (0.086)∗∗ (0.107)∗∗ (0.140)∗ (0.175)∗∗
TRFF EXTRL 0.271 -0.131 -0.098 -0.185
(0.107)∗ (0.240) (0.307) (0.396)
∆% TRFF INTRA -0.172 -0.203
(0.160) (0.203)
∆% TRFF EXTRL 0.223 0.268
(0.158) (0.199)
DISCPLN CNTRLS
FIRMS -0.017
(0.056)
MKTSHR 0.088
(0.366)
ALLCTN -0.341
(0.263)
DOMFIRM 0.241
(0.313)
PRCFIX 1.396
(0.605)∗
INFRMN 0.557
(0.347)
QUOTA -1.569
(0.449)∗∗
BIDRGG 0.689
(0.414)+
RCDVST -0.016
(0.340)
BUYBCK -0.141
(0.421)
CLTRDV 1.120
(0.541)∗
DSCVR US 1.451
(0.716)∗
DSCVR CA -5.176
(1.787)∗∗
DSCVR EU 1.031
(0.690)
DSCVR OTHR 3.192
(1.232)∗∗
Observations 153 119 153 123 118 110 110
Notes: This table reports estimates of the relationship between cartel discipline and trade costs.
The dependent variable is always cartel duration measured in months. The estimator is always the
Cox proportional hazard model. The first five columns of the table offer preliminary evidence for
the effects of trade costs on cartel duration(discipline). Specifically, the single covariate in column
(1) is the logarithm of internal distance. Column (2) adds the logarithm of internal tariffs. Columns
(3) and (4) use external trade costs. Column (5) combines all trade cost covariates. Column (6)
introduces additional controls for cartel discipline, which are borrowed from the related literature.
Finally, column (7) adds controls for cartel discovery. See text for further details.
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Table 4: Cartels, Cartel Discipline and International Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CARTEL DISCIPLINE CARTEL DURATION
GRAV COMMN INTRA FEs TRFF COMMN INTRA FEs TRFF
DIST -0.747 -0.747 -0.747 -0.722 -0.873 -0.747 -0.747 -0.722 -0.873
(0.042)∗∗ (0.048)∗∗ (0.043)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗ (0.043)∗∗ (0.064)∗∗ (0.047)∗∗
CNTG 0.511 0.511 0.510 0.516 0.413 0.511 0.511 0.517 0.413
(0.112)∗∗ (0.109)∗∗ (0.101)∗∗ (0.086)∗∗ (0.107)∗∗ (0.093)∗∗ (0.097)∗∗ (0.094)∗∗ (0.117)∗∗
CLNY 0.276 0.276 0.275 0.281 0.181 0.276 0.275 0.281 0.180
(0.114)∗ (0.120)∗ (0.092)∗∗ (0.121)∗ (0.105)+ (0.109)∗ (0.101)∗∗ (0.128)∗ (0.094)+
LANG 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.060 0.041 0.069 0.069 0.059 0.041
(0.075) (0.095) (0.083) (0.096) (0.058) (0.074) (0.095) (0.090) (0.087)
RTA 0.254 0.255 0.254 0.334 0.392 0.255 0.254 0.333 0.390
(0.101)∗ (0.125)∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.144)∗ (0.156)∗ (0.106)∗ (0.094)∗∗ (0.152)∗ (0.172)∗
CARTEL 1.156 1.089
(0.232)∗∗ (0.252)∗∗
CARTEL DSCPLN -0.103 -0.231
(0.020)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗
CARTEL INTRA 2.541 2.278 2.211 2.588 2.954 2.948
(0.429)∗∗ (0.471)∗∗ (0.618)∗∗ (0.438)∗∗ (0.372)∗∗ (0.513)∗∗
CARTEL DSCPLN INTRA -0.218 -0.182 -0.175 -0.521 -0.570 -0.563
(0.039)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗ (0.052)∗∗ (0.087)∗∗ (0.078)∗∗ (0.106)∗∗
CARTEL EXTRNL 0.798 0.808 0.706 0.721 0.729 0.760
(0.290)∗∗ (0.300)∗∗ (0.090)∗∗ (0.250)∗∗ (0.251)∗∗ (0.347)∗
CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRNL -0.074 -0.071 -0.068 -0.159 -0.151 -0.173
(0.026)∗∗ (0.026)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗ (0.054)∗∗ (0.071)∗
TARIFF -0.186 -0.186
(0.055)∗∗ (0.031)∗∗
Observations 231887 231887 231887 231887 185054 231887 231887 231887 185054
Notes: This table reports estimates of the relationship between cartel discipline and international trade costs. The dependent variable is always the logarithm
of bilateral trade and the estimator is OLS. The estimates in the first three columns are obtained with importer, exporter, sector and time fixed effects. The
estimates of the fixed effects are omitted for brevity. The first column reports estimates with only standard variables from the gravity trade literature. Column (2)
introduces cartels and cartel discipline and constraints the effects of cartels and cartel discipline on internal and on external trade to be equal. Column (3) allows
for heterogeneous effects of cartels and cartel discipline on internal and on external trade. Column (4) uses exporter-time, importer-time, and sector-time fixed
effects. The estimates of the fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Column (5) adds import tariffs to the specification from column (4). Finally, columns (6)-(9)
reproduce the specifications from columns (2)-(5) but using actual ‘cartel duration’ as proxy for cartel discipline. See text for further details.
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Table 5: Cartel Discipline and International Trade Costs: Robustness Experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
MAIN DIST DIST CARTEL CARTEL CARTEL NO TRFF TRFF SCTR
RSLTS GDP POP I OUT I OUT II OUT III TRFF INIT MFN FES
TRADE COSTS
DIST INTRL 0.525 0.579 0.664 0.472 0.567 0.548 0.157 0.565 0.560 0.659
(0.157)∗∗ (0.153)∗∗ (0.163)∗∗ (0.158)∗∗ (0.156)∗∗ (0.157)∗∗ (0.084)+ (0.155)∗∗ (0.162)∗∗ (0.226)∗∗
TRFF INTRL 0.642 0.635 0.443 0.731 0.570 0.230 0.162 0.890 0.356
(0.367)+ (0.368)+ (0.347) (0.363)∗ (0.382) (0.423) (0.332) (0.480)+ (0.507)
DIST EXTRL 0.546 0.528 0.465 0.794 0.293 0.018 0.217 0.479 0.550 0.674
(0.175)∗∗ (0.174)∗∗ (0.204)∗ (0.200)∗∗ (0.141)∗ (0.129) (0.097)∗ (0.164)∗∗ (0.171)∗∗ (0.249)∗∗
TRFF EXTRL -0.185 -0.127 -0.414 -0.301 -0.095 0.278 0.473 -0.478 1.067
(0.396) (0.399) (0.372) (0.391) (0.416) (0.466) (0.391) (0.466) (0.650)
∆% TRFF INTRL -0.203 -0.198 -0.055 -0.116 -0.313 -0.558 -0.366 -0.284 -0.195
(0.203) (0.201) (0.213) (0.207) (0.197) (0.228)∗ (0.245) (0.207) (0.349)
∆% TRFF EXTRL 0.268 0.271 -0.215 0.242 0.280 0.449 -0.014 0.235 -0.151
(0.199) (0.198) (0.212) (0.197) (0.204) (0.243)+ (0.303) (0.209) (0.347)
DISCPLN CNTRLS
FIRMS -0.017 0.003 0.072 -0.021 -0.021 -0.105 -0.015 -0.017 -0.034 -0.090
(0.056) (0.057) (0.061) (0.055) (0.057) (0.072) (0.023) (0.055) (0.060) (0.079)
LGMRKSHR 0.088 0.085 -0.093 0.192 -0.023 -0.369 -0.257 0.115 -0.040 -0.848
(0.366) (0.362) (0.361) (0.365) (0.371) (0.386) (0.274) (0.361) (0.368) (0.533)
ALLCTN -0.341 -0.313 -0.105 -0.378 -0.329 -0.099 -0.410 -0.256 -0.002 -0.104
(0.263) (0.261) (0.258) (0.264) (0.269) (0.262) (0.224)+ (0.254) (0.271) (0.392)
DOMFIRM 0.241 0.195 1.046 0.213 0.348 0.561 0.246 0.338 0.124 1.315
(0.313) (0.314) (0.331)∗∗ (0.309) (0.312) (0.333)+ (0.252) (0.308) (0.321) (0.400)∗∗
PRCFIX 1.396 1.381 1.312 1.493 1.108 0.797 1.402 1.333 1.544 2.300
(0.605)∗ (0.599)∗ (0.579)∗ (0.602)∗ (0.579)+ (0.564) (0.488)∗∗ (0.616)∗ (0.627)∗ (0.967)∗
INFRMN 0.557 0.542 0.869 0.494 0.549 0.867 0.046 0.667 0.722 1.094
(0.347) (0.347) (0.332)∗∗ (0.344) (0.352) (0.380)∗ (0.238) (0.345)+ (0.353)∗ (0.619)+
QUOTA -1.569 -1.570 -1.844 -1.622 -1.521 -1.612 -1.274 -1.705 -1.875 -2.037
(0.449)∗∗ (0.440)∗∗ (0.457)∗∗ (0.449)∗∗ (0.447)∗∗ (0.460)∗∗ (0.344)∗∗ (0.461)∗∗ (0.468)∗∗ (0.735)∗∗
BIDRGG 0.689 0.684 -0.160 0.764 0.493 0.449 -0.145 0.809 0.567 0.686
(0.414)+ (0.410)+ (0.441) (0.416)+ (0.398) (0.477) (0.284) (0.424)+ (0.425) (0.682)
RCDVST -0.016 -0.017 0.519 -0.048 0.028 0.328 0.127 0.010 0.109 0.799
(0.340) (0.342) (0.357) (0.341) (0.338) (0.372) (0.235) (0.343) (0.356) (0.758)
BUYBCK -0.141 -0.230 0.690 -0.134 -0.175 -0.008 0.012 -0.185 0.309 1.948
(0.421) (0.420) (0.422) (0.422) (0.425) (0.430) (0.324) (0.427) (0.446) (0.796)∗
CLTRDV 1.120 1.292 1.814 0.973 1.174 0.775 0.959 1.123 0.848 0.904
(0.541)∗ (0.547)∗ (0.558)∗∗ (0.542)+ (0.544)∗ (0.619) (0.371)∗∗ (0.540)∗ (0.563) (0.756)
DSCVR US 1.451 1.494 2.019 1.441 1.392 1.441 1.148 1.706 1.492 2.148
(0.716)∗ (0.707)∗ (0.714)∗∗ (0.713)∗ (0.716)+ (0.741)+ (0.576)∗ (0.738)∗ (0.728)∗ (0.907)∗
DSCVR CA -5.176 -5.327 -7.141 -5.034 -5.201 -5.644 -3.609 -5.590 -6.016 -6.072
(1.787)∗∗ (1.762)∗∗ (1.786)∗∗ (1.771)∗∗ (1.795)∗∗ (1.850)∗∗ (1.412)∗ (1.870)∗∗ (1.782)∗∗ (2.535)∗
DSCVR EU 1.031 1.032 1.797 1.048 0.979 1.104 0.624 1.319 1.042 0.767
(0.690) (0.685) (0.689)∗∗ (0.685) (0.695) (0.736) (0.560) (0.724)+ (0.707) (0.997)
DSCVR OTHR 3.192 3.309 4.863 3.211 3.034 3.138 1.737 3.302 3.413 5.608
(1.232)∗∗ (1.214)∗∗ (1.163)∗∗ (1.211)∗∗ (1.237)∗ (1.284)∗ (0.771)∗ (1.234)∗∗ (1.205)∗∗ (2.027)∗∗
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 100 153 110 106 110
Notes: This table reports estimates from a series of robustness experiments testing the relationship between
cartel discipline and trade costs. The dependent variable is always cartel duration measured in months. The
estimator is always the Cox proportional hazard model. The first two columns of the table report estimates
with alternative definitions of distance. Specifically, column (2) uses GDP-weighted distance and in column
(3) I construct the distance aggregates using population weights, but multiply them with bilateral distance,
instead of the inverse of bilateral distance. The next three columns use alternative measures for external
distance based on different definitions of the external market for the cartel. Column (4) defines the external
market as a market where at least one of the cartel members exports. Column (5) defines the external market
as a market where all three or more cartel members meet. This definition also includes markets where the two
firms from two-firm cartels meet. Column (6) defines the external market as a market where all cartel members
export simultaneously. In column (7) I use only the proxies for internal trade costs and external trade costs
in order to maximize the number of observations in the sample. I experiment with initial tariffs in column (8)
and with most favored nation (MFN) tariffs in column (9). Finally, in column (10) I introduce sector fixed
effects. See text for further details.
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Table 6: Cartels, Cartel Discipline and International Trade: Robustness Checks I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MAIN DSCPLN1 DSCPLN2 DSCPLN3 CARTELOUT1 CARTELOUT2 CARTELOUT3
DIST -0.722 -0.722 -0.722 -0.722 -0.722 -0.722 -0.722
(0.046)∗∗ (0.048)∗∗ (0.046)∗∗ (0.056)∗∗ (0.050)∗∗ (0.061)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗
CNTG 0.516 0.515 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516
(0.105)∗∗ (0.119)∗∗ (0.084)∗∗ (0.096)∗∗ (0.101)∗∗ (0.123)∗∗ (0.108)∗∗
CLNY 0.281 0.282 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.281
(0.120)∗ (0.103)∗∗ (0.121)∗ (0.103)∗∗ (0.103)∗∗ (0.093)∗∗ (0.121)∗
LANG 0.06 0.059 0.06 0.059 0.06 0.06 0.060
(0.073) (0.080) (0.095) (0.069) (0.082) (0.084) (0.086)
RTA 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.333 0.334 0.334 0.334
(0.135)∗ (0.120)∗∗ (0.126)∗∗ (0.135)∗ (0.122)∗∗ (0.144)∗ (0.140)∗
CARTEL INTRA 2.278 5.35 2.698 2.168 2.303 2.237 2.179
(0.461)∗∗ (0.904)∗∗ (0.542)∗∗ (0.397)∗∗ (0.574)∗∗ (0.614)∗∗ (0.496)∗∗
CARTEL DSCPLN INTRA -0.182 -0.354 -0.225 -0.145 -0.184 -0.179 -0.174
(0.039)∗∗ (0.062)∗∗ (0.048)∗∗ (0.028)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗ (0.043)∗∗
CARTEL EXTRNL 0.808 1.941 0.672 0.202 0.818 0.745 1.313
(0.325)∗ (0.533)∗∗ (0.253)∗∗ (0.245) (0.319)∗ (0.287)∗∗ (0.361)∗∗
CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRNL -0.071 -0.134 -0.06 0 -0.014 -0.071 -0.068 -0.114
(0.028)∗ (0.037)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗ (0.019) (0.029)∗ (0.026)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗
Observations 231887 231887 231887 231887 231887 231887 231887
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of experiments related to the key cartel variables used to study the relationship between cartels, cartel discipline,
and international trade. The first column reproduces the main results from column (4) of Table 4. In columns (2) to (4) I experiment with alternative definitions
of cartel discipline, as described in the text. In columns (5) to (7) I use alternative definitions of cartel external market in order to construct the covariates
CARTEL EXTRNL and CARTEL DSCPLN EXTRNL. Column (5) defines the external market as a market where at least one of the cartel members exports.
Column (6) defines external market as a market where all three or more cartel members meet. This definition also includes markets where the two firms from
two-firm cartels meet. Column (7) defines the external market as a market where all cartel members export simultaneously. See text for further details.
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Table 7: Cartels, Cartel Discipline and International Trade: Robustness Checks II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
MAIN PPML PAIR ASYMM ALL COSTS 4DIGIT ALL 2YRS 3YRS 5YRS
ESTMTR FEs FEs FEs HS6 HS HS INTRVLS INTRVLS INTRVLS
DIST -0.722 -0.713 -0.863 -0.820 -0.825 -0.720 -0.728 -0.701
(0.062)∗∗ (0.071)∗∗ (0.055)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗ (0.043)∗∗ (0.059)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗ (0.050)∗∗
CNTG 0.516 0.274 0.574 0.482 0.476 0.516 0.522 0.568
(0.106)∗∗ (0.121)∗ (0.107)∗∗ (0.093)∗∗ (0.107)∗∗ (0.095)∗∗ (0.103)∗∗ (0.114)∗∗
CLNY 0.281 0.463 0.261 0.294 0.298 0.303 0.312 0.328
(0.109)∗∗ (0.122)∗∗ (0.109)∗ (0.094)∗∗ (0.107)∗∗ (0.115)∗∗ (0.090)∗∗ (0.109)∗∗
LANG 0.060 -0.041 0.144 0.145 0.147 0.059 0.053 0.058
(0.093) (0.125) (0.081)+ (0.062)∗ (0.079)+ (0.091) (0.089) (0.075)
RTA 0.334 0.580 -0.230 -0.203 0.255 0.368 0.370 0.357 0.343 0.383
(0.142)∗ (0.134)∗∗ (0.065)∗∗ (0.066)∗∗ (0.130)∗ (0.116)∗∗ (0.107)∗∗ (0.130)∗∗ (0.135)∗ (0.120)∗∗
CARTEL INTRNL 2.278 3.140 2.016 2.041 1.262 1.348 0.734 0.719 2.163 2.206 1.503
(0.471)∗∗ (1.145)∗∗ (0.532)∗∗ (0.533)∗∗ (0.475)∗∗ (0.479)∗∗ (0.473) (0.511) (0.443)∗∗ (0.508)∗∗ (0.470)∗∗
CARTEL IN DISCIPLINE -0.182 -0.241 -0.165 -0.168 -0.101 -0.108 -0.041 -0.042 -0.175 -0.171 -0.115
(0.042)∗∗ (0.097)∗ (0.047)∗∗ (0.047)∗∗ (0.041)∗ (0.042)∗∗ (0.042) (0.046) (0.039)∗∗ (0.044)∗∗ (0.043)∗∗
CARTEL EXTRNL 0.808 0.933 0.863 0.861 -0.006 -0.009 0.865 0.853 0.933 0.666 0.988
(0.307)∗∗ (0.897) (0.291)∗∗ (0.291)∗∗ (0.214) (0.208) (0.237)∗∗ (0.219)∗∗ (0.280)∗∗ (0.292)∗ (0.208)∗∗
CARTEL OUT DISCIPLINE -0.071 -0.108 -0.074 -0.073 -0.004 -0.003 -0.075 -0.074 -0.082 -0.059 -0.084
(0.027)∗∗ (0.067) (0.026)∗∗ (0.026)∗∗ (0.019) (0.018) (0.022)∗∗ (0.020)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗ (0.026)∗ (0.020)∗∗
N 231887 231887 231887 231887 231028 231028 318617 324011 431874 312704 193434
Notes: This table reports estimates from a series of robustness experiments testing the relationship between cartel discipline and international trade. The first column
reproduces the main results from column (4) of Table 4. Column (2) uses the PPML estimator. Columns (3) and (4) introduce symmetric and asymmetric pair-fixed
effects, respectively. Column (5) uses exporter-sector-time and importer-sector-time fixed effects. In column (6) I also use exporter-sector-time and importer-sector-time
fixed effects and I also allow for the effects of the trade cost covariates (e.g. distance, etc.) to vary at the 6-digit HS level. Column (7) adds to the main specification
cartels for which I only had data at the 4-digit HS level. Column (8) uses all cartels for which I have data. Finally, in columns (9), (10), and (11) I experiment with
2-year, 3-year, and 5-year interval data, respectively. See text for further details.
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Figures
Figure 1: Production and Trade Decisions by Potential Cartel Members (γ = 0)
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Notes: This table describes the equilibrium output allocations of do-
mestic production, xk, and imports from abroad, yk, of both goods
k = 1, 2 under Cournot-Nash competition, maximal collusion and opti-
mal deviation for all possible levels of trade costs, t and cost differentials,
s. The regions listed in the first column are depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Welfare Comparison under Transportation Costs for
Unrelated Goods (γ = 0)
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Figure 3: Welfare Comparison under Transportation Costs for
Imperfect Substitutes (γ = 0.4)
Figure 4: Welfare Comparison under Transportation Costs for
Imperfect Substitutes (γ = 0.9)
139
Figure 5: Minimum Discount Factors and Trade Costs
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Figure 6: Cartel Discipline in the Presence of Internal Trade (Φ)
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Figure 7: Incentive Constraint Contours in the Absence of
Internal Trade (Φ ≥ 0)
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Cartel Discipline (θ∗) and Its
Dependence on Internal Trade Costs (t)
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Figure 9: The Dependence of Welfare on Internal Trade Costs
(t) and Various Discount Factor Values (δ) and Market Size
(β)
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Figure 10: The Dependence of Welfare on the Discount Factor
under Alternative Configurations of Internal Trade Costs (t)
and Market Size (β)
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Figure 11: Kaplan-Meier Curves
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A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?
Derivation of the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Output Levels: Here, I pro-
vide solutions of the optimal output allocations under Cournot-Nash competition.
First, when t < ty and s < sy, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output levels are given
by: xN1 =
(1−γ)α+s(1+2γ)+t(1−γ)
3(1−γ2) , y
N
1 =
(1−γ)α−s(2+γ)−2 t(1−γ)
3(1−γ2) , x
N
2 =
(1−γ)α−s(2+γ)+t(1−γ)
3(1−γ2) ,
yN2 =
(1−γ)α+s(1+2γ)−2 t(1−γ)
3(1−γ2) . When the initial level of trade costs or the cost differen-
tial exceeds the prohibitive values of t or s, equation (5) needs to be re-optimized for
all possible cases to re-derive the optimal output allocations:
Part a) t ∈ [ty, tx): First, the value of t such that yN1 = 0 is obtained from
equation (4b), which gives ty ≡ t = α(1−γ)−s(2+γ)2(1−γ) . Then, taking into consideration
the fact that yN1 = 0 for t ∈ [ty, tx), re-optimization of the Cournot-Nash problem
delivers he equilibrium outputs for intermediate levels of trade costs, t ∈ [ty, tx):
xN1 =
α(1−γ)+γ s
2(1−γ2) , x
N
2 =
α(2−γ)(1−γ)+2t(1−γ2)−s(4−γ2)
6(1−γ2) , and y
N
2 =
1
3
(α + s− 2t).
Part b) t ∈ [tx, α): Next, using the optimal output allocations from Part a)
above, the value of t such yN2 =
1
3
(α + s − 2t) = 0 is given by tx = α+s2 . Then, re-
optimization of the Cournot-Nash problem for sufficiently high levels of trade costs,
such that t ∈ [tx,∞) delivers: xN1 = α(1−γ)+γ s2(1−γ2) , xN2 =
α(1−γ)−s
2(1−γ2) , and y
N
1 = y
N
2 = 0.
From this expression for xN2 , the value of s such that the cost-inefficient good is not
even produced domestically: s0 = α(1− γ).
Part c) s ∈ [sy, sx): Similarly, the value of s such that yN1 = 0 is obtained from
equation (4b), which gives sy =
(1−γ)(α−2t)
(2+γ)
. For this interval of cost asymmetries,
yN1 = 0 and the optimization problem coincides with the one in Part a) above with
the optimal outputs given by: xN1 =
α(1−γ)+γ s
2(1−γ2) , x
N
2 =
(α(2−γ)(1−γ)+2t(1−γ2)−s(4−γ2))
6(1−γ2) , and
yN2 =
1
3
(α + s− 2t).
Part d) s ∈ [sx, α): Lastly, using the optimal output allocations form Part c)
above, solve for the value of s such that the cost-inefficient good is no longer produced
domestically, xN2 =
(α(2−γ)(1−γ)+2t(1−γ2)−s(4−γ2))
6(1−γ2) = 0 to obtain sx =
(1−γ)(α(2−γ)+2t(1+γ)
(4−γ2) .
Then, the equilibrium output allocations for sufficiently high levels of the cost dif-
ferential, such that s ∈ [sx, α), are given by: xN1 = α(2−γ)+γt4−γ2 , yN2 = α(2−γ)−2t4−γ2 , and
yN1 = x
N
2 = 0. From the last equation, the value of t such that the cost-efficient good
will not be traded: t0 = α(1− γ2 ).
Figure (12) illustrates how changes in the degree of substitutability affect the
prohibitive levels of t and s.93 As the goods become closer substitutes, the regions,
93 Figure (12) presents the constraints for Cournot-Nash competition, maximal collusion, and
deviation.
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Figure 12: Production and Trade Decisions by Potential Cartel Members (γ = 0.4)
which allow for positive domestic production of the cost-inefficient good and trade
of either of the goods, shrink. This is due to the fact that the higher the degree of
product substitutability, the stronger the negative price externality that producing
more of one good inflicts onto the marginal revenue of the other.
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof follows readily by using the definition of ΠN in
equation (5), evaluating ΠN at the relevant points and then comparing them.
a) If t ∈ [0, ty), then ∂ΠN (t,s,γ)∂t = −2(2α−s−10 t)9(1+γ) S 0 with tNmin = α5 − s10 . ∂
2ΠN (t,s,γ)
∂t2
=
20
9(1+γ)
> 0. If t ∈ [ty, tx), then ∂ΠN (t,s,γ)∂t = (2α−8s−10 t)9 S 0 with tNmin = α5 + 4s5 .
∂2ΠN (t,s,γ)
∂t2
= 10
9
> 0. It is possible for ΠN(t, s, γ) to have two local minima for any
degree of product substitutability when the cost differential takes on intermediate
values, s ∈
[
α(1−γ)
(6−γ) ,
α(1−γ)
(3+2γ)
)
.
b) If s ∈ [0, sy), then ∂ΠN (t,s,γ)∂s = −2(2α(1−γ)−s(10+8γ)−t(1−γ))9(1−γ2) S 0 with sNmin =
2α(1− γ)−t(1−γ)
2(4 γ+5)
. ∂
2ΠN (t,s,γ)
∂s2
= 2(10+8γ)
9(1−γ2) > 0. If s ∈ [sy, sx), then
∂ΠN (t,s,γ)
∂s
= α(1−γ)(4−5γ)+16t(1−γ
2)−s(20−11γ2)
18(γ2−1) S 0 with sNmin = −α(1−γ)(4−5γ)+16t(1−γ
2)
20−11γ2 .
∂2ΠN (t,s,γ)
∂s2
= 20−11γ
2
18(1−γ2) > 0. It is possible for Π
N(t, s, γ) to have two local minima
for any degree of product substitutability when trade costs are intermediate, t ∈[
α(1+γ)(2−γ)
(12+8γ−γ2) ,
2α(1+γ)
(6+5γ)
)
. ||
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof follows readily from the definition of ΠM in
equation (7):
a) If t ≤ min (s, α(1− γ)), then ∂ΠM (t)
∂t
= −α(1−γ)+t
2(1−γ2) < 0 and
∂2ΠM (t)
∂t2
= 1
2(1−γ2) > 0.
From here, I can easily see that argmint Π
M(t)→ min (s, α(1− γ)) and argmaxt ΠM(t) =
0. If t ∈ [α(1− γ), s), then ∂ΠM (t)
∂t
= 0.
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b) If s ≤ min (t, α(1− γ)), then ∂ΠM (s)
∂s
= −α(1−γ)+s
2(1−γ2) < 0 and
∂2ΠM (s)
∂s2
= 1
2(1−γ2) > 0.
From here, I can easily see that argmins Π
M(s)→ min (t, α(1− γ)) and argmaxs ΠM(s) =
0. If s ∈ [α(1− γ), t), then ∂ΠM (s)
∂s
= 0. ||
Proof of Proposition 1: I compare the volume of trade under competition,
yNk , and the volume of trade under monopoly, y
M
k , when trade costs are such that
t < min(s, α(1 − γ)), so that trade actually occurs under collusion. In this case,
the cartel produces good 1 domestically and imports good 2 from the other market.
Therefore, I compare the volume of trade of good 2, the cost-efficient good, for home
under monopoly and under competition. If trade costs are below the prohibitive level
for the cost-efficient good, t < ty, and if t < min(s, α(1− γ)):
yM2 − yN2 =
α(1− γ)− t
2(1− γ2) −
(1− γ)α + s(2γ + 1)− 2 t(1− γ)
3(1− γ2) (30)
yM2 − yN2 =
α(1− γ)− 2s(2γ + 1) + t(1− 4γ)
(1− γ2) T 0 (31)
Whether the above expression is positive, for given trade costs, depends on the degree
of substitutability and on the cost differential. If the goods are completely unrelated,
γ = 0, and the cost differential is not too high, s < α+t
2
, the volume of trade under
monopoly will exceed the volume of trade under competition for the cost-efficient
good: yM2 − yN2 > 0. For intermediate values of γ, such that the goods are imperfect
substitutes, the above expression (31) is positive only if γ < γ̂ ≡ α+t−2s
α+t+4s
∈ [0, 1) and
if the cost differential is not too high, s ≤ α+t
2
.
Next, I compare the value of home’s imports (or foreign’s exports) of good 2, the
cost-efficient good, under monopoly and competition. Recall that:
pN2 = (α− (xN2 + yN2 )− γ(xN1 + yN1 )) =
1
3
(α + t+ s) (32)
pM2 = (α− (xM2 + yM2 )− γ(xM1 + yM1 )) =
1
2
(α + t) (33)
Using the price equations along with the equilibrium outputs, the value of trade under
monopoly, V TM2 = p
M
2 y
M
2 and the value of trade under competition, V T
N
2 = p
N
2 y
N
2 ,
are given by:
V TN2 =
(α + s+ t) (α(1− γ)− 2t(1− γ) + s(1 + 2γ))
9 (1− γ2) (34)
V TM2 =
(α + t) (α(1− γ)− t)
4 (1− γ2) (35)
From the above expressions it follows that, V TM2 > V T
N
2 as long as the cost differ-
ential is not too high, s < α+t
2
, and the goods are sufficiently unrelated, γ < ˆˆγ ≡
(5α+2 s−t)(α−2 s+t)
5α2+4α s+13α t+8 s2+16 st+8 t2
∈ [0, 1). It is also straightforward to verify that the same
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results hold for intermediate levels of trade costs, t ∈ [ty, tx), such that the compet-
itive firms no longer trade the cost-inefficient good and the volume of trade of the
cost-efficient good equals yN2 =
1
3
(α + s− 2t). ||
Collusion and Welfare, Part I: Transportation Costs
Proof of Lemma 3: If trade costs take the form of transportation costs:
WN =

α(QN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (QN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(QN1 )(QN2 )− s(QN2 )− t(yN1 + yN2 ) if t < ty
α(xN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(QN2 )− s(QN2 )− t(yN2 ) if ty ≤ t < tx
α(xN1 + x
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (xN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(xN2 )− s(xN2 ) if t ≥ tx s < α(1− γ)
α(xN1 )− 12 (xN1 )2 if t ≥ tx s ≥ α(1− γ)
α(QN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (QN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(QN1 )(QN2 )− s(QN2 )− t(yN1 + yN2 ) if s < sy
α(xN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(QN2 )− s(xN2 )− t(yN2 ) if sy ≤ s < sx
α(xN1 + y
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (yN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(yN2 )− t(yN2 ) if s ≥ sx t < α(1− 12γ)
α(xN1 )− 12 (xN1 )2 if s ≥ sx t ≥ α(1− 12γ)
Thus, after rearranging terms and simplifying the expressions,
WN =

8α(1−γ)(α−s−t)+t(1−γ)(11t+4s)+s2(7γ+11)
9(1−γ2) if t < ty
α2(59−5 γ2)−t(1−γ2)(32α+56 s−44 t)−54αγ (α−s)−α s(22 γ2+32)−s2(17 γ2−44)
72(1−γ)2 if ty ≤ t < tx
3[2α(1−γ)(α−s)+s2]
8(1−γ)2 if t ≥ tx s < α(1− γ)
3
8
α2 if t ≥ tx s ≥ α(1− γ)
8α(1−γ)(α−s−t)+t(1−γ)(11t+4s)+s2(7γ+11)
9(1−γ2) if s < sy
α2(59−5 γ2)−t(1−γ2)(32α+56 s−44 t)−54αγ (α−s)−α s(22 γ2+32)−s2(17 γ2−44)
72(1−γ)2 if sy ≤ s < sx
2α(α−t)(γ3−γ2−8γ+12)+t2(12−γ2)
2(γ−2)2(2+γ)2 if s ≥ s¯x t < α(1−
1
2
γ)
3
8
α2 if s ≥ s¯x t ≥ α(1− 12γ)
(36)
Part (a). If t ∈ [0, ty), then ∂WN∂t = 2(−4α+2s+11t)9(1+γ) S 0 and tNmin = 4α−2s11 . However,
tNmin ∈ [0, ty), only if s < α(1−γ)6+5γ . This can be easily verified by comparing tNmin and ty
and finding the values of s, which satisfy tNmin ∈ [0, ty).
If t ∈ [ty, tx), then ∂WN∂t = −4α−7s+11t9 S 0 and tNmin = 4α+7s11 . However, tNmin ∈ [ty, tx),
only if s ≥ α(1−γ)
12−γ . This can be easily verified by finding the values of s, which satisfy
tNmin ∈ [ty, tx).
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Part (b). Again, from the definition of WN(t, s, γ), it easily follows that if s ∈
(0, s¯y), then
∂WN
∂s
= 2((−4α+2t)(1−γ)+s(11+7γ))
9(1−γ2) S 0 and sNmin =
(4α−2t)(1−γ)
11+7γ
with sNmin ∈
[0, s¯y) if t ∈
[
0, α(1+γ)
2(2γ+3)
)
.
If s ∈ [s¯y, s¯x), ∂WN∂s = α(16−11γ)(1−γ)+s(17γ
2−44)+28t(1−γ2)
36(1−γ2) S 0 and sNmin =
(α(16−11γ)+28t(1+γ))(1−γ)
(44−17γ2)
with sNmin ∈ [s¯y, s¯x) if t ∈
[
α(2−γ−γ2)
(24−14γ−γ2) ,
α(2−γ)2
4+γ2
)
.
Part (c). First, note thatWN(0, s, γ)8α
2(1−γ)−8αs(1−γ)+s2(11+7γ)
9(1−γ2) and alsoW
N(tx, s, γ) =
3(2α2γ−2αγ s−2α2+2 sα−s2)
8(1−γ2) . Comparing these two expressions, one can easily verify that
WN(0, s, γ) > WN(tx, s, γ)
Proof of Lemma 4: From the definition of welfare, one can show, after rearrang-
ing terms, that welfare under maximal collusion under transportation costs is given
by
WM =

3[2α(1−γ)(α−t)+t2]
8(1−γ2) if t < min(s, α(1− γ))
3
8
α2 if t ≥ [α(1− γ), s)
3[2α(1−γ)(α−s)+s2]
8(1−γ2) if s ≤ min(t, α(1− γ))
3
8
α2 if s ≥ [α(1− γ), t)
(37)
a) If t < min (s, α(1− γ)), then
i) ∂W
M (t)
∂t
= 3(−α(1−γ)+t)
4(1−γ2) < 0 and
∂2WM (t)
∂t2
= 3
4(1−γ2) > 0, with argmintW
M(t)→
min (s, α(1− γ)) and argmaxtWM(t) = 0. If t ∈ [α(1− γ), s), then ∂WM (t)∂t = 0.
b) If s ≤ min (t, α(1− γ)), then
i) ∂W
M (s)
∂s
= 3(−α(1−γ)+s)
4(1−γ2) < 0 and
∂2WM (s)
∂s2
= 3
4(1−γ2) > 0, with argminsW
M(s)→
min (t, α(1− γ)) and argmaxsWM(s) = 0. If s ∈ [α(1− γ), t), then ∂WM (s)∂s = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: In the case of transportation costs, welfare under Nash
competition is defined in (36), while welfare under maximal collusion is defined in
(37).
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1) Suppose t < ty, t < min(s, α(1 − γ)), i.e. trade costs and the cost differential
are such that they allow for trade in both goods under competition and for trade in
the cost-efficient good under collusion. In this case, the difference in welfare levels,
∆W ≡ WN(t, s, γ)−WM(t, γ), is given by:
∆W ≡WN (t, s, γ)−WM (t, γ) = s
2(88 + 56γ)− t2(88γ − 61) + (1− γ) (32st− α(10t+ 64s) + 10α2)
72(1− γ2) (38)
Equation (38) is a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape,
I need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Henceforth, I denote Wz the partial derivative of the difference ∆W ≡ WN(t, s, γ)−
WM(t, γ) with respect to variable z.
Wt =
−5α(1− γ) + 16s(1− γ) + t(61− 88γ)
36(1− γ2) (39)
Ws =
2 (−4α(1− γ) + 2t(1− γ) + s(11 + 7γ))
9(1− γ2) (40)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hes-
sian is given by: HW =
 (61−88γ)36(1−γ2) 16(1−γ)36(1−γ2)
4(1−γ)
9(1−γ2)
(11+7γ)
9(1−γ2)
 and is invertible for values of γ ∈
[
0, −53+
√
23257
144
)
. The critical point is given by: t0 =
(11 γ−1)(γ−1)α
72 γ2+53 γ−71 and s0 = −2 α (19 γ−13)(γ−1)72 g2+53 g−71 .
For γ ∈
(
−53+√23257
144
, 1
)
, (t0, s0) is actually a saddle point as the determinant of HW
becomes negative. Using the sign of the determinant of HW , I can determine the shape
of the quadratic function (38). Thus, for values of γ ∈
[
0, −53+
√
23257
144
)
, (38) will take
the shape of an ellipse, while for γ ∈
(
−53+√23257
144
, 1
)
, (38) will be a hyperbola.
When t = 0 (and γ = 0), W = 1
36
(α− 2 s) (5α− 22 s) and therefore, the s-
intercepts are s = α
2
and s = 5α
22
. On the other hand, at s = 0 (and γ = 0),
W = 5α
2
36
− 5α t
36
+ 61 t
2
72
and the equation has not real solutions, suggesting that the
ellipse never crosses the t-axis. Moreover, when t = 0 (and γ = 0), welfare under
monopoly is greater than welfare under competition as long as s ∈ (5α
22
, α
2
)
. Further,
152
for t < ty, t < min(s, α(1− γ)), and when γ = 0, WM(t, 0) > WN(t, s, 0) for

s ∈
(
4
11
α− 2
11
t− 3
44
√
4α2 − 4α t− 142 t2, 4
11
α− 2
11
t+ 3
44
√
4α2 − 4α t− 142 t2
)
& t ∈
(
2
13
α, 2α
1+
√
143)
)
s ∈
(
4
11
α− 2
11
t− 3
44
√
4α2 − 4α t− 142 t2, 1
2
α− t
)
& t ∈ [0, 2
13
α
]
(41)
Notice that if the cost differential is sufficiently high, then WM(t, 0) > WN(t, s, 0)
for the entire relevant range of trade costs, t ∈ [0, t¯2).
The same result holds true even for a positive degree of substitutability between
good 1 and good 2, as long as γ < ̂̂γ. To find this threshold value ̂̂γ, I need to find the
value of γ such that the curve (38) is exactly tangent to the s-axis. Thus, I evaluate
equation (38) at t = 0, find the value of s that maximizes it, s∗, and then evaluate
(38) at t = 0 and s = s∗. Thus, (38) at t = 0 and s = s∗ = 4α(1−γ)
(11+7γ)
is equal to
∆W |t=0,s=s∗ = α
2(11γ − 1)
4(1 + γ)(11 + 7γ)
(42)
Therefore, ̂̂γ = 1
11
and WM(t, γ) > WN(t, s, γ) when t < s, t < min(α(1− γ), ty) and
γ ∈ [0, ̂̂γ). Moreover, as γ increases and approaches ̂̂γ, the set of values of the cost
differential and transportation costs, (t, s), for which WM(t, γ) > WN(t, s, γ) shrinks
and vanishes when γ ≥ ̂̂γ.
2) Next, I consider the interval of trade costs such that trade of the cost-efficient
good persists under monopoly, while under competition the cost-inefficient good is
produced domestically, but not traded: t < min(s, α(1− γ)) and s ∈ [sy, sx). In this
case, the difference in welfare levels, ∆W ≡ WN(t, s, γ)−WM(t, γ), is given by:
∆W ≡WN (t, s, γ)−WM (t, γ) =
s2(17γ2 − 44)− t2(17− 44γ2)− αγs(54− 22γ) + αγt(5− 32γ) + (1− γ2) (−5α2 + 56st)+ α(32s− 22t)
72(1− γ2) (43)
Equation (43) is a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape,
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I need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Wt =
16α γ2 + 28 γ2s− 44 γ2t− 27α γ + 11α− 28 s+ 17 t
36 (1− γ2) (44)
Ws = − 11α γ
2 + 17 γ2s− 28 γ2t− 27α γ + 16α− 44 s+ 28 t
36 (1− γ2) (45)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian
is given by: HW =
 17−44 γ236(1−γ2) −79
−7
9
44−17 γ2
36(1−γ2)
 and the determinant of HW is negative for
all values of γ ∈ [0, 1). The saddle point is given by t0 = α(γ−1)(γ−2)(4 γ
2−21 γ+2)
4 γ4+73 γ2+4
and
s0 =
α (γ−1)(2 γ−1)(2 γ2−21 γ+4)
4 γ4+73 γ2+4
. Moreover, as the determinant of HW is negative, (43)
will take the form of a hyperbola for all γ ∈ [0, 1).
When t = 0 (and γ = 0), W = 1
72
(α− 2 s) (5α− 22 s) and therefore, the s-
intercepts are s1 =
α
2
and s2 =
5α
22
. On the other hand, at s = 0 (and γ = 0),
W = 1
72
(5α + 17t)(α + t) and the t-intercepts are t1 = −α and t2 = −5α17 . When t = 0
(and γ = 0), welfare under monopoly is greater than welfare under competition as
long as s ∈ (5α
22
, α
2
)
. More generally, for t < s, t < α(1−γ) and s ∈ [sy, sx), and when
γ = 0, WM(t, 0) > WN(t, s, 0) for
 s ∈
(
5α+17t
22 , sx
)
& t ∈ ( 213α, α)
s ∈ [sy, sx) & t ∈
(
0, 213α
] (46)
Notice that if trade costs are sufficiently small, then WM(t, 0) > WN(t, s, 0) for the
entire relevant range of the cost differential, s ∈ [sy, sx).
The same result holds true even for a positive degree of substitutability between
good 1 and good 2, as long as γ < ̂̂γ. To find this threshold value ̂̂γ, I need to find the
value of γ such that the hyperbola is exactly tangent to the ty-line. Thus, I evaluate
equation (43) at t = s, find the value of s that maximizes it, s∗, and then evaluate
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(43) at t = ty and s = s
∗. Thus, (43) at t = ty and s = s∗ is equal to
∆W |t=ty ,s=s∗ =
α2 (25 γ3 − 155 γ2 + 104 γ − 4)
8 (γ + 1) (8 γ3 − 43 γ2 − 44 γ + 52) (47)
Given the non-linearity of equation (47), I study how the hyperbola (43) changes as
γ changes from 0 to 1. First, the saddle point of the hyperbola is located in the I
quadrant of the (t, s) space, i.e. t0 ∈ [0, α) and s0 ∈ [0, α), for values of γ in the
neighborhood of 0. However, as γ increases slightly, the saddle point moves to the II
quadrant with t0 taking a negative value. As γ raises further and approaches 1, the
saddle point of the hyperbola (43) shifts down to the III quadrant of the (t, s) space
with both its coordinates being negative. Second, the two curves of the hyperbola
get closer and closer to each other as γ increases from 0 to 1. Lastly, the value of
γ, above which competition weakly welfare-dominates collusion within the relevant
range of trade costs and cost differential values is ̂̂γ = 0.041. WM(t, γ) ≤ WN(t, s, γ)
when t < s, t < α(1−γ) and s ∈ [sy, sx) and γ ∈ [̂̂γ, 1). As γ increases and approacheŝ̂γ, the set of values of the cost differential and transportation costs, (t, s), for which
WM(t, γ) > WN(t, s, γ) shrinks and vanishes when γ ≥ ̂̂γ.
3) Now, I focus on the case of no trade in any good under collusion, while trade
persists in both goods under competition: t ≥ s, s < min(α(1−γ), sy). The difference
in the welfare functions is:
∆W ≡WN (t, s, 0)−WM (s, 0) = (1− γ)(88t
2 + 32st+ 10α2 − 10αs− 64αt) + s2(61 + 56γ)
72(1− γ2) (48)
Equation (48) is a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape,
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I need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Wt = − 2(4α− 2s− 11t)
9 (γ + 1)
(49)
Ws =
5α γ + 56 γs− 16 γt− 5α + 61 s+ 16 t
36 (1− γ2) (50)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian
is given by: HW =
 229(γ+1) 49(γ+1)
4
9(γ+1)
56 γ+61
36(1−γ2)
 and the determinant of HW is positive for all
values of γ ∈ [0, 1). Thus, the critical point is given by t0 = 26α(γ+1)72 γ+71 and s0 = α(γ−1)72 γ+71 .
Further, as the determinant of HW is positive, (48) will take the form of an ellipse
for all γ ∈ [0, 1).
When t = 0 (and γ = 0), W = 5α
2
36
− 5α s
36
+ 61 s
2
72
and the function has no
real solutions, suggesting that the ellipse does not cross the s-axis. On the other
hand, at s = 0 (and γ = 0), W = 1
36
(α− 2t)(5α− 22t) and the t-intercepts are
t1 =
α
2
and t2 =
5α
22
. When s = 0 (and γ = 0), welfare under monopoly is greater
than welfare under competition as long as t ∈ (5α
22
, α
2
)
. More generally, for t ≥ s,
s < min(α(1 − γ), sy), and when γ = 0, maximal collusion is welfare-superior to
Cournot-Nash competition, WM(s, 0) > WN(t, s, 0), for
 t ∈
(
4α−2s
11 − 344
√
4α2 − 4αs− 142s2, 4α−2s11 + 344
√
4α2 − 4αs− 142s2
)
& s ∈
(
2
13α,
2α
1+
√
143
]
t ∈ [4α−2s11 − 344
√
4α2 − 4αs− 142s2, ty) & s ∈
(
0, 213α
]
(51)
The same result holds true even for a positive degree of substitutability between
good 1 and good 2, as long as γ < ̂̂γ. To find this threshold value ̂̂γ, I need to find the
value of γ such that the hyperbola is exactly tangent to the t-axis. Thus, I evaluate
equation (48) at s = 0, find the value of t that maximizes it, t∗, and then evaluate
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(48) at s = 0 and t = t∗. Thus, (48) at s = 0 and t = t∗ = 4
11
α is equal to
∆W |s=0,t=t∗ = − α
2 (2 + γ) (2 γ2 − 33 γ + 22) (26 γ3 + 61 γ2 + 220 γ − 172)
36 (8 γ3 − 43 γ2 − 44 γ + 52)2 (γ + 1) (52)
Therefore, WM(s, γ) > WN(t, s, γ) when t ≥ s, s < min(α(1 − γ), sy) and γ ∈
[0, 0.638) ∪ (0.696, 1).
4) Next, I consider the case of no trade in the cost-inefficient good under compe-
tition and no trade in any good under collusion: t ≥ s, s < α(1− γ) and t ∈ [ty, tx).
Then,
∆W ≡ WN(t, s, γ)−WM(s, γ) = 1
72
(5α− 22t+ 17s) (α− 2t+ s) (53)
Equation (53) is a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape, I
need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Wt =
11 t
9
− 4α
9
− 7 s
9
(54)
Ws = −7 t
9
+
11α
36
+
17 s
36
(55)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian
is given by: HW =
 119 −79
−7
9
17
36
 and the determinant of HW is negative and does not
depend on the values of γ. Thus, there is a saddle point given by t0 = α and s0 = α.
In addition, given that the determinant of HW is negative, (53) will take the form of
a hyperbola regardless of the value of γ ∈ [0, 1).
When t = 0 (and γ = 0), W = (5α+17 s)(α+s)
72
and the s-intercepts are given by s1 =
−5α
17
and s2 = −α. On the other hand, at s = 0 (and γ = 0), W = (−2 t+α)(−22 t+5α)72
and the t-intercepts are t1 =
α
2
and t2 =
5α
22
. When s = 0 (and γ = 0), welfare under
monopoly is greater than welfare under competition as long as t ∈ (5α
22
, α
2
)
. More
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generally, for t ≥ s, t < α(1−γ) and t ∈ [ty, tx), maximal collusion is welfare-superior
to Cournot-Nash competition, WM(s, γ) > WN(t, s, γ), for any degree of product
substitutability, γ, for
 t ∈
(
5α+17s
22 , tx
)
& s ∈ ( 213α, α)
t ∈ (ty, tx) & s ∈ (0, 213α] (56)
Note that this is true for any value of γ. That is, within this range of trade costs
and cost differential values, collusion welfare-dominates competition for any degree
of product substitutability.
5) I move on to the case of the cost-inefficient good not being traded under
collusion, but still being produced domestically, while under competition the cost-
inefficient good is not produced in the domestic market at all, nor is it imported:
t ≥ s and s ∈ [s¯x, α(1− γ)). Then,
∆W ≡WN (t, s, γ)−WM (s, γ) = α(α− t)(24− 16γ − 2γ
2(1− γ)) + t2(12− γ2)
2(γ − 2)2(γ + 2)2 −
3
8
(1− γ)2α(α− s) + s2
(1− γ2) (57)
Equation (57) is a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape, I
need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Wt = −α γ
3 − α γ2 + γ2t− 8α γ + 12α− 12 t
(γ − 2)2 (γ + 2)2 (58)
Ws =
3
4
α(1− γ)− s
(1− γ2) (59)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian
is given by: HW =
 12−γ2(γ−2)2(γ+2)2 0
0 − 3
4(1−γ2)
 and the determinant of HW is negative
for all values of γ ∈ [0, 1). Thus, there is a saddle point given by t0 = α(3+γ)(γ−2)212−γ2 and
s0 = α(1− γ). Furthermore, as the determinant of HW is negative, (57) will take the
form of a hyperbola for any value of γ ∈ [0, 1).
When t = 0 (and γ = 0), W = 3s(2α−s)
8
and the s-intercepts are given by s1 = 0
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and s2 = 2α. On the other hand, at s = 0 (and γ = 0), W = −3t(2α−t)8 and the t-
intercepts are t1 = 0 and t2 = 2α. Moreover, for t ≥ s and s ∈ [s¯x, α(1−γ)), maximal
collusion is welfare-superior to Cournot-Nash competition, WM(s, γ) > WN(t, s, γ),
for
{
t ∈
(
M, (2−γ)(αγ+γs−α+2s
2(1−γ2)
)
& s ∈
(
α(1−γ)(9−2γ)
(9+5γ2)
, α(1− γ)
)
& γ ∈ (0, 1) (60)
where
M =
2αγ(γ4−γ3−9 γ2+13 γ+8)−24α+
√
(γ−1)(γ+1)(γ−2)2(γ+2)2((4 γ4−6 γ3−34 γ2+72 γ−36)α2+6 s(γ−1)(γ2−12)α+3 s2(γ2−12))
(γ−1)(γ+1)(γ2−12)
Within this range of trade costs and cost differential values, collusion welfare-dominates
competition as long as good 1 and good 2 are imperfect substitutes.
6) Next, I consider the case of no trade and no domestic production of the cost-inefficient
good under collusion, while under competition the cost-inefficient good is traded, but not
produced domestically: s > α(1− γ), s ∈ [s¯x, α) and t ∈
[
α(1− γ), α(1− 12γ)
)
. Then,
∆W ≡WN (t, s, γ)−WM (s, γ) = (2α− αγ − 2 t)
(
3αγ3 − 2αγ2 + 2 γ2t− 20αγ + 24α− 24 t)
8 (γ − 2)2 (γ + 2)2
(61)
Equation (61) is a quadratic function in t only and that this case is only relevant when
γ 6= 0. If γ = 0, then the case of t > s, s > α(1 − γ) and s ∈ [t−13 , α) is non-existent as
evident in Figure (2).
For s > α(1−γ), s ∈ [s¯x, α) and t ∈
[
α(1− γ), α(1− 12γ)
)
, maximal collusion is welfare-
superior to Cournot-Nash competition, WM (s, γ) > WN (t, s, γ), for
{
t ∈
(
α(3 γ3−2 γ2−20 γ+24)
2(12−γ2) , α
(
1− 12γ
))
& s ∈ (α(1− γ), α) & γ ∈ (0, 1) (62)
Within this range of trade costs and cost differential values, collusion welfare-dominates
competition regardless of the degree of product substitutability between good 1 and good
2.
7) In the case of the cost differential being prohibitively high for the cost-inefficient
good to even be produced domestically under competition, while trade costs are sufficiently
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low and allow for trade of the cost-efficient good under maximal collusion, i.e. t < s,
t < α(1− γ), and s ∈ [s¯x, α), I find that the difference in welfare levels if given by
∆W ≡WN (t, s, γ)−WM (s, γ) = 2α(α− t)(γ
3 − γ2 − 8γ + 12) + t2(12− γ2)
2 (γ − 2)2 (2 + γ)2 −
3[2α(1− γ)(α− t) + t2]
8(1− γ2) (63)
Clearly, expression (63) is a quadratic function in t only and, again, this case is relevant
for γ > 0. If γ = 0, then the case of t < s, t < α(1− γ), and s ∈ [s¯x, α) is non-existent as
evident in Figure (2). For this range of values of the cost differential and the transportation
costs, competition welfare-dominates collusion for any degree of substitutability. That is,
when t < s, t < α(1 − γ), and s ∈ [s¯x, α), WN (t, s, γ) > WM (t, γ) for any γ ∈ (0, 1) and
any (t, s) within the relevant range.
Lastly, when t ≥ t¯x and t ≥ s < α(1−γ) under both competition and maximal collusion
no trade in either of the goods takes place and each firm is a monopolist in its own market,
producing both goods for domestic consumption only. Therefore, the levels of welfare under
these types of market structure are identical. Furthermore, in the case of t > α(1 − 12γ)
and s > α(1 − γ), only the cost-efficient good is produced in the domestic market and no
trade takes place under both types of market structure. Each firm is a monopolist in its
own country and the welfare levels coincide.
Collusion and Welfare, Part II: Import Tariffs
In this section of Appendix A I study the welfare implications of collusion in the case
of import tariffs. First, I define welfare when trade costs take the form of tariffs and
then characterize it for both Cournot-Nash competition and maximal collusion. Second, I
compare the levels of welfare under duopoly and monopoly when the goods are completely
unrelated and show that collusion can again welfare-dominate competition. Then, I allow
for the presence of imperfect substitutes and re-examine the validity of the results.
If trade costs take the form of import tariffs, welfare in the domestic country is given
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by V = CS + Π1 + Π2 + ty1 + ty2, where CS and Πk capture consumer surplus and the
global profit from good k, respectively. It is easy to verify that CS = 12(Q
2
1 +Q
2
2) + γQ1Q2.
Utilizing these observations in the definition of welfare and simplifying gives the welfare of
the domestic country:
V = α (Q1 +Q2)− 1
2
(
Q21 +Q
2
2
)− γ (Q1) (Q2)− s (Q2) (64)
Lemma A1. (Nash Equilibrium) Under Cournot-Nash competition, reciprocal reduc-
tions in import tariffs (“trade liberalization”) enhance both countries’ welfare (i.e., ∂V N/∂(−t) >
0). Furthermore,
a) arg mins V
N (t, s, γ) = (8α−t)(1−γ)(22+14γ) ∈ (0, sy) if t ∈
(
0, 2α(1+γ)(14+9γ)
)
and arg mins V
N (t, s, γ) =
[α(16−11γ)+16t(1+γ)](1−γ)
(44−17γ2) ∈ [sy, sx) if t ∈
[
α(2+γ−γ2)
(20+8γ−3γ2) , α
)
;
b) V N (0, s, γ) > V N (tx, s, γ);
c) V N (t, s, γ) > WN (t, s, γ) for all t ∈ (0, tx).
Trade liberalization improves welfare, V N , as it leads to an expansion of domestic output
xNk + y
N
k for k = 1, 2. Welfare is non-monotonic in the production cost differential for
0 ≤ s < sy and sy ≤ s < sx. Increases in the cost heterogeneity lead to higher production
of the efficient good and lower production of the inefficient good, with the effect on total
output being negative. As the cost asymmetry expands, consumer surplus and tariff revenue
fall, while profits fall (rise) if the initial level of s is low (high), hence the non-monotonicity
of V N in s.
Proof of Lemma A1: If trade costs take the form of import tariffs:
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V N =

α(QN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (QN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(QN1 )(QN2 )− s(QN2 ) if t < ty
α(xN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(QN2 )− s(QN2 ) if ty ≤ t < tx
α(xN1 + x
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (xN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(xN2 )− s(xN2 ) if t ≥ tx s < α(1− γ)
α(xN1 )− 12 (xN1 )2 if t ≥ tx s ≥ α(1− γ)
α(QN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (QN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(QN1 )(QN2 )− s(QN2 ) if s < sy
α(xN1 +Q
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (QN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(QN2 )− s(xN2 ) if sy ≤ s < sx
α(xN1 + y
N
2 )− 12 (xN1 )2 − 12 (yN2 )2 − γ(xN1 )(yN2 ) if s ≥ sx t < α(1− 12γ)
α(xN1 )− 12 (xN1 )2 if s ≥ sx t ≥ α(1− 12γ)
Thus, after rearranging terms and simplifying the expressions,
V N =

(1−γ)(8α2−8αs−2αt−t2+st)+s2(7γ+11)
9(1−γ2) if t < ty
α2(59−5 γ2)−4t(1−γ2)(2α+8 s+ t)−54αγ(α−s)−α s(22γ2+32)−s2(17 γ2−44)
72(1−γ)2 if ty ≤ t < tx
3[2α(1−γ)(α−s)+s2]
8(1−γ)2 if t ≥ tx & s < α(1− γ)
3
8
α2 if t ≥ tx & s ≥ α(1− γ)
(1−γ)(8α2−8αs−2αt−t2+st)+s2(7γ+11)
9(1−γ2) if s < sy
α2(59−5 γ2)−4t(1−γ2)(2α+8 s+ t)−54αγ(α−s)−α s(22γ2+32)−s2(17 γ2−44)
72(1−γ)2 if sy ≤ s < sx
2α2γ3−2α2γ2−2αγ2t+3 γ2t2−16α2γ+8αγ t+24α2−8α t−4 t2
2(γ−2)2(2+γ)2 if s ≥ s¯x & t < α(1−
1
2
γ)
3
8
α2 if s ≥ s¯x & t ≥ α(1− 12γ)
(65)
Part (a). From the definition of V N (t, s, γ), it easily follows that if s ∈ (0, s¯y),
then ∂V
N
∂s =
−8α(1− γ)+t(1−γ)+2s(11+7γ)
9(1−γ2) S 0 and s
N
min =
(8α−t)(1−γ)
22+14γ with s
N
min ∈ (0, s¯y)
if t ∈
[
0, 2α(1+γ)(14+9γ)
)
.
If s ∈ [s¯y, s¯x), ∂V N∂s = α(16−11γ)(1−γ)+s(17γ
2−44)+16t(1−γ2)
36(1−γ2) S 0 and s
N
min =
(α(16−11γ)+16t(1+γ))(1−γ)
(44−17γ2)
with sNmin ∈ [s¯y, s¯x) if t ∈
[
α(2+γ−γ2)
(20+8γ−3γ2) , α
)
.
Part (b). First, note that V N (0, s, γ) = 8α
2(1−γ)−8αs(1−γ)+s2(11+7γ)
9(1−γ2) and also V
N (tx, s, γ) =
3(2α2γ−2αγ s−2α2+2 sα−s2)
8(1−γ2) . Comparing these two expressions, one can easily verify that
V N (0, s, γ) > V N (tx, s, γ)
Part (c). From the definitions of WN (t, s, γ) and V N (t, s, γ) it easily follows that
V N (t, s, γ)−WN (t, s, γ) = t(2α−s−4t)1+γ = t(yN1 + yN2 ) > 0 for t ∈ [0, ty). Also, for t ∈ [ty, tx),
V N (t, s, γ)−WN (t, s, γ) = t(α+s−2t)3 = tyN2 > 0.
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Lemma A2. (Maximal Collusion) Under maximal collusion, national welfare at home
in the case of import tariffs, VM , has the following properties:
a) If t ≤ min (s, α(1− γ)), then ∂VM (t)∂t < 0 and ∂
2VM (t)
∂t2
< 0, with argmaxt V
M (t)→ 0
and argmint V
M (t)→ min (s, α(1− γ)). If t ∈ [α(1− γ), s), then ∂VM (t)∂t = 0.
b) If s ≤ min (t, α(1− γ)), then VM (s) ≡WM (s). Moreover, lims→t VM (s) ≡ 3(2α(1−γ)(α−t)+t
2)
8(1γ2)
6=
VM (t) = 2α(1−γ)(3α−t)+t
2
8(1γ2)
, suggesting VM is discontinuous at s = t.
If t ≤ min (s, α(1− γ)), then VM (t) is decreasing and strictly concave in t and independent
of s. Second, if s ≤ min (t, α(1− γ)), then given that no trade takes place under monopoly
in this case, welfare under tariffs coincides with welfare under transportation costs, i.e.
VM (s) ≡ WM (s). Third, welfare under unconstrained collusion will be maximized when
tariffs are zero. Fourth, welfare in the case of import tariffs is discontinuous in (t, s) when
t = s (along the 45◦-line illustrated in Figure (1)). This discontinuity is due to the presence
(absence) of tariff revenues for t < s (t > s). For any t > s, no trade takes place under
maximal collusion and welfare is decreasing in s as both profits and consumer surplus fall
when the cost heterogeneity expands. However, for any t < s, the monopolist produces
only the cost-efficient good domestically and imports the other one, tariff revenues become
positive and welfare, which is now independent of s, rises.
Proof of Lemma A2: From the definitions of welfare, one can show, after rearranging
terms, that welfare under maximal collusion in the case of import tariffs is given by:
VM =

2(1−γ)(3α2−αt)−t2
8(1−γ2) if t < min(s, α(1− γ))
3
8α
2 if t ≥ [α(1− γ), s)
3[2α(1−γ)(α−s)+s2]
8(1−γ2) if s ≤ min(t, α(1− γ))
3
8α
2 if s ≥ [α(1− γ), t)
(66)
a) If t < min (s, α(1− γ)), then ∂VM (t)∂t = −α(1−γ)+t4(1−γ2) < 0 and ∂
2VM (t)
∂t2
= −1
4(1−γ2) < 0,
with argmaxt V
M (t)→ 0 and argmint VM (t)→ min (s, α(1− γ)). If t ∈ [α(1−γ), s), then
∂VM (t)
∂t = 0.
b) If s ≤ min (t, α(1− γ)), then VM (s) ≡WM (s) as evident from (37) and (66). More-
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over, lims→t VM (s) ≡ 3(2α(1−γ)(α−t)+t
2)
8(1γ2)
6= VM (t) = 2α(1−γ)(3α+t)+t2
8(1γ2)
, suggesting VM is
discontinuous at t = s.
Proposition A1: (Welfare Comparison – Tariffs) Suppose the two goods are com-
pletely unrelated (i.e., γ = 0) and trade costs take the form of tariffs. Then, for any
t ∈ [0, α), there exists a range of values for the cost differential s such that 0 ≤ t < s < s¯x
that imply collusion welfare-dominates competition (VM (t, s, 0) > V N (t, s, 0)) for all s in
this range. In this case, under collusion, firms specialize completely in the good they produce
most efficiently and trade it internationally, whereas under competition firms may produce
and trade their inefficient good.
Figure (13) provides a graphical illustration of Proposition A1. In the case of tariffs,
maximal collusion might welfare-dominate Cournot competition for any tariff level as long
as the cost heterogeneity is sufficiently greater than the heterogeneity in trade policy. As
evident from region A of Figure (13), this result holds true both when the duopolists trade
both goods and when they trade only the less costly good, as long as the cost differential is
considerably large. The monopolist specializes completely in the production of the low-cost
good in each market and imports the other one, generates efficiency gains, and enjoys larger
profits. Two additional effects contribute to this novel result: 1) when the goods are com-
pletely unrelated, shipping more of one good will not inflict a negative price externality onto
the other; 2) as long as the initial level of trade costs is not infinitesimal, the cartel enjoys
greater tariff revenues than the competitive firms. Thus, the increase in profits and tariff
revenues due to the switch from competition to collusion more than offsets the reduction in
consumer surplus and maximal collusion welfare-dominates Cournot competition.
As Figure (13) shows, in the case of import tariffs, the symmetry between t and s
with respect to the 45◦-line disappears. Welfare under collusion in the case of tariffs is
discontinuous in s and in t at s = t. This discontinuity is due to the presence (resp.,
absence) of tariff revenues for t ≤ s (resp., t > s). Specifically, for any t ≤ s, the cartel
imports the cost-inefficient good and accumulates positive tariff revenues. However, for
any t > s, there is no trade between the two countries under unconstrained collusion,
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Figure 13: Welfare Comparison under Tariffs for Unrelated
Goods (γ = 0)
the goods are produced only domestically, and the cartel no longer enjoys tariff revenues.
Welfare under collusion is decreasing in s as both profits and consumer surplus fall when
the cost heterogeneity expands. Under Cournot competition, however, the duopolists still
trade either both goods (t < ty) or only the cost-efficient good (ty ≤ t < tx). In this
case, the higher monopoly profits fail to compensate for the decrease in consumer surplus
and the absence of tariff revenues. Therefore, welfare under competition exceeds welfare
under collusion, as shown in region B of Figure (13). Further, for prohibitively high tariffs,
t ∈ [tx, α), or cost differential values, s ∈ [sx, α), welfare under maximal collusion coincides
with welfare under competition.
Next, I relax the assumption of unrelated goods and allow for γ ∈ (0, 1). Collusion can
still welfare-dominate competition for certain values of trade costs and the cost differential.
However, when trade costs take the form of tariffs, there exists a threshold value for γ > 0
beyond which the cartel fails to enhance national welfare for all relevant (t, s) values. The
following proposition provides a description of these possibilities.
Proposition A2: (Welfare and Product Substitutability) The higher the degree of
substitutability between goods γ, the smaller the set of (t, s) under which collusion welfare-
dominates competition. In particular, if trade costs takes the form of tariffs, there exists
a threshold ̂̂γ ∈ (0, 1), such that competition welfare-dominates monopoly for all (t, s) if
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γ ∈ (̂̂γ, 1).
Figure 14: Welfare Comparison under Tariffs for Imperfect
Substitutes (γ = 0.091)
Figure 15: Welfare Comparison under Tariffs for Imperfect
Substitutes (γ = 0.103)
I refer to Figures (14)− (15) to convey the intuition behind Proposition A2. When the
assumption of unrelated goods is relaxed, region A from Figure (13) shrinks. As the goods
become closer substitutes, producing more of any one good inflicts a stronger negative ex-
ternality onto the the marginal revenue of the other. Profits, consumer surplus and tariff
revenues fall, with the decline in cartel profits and tariff revenue being more pronounced.
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As γ surpasses the threshold level ̂̂γ, region A from Figure (13) vanishes completely. If the
degree of substitutability is sufficiently large, then competition weakly welfare-dominates
unconstrained collusion for all values of the cost heterogeneity and all tariff levels, as illus-
trated in Figures (14)− (15). When γ = 0.091 collusion can no longer offer a greater level
of welfare for any combinations of (t, s) ∈ [0, ty) × (0, sy), but can still welfare-dominate
competition for some values of (t, s) ∈ [ty, s)×[sy, sx). However, when the degree of product
substitutability surpasses γ = 0.103 ≡ ̂̂γ, competition is welfare-superior for all (t, s).
Proof of Proposition A1 & Proposition A2: Using the definitions of welfare under
Counot-Nash competition and maximal collusion, I examine the shape and properties of
the welfare functions for all possible values of s and t.
1) First, I focus on the case when tariffs are sufficiently small so that both goods are
traded under competition, while under collusion only the cost-efficient good is traded, i.e.
t < s, t < min(α(1− γ), ty). Then, the difference V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (t, γ) is equal to
∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (t, γ) = (1− γ)(10α
2 + 2αt− 64αs+ 8st) + s2(88 + 56γ) + t2(1 + 8γ)
72(1− γ2)
(67)
Equation (67) is also a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape, I
need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible. Henceforth,
I denote Vz the partial derivative of the difference ∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)−VM (t, γ) with respect
to variable z.
Vt = − (1− γ)(α− 4s)− t(1 + 8γ)
36 (1− γ2) (68)
Vs =
(1− γ)(−8α+ t) + (14 γ + 22 )s
9 (1− γ2) (69)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian is
given by: HW =
 (1+8γ)36(1−γ2) 19(1+γ)
1
9(1+γ)
2(11+7γ)
9(1−γ2)
 and is invertible for all values of γ ∈ [0, 1). The
critical point is given by: t0 = −α (γ−1)(γ−3)6 γ2+11 γ+1 and s0 = (7 γ+1)(1−γ)α2(6 γ2+11 γ+1) . Furthermore, as the
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determinant of HW is positive, (67) will take the form of an ellipse for all admissible values
of γ ∈ [0, 1).
When t = 0 (and γ = 0), V = 136 (α− 2 s) (5α− 22 s) and therefore, the s-intercepts
are s = α2 and s =
5α
22 . On the other hand, at s = 0 (and γ = 0), V =
5α2
36 +
1
36 α t +
t2
72
and the equation has not real solutions, suggesting that the ellipse never crosses the t-
axis. When t = 0 (and γ = 0), welfare under monopoly is greater than welfare under
competition as long as s ∈ (5α22 , α2 ).94 The possibility that VM (t, 0) > V N (t, s, 0) when
t < s, t < min(α(1− γ), ty) and γ = 0 arises for
{
s ∈
(
4
11α− 122 t− 344
√
4α2 − 12αt− 2t2, s¯y
)
& t ∈ [0, 29α) (70)
The same result holds true even for a positive degree of substitutability between good
1 and good 2, as long as γ < ̂̂γ. To find this threshold value ̂̂γ, I need to find the value of
γ such that the ellipse is exactly tangent to the s-axis. Thus, I evaluate equation (67) at
t = 0, find the value of s that maximizes it, s∗, and then evaluate (67) at t = 0 and s = s∗.
Thus, (67) at t = 0 and s = s∗ = 4α(1−γ)(11+7γ) is equal to
∆V |t=0,s=s∗ = α
2(11γ − 1)
4(1 + γ)(11 + 7γ)
(71)
Therefore, ̂̂γ = 111 and VM (t, γ) > V N (t, s, γ) when t < s, t < min(α(1 − γ), ty) and
γ ∈ [0, ̂̂γ). Moreover, as γ increases and approaches ̂̂γ, the set of values of the cost differential
and tariff levels, (t, s), for which VM (t, γ) > V N (t, s, γ) shrinks and vanishes when γ ≥ ̂̂γ.
2) Now, I move on to the case of no trade of any of the goods under collusion, while
trade in both goods persists under competition: t ≥ s, s < min(α(1−γ), sy). The difference
in the two welfare functions is then given by:
∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (s, γ) = (1− γ)(10α
2 + 16αt+ 10αs− 8st+ 8t2)− s2(61 + 56γ)
72(1− γ2) (72)
94 Given that trade costs are assumed to equal 0 in this case, the differences in welfare under
tariffs and transportation costs are exactly the same. Hence, the values of the cost differential,
for which monopoly welfare-dominates competition, are also the same.
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Equation (72) is also a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape, I
first make sure that it is a non-degenerate.
Vt = − 2(α+ t)− s
9 (1 + γ)
(73)
Vs =
5αγ + 56 sγ − 4 tγ − 5α+ 61 s+ 4 t
36 (1− γ2) (74)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian is given
by: HW =
− 29(1+γ) 19(1+γ)
1
9(1+γ)
61+56γ
36(1−γ2)
 and its determinant is negative for all values of γ ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, there is a saddle point given by: t0 = −4α(γ+1)3γ+5 and s0 = −2α(γ−1)3γ+5 . Further, given
that the determinant of HW is negative, (72) will take the form of a hyperbola for any
γ ∈ [0, 1).
When t ≥ s, s < min(α(1− γ), sy), VM (t, γ) < V N (t, s, γ) for all possible values of the
cost differential and all tariff levels. Within this range of values of the cost differential and
tariff levels, competition always welfare-dominates collusion.
3) Next, I consider the case of trade of the cost-efficient good under collusion, while
there is no trade in the cost-inefficient good under competition: t < min(s, α(1 − γ)) and
s ∈ [sy, sx). The difference in the two welfare functions is then given by:
∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (t, γ) = −t
2(5 + 4γ2) + 2αt(1− γ)(4γ − 5)
72(1− γ2) +
−s2(17γ − 44) + 2αs(1− γ)(16− 11γ)
72(1− γ2) +
(75)
−32st(1− γ2) + 5α2(1− γ2)
72(1− γ2)
Equation (??) is also a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape, I
need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Vt =
4αγ2 + 16 γ2s+ 4 γ2t− 9αγ + 5α− 16 s+ 5 t
36 (1− γ2) (76)
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Vs = − 11αγ
2 + 17 γ2s− 16 γ2t− 27αγ + 16α− 44 s+ 16 t
36 (1− γ2) (77)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian is
given by: HW =
 5+4γ236(1−γ2) −49
−49 17γ
2−44
36(1−γ2)
 and its determinant is negative for all values of
γ ∈ [0, 0.249). Thus, there is a saddle point given by: t0 = −4α(γ+1)3γ+5 and s0 = −2α(γ−1)3γ+5
when γ ∈ [0, 0.249). As the determinant of HW is negative for γ ∈ [0, 0.249), (??) will take
the form of a hyperbola, while for γ ∈ [0, 0.249) (??) will be an ellipse.
Monopoly can again welfare-dominate competition, VM (t, 0) > V N (t, s, 0), when t <
min(s, α(1− γ)) and s ∈ [sy, sx) and γ = 0

s ∈ [sy, sx) & t ∈
[
0, 29α
]
s ∈ ( 522(α+ t), sx) & t ∈ (29α, 517α]
s ∈ (t, sx) & t ∈
(
5
17α, α
) (78)
The same result holds true even for a positive degree of substitutability between good
1 and good 2, as long as γ < ̂̂γ. To find this threshold value ̂̂γ, I find the value of γ such
that the ellipse is exactly tangent to the 45◦-line. Thus, I evaluate equation (??) at t = s,
find the value of s that maximizes it, s∗, and then evaluate (??) at t = s and s = s∗. Thus,
(??) at t = s and s = s∗ = α (1−γ)(11−7 γ)
19 γ2+17
is equal to
∆V |t=s,s=s∗ =
α2
(
4 γ3 − 3 γ2 + 10 γ − 1)
2 (1 + γ) (19 γ2 + 17)
(79)
Therefore, ̂̂γ = 0.103 and VM (t, γ) > V N (t, s, γ) when t < s, t < α(1 − γ) and s ∈ [sy, sx)
and γ ∈ [0, ̂̂γ). Moreover, as γ increases and approaches ̂̂γ, the set of values of the cost
differential and tariff levels, (t, s), for which VM (t, γ) > V N (t, s, γ) shrinks and vanishes
when γ ≥ ̂̂γ.
4) Now, I focus on the case of no trade of any of the goods under collusion and no trade
of the cost-inefficient good under competition: s < min(t, α(1 − γ)) and t ∈ [ty, tx). The
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difference in the two welfare functions is then given by:
∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (s, γ) = 1
72
(α+ s− 2t)(5α+ 2t+ 17s) (80)
Equation (80) is also a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape, I
need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Vt = −1
9
(α− 4s− t) (81)
Vs =
1
36
(11α+ 17s− 16t) (82)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian is
given by: HW =
−19 −49
−49 1736
 and its determinant is negative for all values of γ ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, there is a saddle point given by: t0 =
1
3α and s0 = −13α. As the determinant of
HW is negative, (80) will take the shape of a hyperbola for all γ ∈ [0, 1). For this range of
tariff levels and cost differential values, t > s, t < α(1 − γ) and t ∈ [ty, tx), Cournot-Nash
competition always provides a higher level of welfare than maximal collusion. When t > s,
t < α(1− γ) and t ∈ [ty, tx), V N (t, s, γ) > VM (s, γ).
5) Two more regions become relevant for welfare comparisons when γ 6= 0. When
there is no trade of any of the goods under unconstrained collusion, but the cost-inefficient
good is still produced domestically, while under competition the cost-inefficient good is not
produced in the domestic market any longer, but is still traded: t > s and s ∈ [s¯x, α(1−γ)).
The difference in the two welfare functions is then given by:
∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (s, γ) = −2αt(γ − 2)
2 + α2(24− 16γ) + t2(3γ2 − 4)
2(γ − 2)2(γ + 2)2 −
3
8
2α(1− γ)(α− s) + s2
(1− γ2) (83)
Equation (83) is also a quadratic function in (t, s) and in order to examine its shape, I
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need to first make sure that it is a non-degenerate, i.e. its Hessian is invertible.
Vt = −4α(1− γ) + αγ
2 + t(4− 3 γ2)
(γ − 2)2 (γ + 2)2 (84)
Vs =
1
36
(11α+ 17s− 16t) (85)
Then, using the second-order derivatives of ∆W with respect to t and s, the Hessian is given
by: HW =
 4−3γ2(γ−2)2(γ+2)2 0
0 3(α(1−γ)−s)
4(1−γ2)
 and its determinant of the Hessian is positive for all
values of γ ∈ [0, 1). The critical point is given by: t0 = α(γ−2)
2
3γ2−4 and s0 = α(1− γ). As the
determinant of HW is positive, (83) will take the shape of an ellipse for all γ ∈ [0, 1). For
this range of tariff levels and cost differential values, t > s and s ∈ [s¯x, α(1−γ)), competition
always provides a higher level of welfare than collusion. When t > s and s ∈ [s¯x, α(1− γ)),
V N (t, s, γ) > VM (s, γ).
6) Naturally, the next case to consider is when under maximal collusion the cost-
inefficient good is neither produced domestically nor traded, while under competition the
cost-inefficient good is not produced in the domestic market any longer, but is still traded:
s > α(1 − γ), s ∈ [s¯x, α) and t ∈
[
α(1− γ), α(1− 12γ)
)
. The difference in the two welfare
functions is then given by:
∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (s, γ) = 2 (γ + 3) (γ − 2)
2 α2 − 2 t (γ − 2)2 α+ 3 γ2t2 − 4 t2
2 (γ − 2)2 (2 + γ)2 −
3
8
α2 (86)
Equation (86) is also a quadratic function in t only with
Vt = −4α(1− γ) + αγ
2 + t(4− 3 γ2)
(γ − 2)2 (γ + 2)2 (87)
Vtt = − 4− 3γ
2
(γ − 2)2(γ + 2)2 (88)
For this range of tariff levels and cost differential values, t > α(1 − γ), s > α(1 − γ),
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s ∈ [s¯x, α) and t < α(1 − 12γ), competition always provides a higher level of welfare than
collusion for any degree of product substitutability. When s > α(1 − γ), s ∈ [s¯x, α) and
t ∈ [α(1− γ), α(1− 12γ)), V N (t, s, γ) > VM (s, γ) for any value of γ ∈ (0, 1).
7) Next, I look at the possibility of the cost differential being prohibitively high for so
that the cost-inefficient good is not produced in the domestic market under Cournot-Nash
competition, while under collusion tariff levels allow for trade and complete specialization:
t < s, t < α(1− γ), and s ∈ [s¯x, α). The difference in the two welfare functions is then:
∆V ≡ V N (t, s, γ)− VM (s, γ) = 2α
2γ3 − 2α2γ2 − 2αγ2t+ 3 γ2t2 − 16α2γ + 8αγ t+ 24α2 − 8α t− 4 t2
2 (γ − 2)2 (2 + γ)2
−2(1− γ)(3α
2 − αt)− t2
8(1− γ2) (89)
Equation (89) is also a quadratic function in t only with
Vt = −
γ2
(
αγ3 + 11 tγ2 − 5αγ2 + 8αγ − 20 t− 4α)
4 (γ − 2)2 (γ + 2)2 (1− γ2) (90)
Vtt =
γ2
(
20− 11 γ2)
4 (γ − 2)2 (γ + 2)2 (1− γ2) (91)
For this range of tariff levels and cost differential values, t < s, t < α(1−γ), and s ∈ [s¯x, α),
competition is welfare-superior to collusion for any degree of product substitutability. When
t < s, t < α(1− γ), and s ∈ [s¯x, α), V N (t, s, γ) > VM (s, γ) for any value of γ ∈ (0, 1).
When t ≥ t¯x and t ≥ s < α(1 − γ) under both competition and collusion no trade in
either of the goods takes place and each firm is a monopolist in its own market, producing
both goods for domestic consumption only. The levels of welfare under competition and
under collusion are identical. Moreover, when t > α(1 − 12γ) and s > α(1 − γ), only the
cost-efficient good is produced in the domestic market and no trade takes place under both
types of market structure. In this case, each firm is a monopolist in its own country and
the welfare levels coincide. ||
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Stability of Maximal Collusion
In this section I analyze the sustainability of unconstrained collusion, its dependence on
trade costs and the cost differential, and verify that the aforementioned findings hold true.
Multi-market collusion arises in the model as a result of repeated firm interactions over
the infinite time horizon and in multiple markets. The literature on game theory has already
established that repeated interactions over time allow firms to sustain collusion by acting
cooperatively until one of them deviates and retaliation ensues afterwards. It is also well
known from Bernheim and Whinston (1990) that if firms meet in more than one isolated
market, then any deviation by a cartel member in a given market will extend to all markets
and will be followed by punishment in all markets. Multi-market interactions can facilitate
cartel agreements by allowing members to pool their incentive constraints across markets
and thus relaxing a binding incentive-compatibility constraint.
Let δ < 1 denote the firms’ common discount factor. Following Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1990), I assume multi-market collusion requires allocating to each firm a pair (x,y),
which denotes the output vector of good 1 and good 2 targeted for domestic production
and imports, respectively. Collusion is sustained through a grim-trigger strategy, stipu-
lating continued adherence to the prescribed output (x,y) and reversion to the Cournot
competitive equilibrium upon violation of the cartel agreement. Collusion will be stable as
long as the present value of profits along the collusive path outweighs the one-period gain
from deviation plus the discounted profit loss from the ensuing punishment. Therefore, the
incentive-compatibility constraint, which ensures a sustainable cartel agreement is given by:
1
1− δΠ
C(x,y, t, s) ≥ ΠD(x,y, t, s) + δ
1− δΠ
N (t, s) (92)
The no-deviation constraint, (92), is pooled both across markets and across products. I
let the no-deviation constraint (92) bind and solve for δM , the minimum discount factor
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capable of sustaining maximal collusion:
δM (t, s) =
ΠD(xM ,yM , t, s)−ΠM (xM ,yM , t, s)
ΠD(xM ,yM , t, s)−ΠN (t, s) (93)
As outlined in the earlier analysis, the monopoly output levels depend on the interaction
between the cost heterogeneity and the heterogeneity in geography. Recall that if trade
costs are below the cost asymmetry, t < s, complete specialization is established under
maximal collusion and each good is produced only in the country that has a competitive
advantage in it and exported to the other market. On the other hand, if trade costs exceed
the cost heterogeneity, t > s, there is no trade and both goods are produced domesti-
cally in both markets. And, in case of trade costs being equal to the cost asymmetry, the
cartel is indifferent between importing the cost-inefficient good and producing it domes-
tically. Therefore, any combination of outputs satisfying xM2 + y
M
2 =
α−s
2 maximizes the
monopolist’s profits, when t = s. The optimal deviation payoffs, however, are minimized
when both cartel members share equally each market due to the strict convexity of ΠD in
(x,y). Thus, when t = s, each firm will choose to maintain presence in its rival’s market
and xM2 = y
M
2 =
α−s
4 . Lastly, I are already familiar with the dependence of profits under
monopoly, optimal deviation and competition on t and s, outlined in the previous section.
The minimum discount factor capable of sustaining maximal collusion exhibits the following
properties:
Proposition A3 (Minimum Discount Factor) The minimum discount factor that is
capable of sustaining maximal collusion, δM (t, s), has the following properties:
a) if t < s,
i) δM (0, s) = 9(α−2s)13α+22s , δ
M (ty, s) =
9(α−2s)
38s−3α , δ
M (t, t
−1
y , 0) =
9t
8α−19t
ii) ∃ tδ1 ∈ [0, ty) s.t. ∂δ
M
∂t S 0 for t S tδ1 and
∂δM
∂t > 0 for t ∈ [ty, s)
iii) ∃ sδ1 ∈ (t, sy) s.t. ∂δ
M
∂s S 0 for s S sδ1 and ∃ sδ2 ∈ [sy, sx) s.t. ∂δ
M
∂s S 0 for s S sδ2
b) if t > s,
i) δM (t, 0) = 9(α−2t)13α+22t , δ
M (ty, s) =
9s
8α−19s , δ
M (t, t
−1
y ) =
9(α−2t)
38t−3α
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ii) ∃ tδ2 ∈ (s, ty) s.t. ∂δ
M
∂t S 0 for t S tδ2 and ∃ tδ3 ∈ [ty, tx) s.t. ∂δ
M
∂t S 0 for t S tδ3
iii) ∃ sδ3 ∈ (0, sy] s.t.∂δ
M
∂s T 0 for s T sδ3 and
∂δM
∂s > 0 for s ∈ [sy, t)
c) if t = s, then δM (s, s) = 3(α
2−6α s+11 s2)
19α2−34α s+41 s2−32 ΠN 6= lim δMt→s = 2α
2−10α s+17 s2
10α2−18α s+21 s2−16 ΠN ,
where ΠN is given in equation (5).
Proposition A3 part a) focuses on the case of trade being present under collusion. Part
a.i) evaluates the minimum discount factor at the extremes of free trade (t = 0) and no trade
in the cost-inefficient good (t ≥ ty and s ≥ sy). Parts a.ii) and a.iii) show the dependence
of the discount factor on trade costs and the cost differential for all relevant intervals.
Interestingly, the relation between δM and t (resp., s), holding s (resp., t) constant, is non-
monotonic. When t < s, ΠM is decreasing in t and independent of s, ΠD is decreasing in
(t, s), while ΠN is non-monotonic in (t, s). Increases in trade costs raise cartel’s exporting
costs and reduce profits. As t rises, profits under optimal deviation fall due to the higher
costs of trading, which enhances collusive stability. The punishment profits, on the other
hand, depend non-monotonically on t: for low values of t, ∂ΠN/∂t < 0, while for high
values of t, ∂ΠN/∂t > 0. Combining these effects of t on all profit functions explains the
non-monotonicity of the minimum discount factor in trade costs. The link between δM
and s is also non-monotonic due to the non-monotonicity of ΠN in s, which dominates the
negative effect of the cost differential on the deviation profits for high initial values of s.
One interesting result deserves more emphasis: when the inefficient good is no longer
traded under competition, trade liberalization improves collusive sustainability. That is, for
values of t ∈ [ty, s), the minimum discount factor is increasing in trade costs, ∂δM/∂t > 0,
due to the fact that within this range of trade costs, ∂ΠN/∂t < 0. This possibility is
illustrated by the red dotted line in the second panel of Figure (16) and stands in sharp
contrast to the previous literature, which finds the discount factor to be decreasing in trade
costs (e.g., Bond and Syropoulos, 2008). Moreover, as already shown, for trade costs within
this range of values t ∈ [ty, s)95, maximal collusion can welfare-dominate competition if
the cost heterogeneity is sufficiently high. Combining these results, one can argue that by
95 Or for t ∈ [t2, ta) in the case of transportation costs, where ta < s and is defined in equation
(78).
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Figure 16: Minimum Discount Factor and Trade Costs
enhancing cartel’s stability trade liberalization can further contribute to national welfare.
Figure 17: Minimum Discount Factor and Cost Asymmetries
Next, I consider the case of no trade under maximal collusion, discussed in part b) of
Proposition A3. Part b.i) evaluates the minimum discount factor at the extremes of free
trade (t = 0) and no trade in the inefficient good (t ≥ ty and s ≥ sy). Then, parts b.ii) and
b.iii) study the link between the discount factor and trade costs and between the minimum
discount factor and the cost differential for all relevant intervals. Since in this case ΠM is
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decreasing in s and independent of t, the effects of trade costs on the minimum discount
factor are channeled through ΠD and ΠN . The negative effect of t on ΠD becomes second
order at high levels of t and is dominated by the non-monotonicity of the punishment payoffs
in t. Analogously, the non-monotonicity of ΠN in s also prevails over the negative effect of s
on ΠD and ΠM for high initial values of s. Interestingly, for intermediate values of the cost
heterogeneity, s ∈ [t−1y , t), the minimum discount factor is increasing in s, ∂δM/∂s > 0.96
Therefore, as the difference in marginal costs shrinks, the cartel’s stability is improved.
Moreover, for the same range of values of s, when transportation costs are sufficiently high,
maximal collusion can provide a greater level of welfare than Cournot competition. Thus,
reductions in the cost heterogeneity by strengthening the collusive agreement can further
sustain the gains in efficiency and improve national welfare. Figures (16) − (17) illustrate
the non-monotonicity of the minimum discount factor and its dependence on trade costs
(for a given level of s) and the cost differential (for a given level of t). The red curves
capture part a) of Proposition A3 with trade being present under collusion, while the blue
curves correspond to part b) of Proposition A3 with no trade under monopoly.
Lastly, part c) of Proposition A3 shows that when trade costs are equal to the cost
differential, the minimum discount factor is discontinuous. This discontinuity is due to the
strict convexity of the deviation payoffs, which implies that cartel members’ incentives to
deviate are minimized when they share equally both markets: xM2 = y
M
2 =
1
2
α(1−γ)−s
2(1−γ2) . If
trade costs either exceed or fall short of the cost differential, the cartel strictly prefers either
to cease trade or to specialize completely and import the cost-inefficient good.
In this section, I demonstrate that collusion is a stable outcome of the repeated game
for values of the discount factor greater than δM . To verify that the trade and welfare
comparisons from the previous sections are valid, I take the values of t and s, which ensure
that 1) trade of the cost-efficient good is greater under collusion than under competition; 2)
welfare is higher under collusion than under competition in the case of transportation costs
and tariffs; and substitute them in the expression for δM in (93). I perform this exercise step
96 This possibility is illustrated by the red dotted line in the second panel of Figure (17) and is
driven by the fact that when the goods are completely unrelated ∂ΠN/∂s < 0 for s ∈ [t−1y , t).
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by step for each of the possible parameter values, assuming that the goods are completely
unrelated (γ = 0), for simplicity. In all cases, I obtain plausible values of δM below 1, which
confirms the validity of the main results.97 Namely, I establish that not only can collusion
promote bilateral trade and improve national welfare relative to competition, but that such
cartel agreements are stable contracts as long as firms value profits sufficiently.
Proof of Proposition A3: To derive expressions for δM , I substitute the relevant profit
functions in the ICC in equation (92), set the ICC equal to 0 and solve for δ ≡ δM . Recall
from the analysis in the text that the value of both ΠM and ΠD depends on the initial levels
of t and s. More specifically, ΠM and ΠD take on different values depending on whether
t T s. If t < s, then ΠD = 58 α2 − 12 α s − 58 α t + 12 s2 + 14 st + 9 t
2
16 , while if t > s, Π
D =
5
8 α
2− 58 α s− 12 α t+ 9 s
2
16 +
1
4 st+
1
2 t
2. Lastly, if t = s, ΠD = 19α
2
32 − 7α s16 − 58 α t+ 13 s
2
32 +
3
8 st+
1
2 t
2.
The value of the punishment payoffs, ΠN , is also different depending on the range of trade
costs and cost differentials as shown in equation (5). Below, I present the expressions for
δM for the aforementioned cases as a function of ΠN :
δM (t, s, 0) =

2α2−8α s−2α t+8 s2+4 st+5 t2
10α2−8α s−10α t+8 s2+4 st+9 t2−16 ΠN if t < min(s, α)
2α2−2α s−8α t+5 s2+4 st+8 t2
10α2−10α s−8α t+9 s2+4 st+8 t2−16 ΠN if s < min(t, α)
3α2+2α s−20α t+5 s2+12 st+16 t2
19α2−14α s−20α t+13 s2+12 st+16 t2−32 ΠN if t = s
(94)
Part (a): t < s
Part (a.i) The proof of part (a.i) follows readily by evaluating (94) at t = 0, t = ty,
and s = t
−1
y . It is also straightforward to show δ
M (0, s, 0) > δM (ty, s, 0) if s ∈ (α2 , α) or if
s ∈ (0, 3α38 ).
Part (a.ii)
Suppose t ∈ [0, ty). Then, to derive the full expression for δM (t, s, 0), I substitute the
relevant value of ΠN from (5) and simplify: δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−8α s−2α t+8 s2+4 st+5 t2)
26α2−8α s−26α t−88 s2+4 st−79 t2 . It
follows that ∂δ
M
∂t =
−432(2α2s−12 tα2−8α s2+28 tα s+6 t2α+8 s3−8 ts2−7 t2s)
(26α2−8α s−26α t−88 s2+4 st−79 t2)2 . Setting this derivative
97 The analysis of these parameter values in all relevant cases is available upon request.
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equal to 0, gives the value of t, which minimizes the discount factor. Let
arg mint δ
M = tδ1 ≡ −−6α
2+14α s−4 s2+3√2
√
(2α2−2α s+s2)(α−2 s)2
−7 s+6α ∈ [0, ty) and
∂δM
∂t
> 0 if
 t ∈ (tδ1 , s) and s ∈ (0,
α
4 )
t ∈ (tδ1 , ty) and s ∈ (0, α2 )
Otherwise, ∂δ
M
∂s ≤ 0 if t ≤ tδ1 .
If t ∈ [ty, tx), then δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−8α s−2α t+8 s2+4 st+5 t2)
22α2−40α s−58α t−8 s2+164 st+t2 and
∂δM
∂t =
216(3α3−26α2s+9 tα2+68α s2−16 tα s−12 t2α−56 s3−4 ts2+34 t2s)
(22α2−40α s−58α t−8 s2+164 st+t2)2 . This derivative turns out to
be positive for all values of t in the relevant range, namely ∂δ
M
∂t > 0 for any t ∈ [ty, s).
Part (a.iii)
If s ∈ [t, s¯y), then δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−8α s−2α t+8 s2+4 st+5 t2)
26α2−8α s−26α t−88 s2+4 st−79 t2 and
∂δM
∂s =
−432(4α3−16α2s−6 tα2+16α s2+16 tα s−12 t2α−8 ts2+8 t2s+7 t3)
(26α2−8α s−26 tα−88 s2+4 ts−79 t2)2 . Similarly, setting the deriva-
tive equal to 0 and solving for s gives the value of s that minimizes δM (t, s, 0). Let
arg mins δ
M = sδ1 ≡ −(−4α
2+4 tα+2 t2+3
√
2
√
t2(t2−2 tα+2α2))
4(2α−t) ∈ [t, s¯y). Thus,
∂δM
∂s
> 0 if
 s ∈ (sδ1 , sy) and t ∈ (0, α)s ∈ (t, sy) and t ∈ (0, α4 ) (95)
Otherwise, ∂δ
M
∂s ≤ 0 if s ≤ sδ1 .
If s ∈ [s¯y, s¯x), then δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−8α s−2α t+8 s2+4 st+5 t2)
22α2−40α s−58α t−8 s2+164 st+t2
and ∂δ
M
∂s =
−432(2α3−8α2s−3 tα2+8α s2+20 tα s−6 t2α−28 ts2−2 t2s+17 t3)
(22α2−40α s−58 tα−8 s2+164 ts+t2)2 . To find the value of s
that minimizes δM (t, s, 0), I set this derivative equal to 0, again, and solve for s: arg mins δ
M =
sδ2 ≡ −(−4α
2+10 tα−t2+3
√
t2(8α2−36 tα+53 t2))
4(2α−7 t) ∈ [s¯y, s¯x). Thus, ∂δ
M
∂s T 0 for any s T sδ2 and
t ∈ (0, α).
Part (b): t > s
Part (b.i) The proof of part (b.i) follows readily by evaluating (94) at s = 0, t = ty,
and s = s¯y.
Part (b.ii)
If t ∈ [s, ty), then δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−2α s−8α t+5 s2+4 st+8 t2)
26α2−26α s−8α t−79 s2+4 st−88 t2 and
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∂δM
∂t =
−432(4α3−6α2s−16 tα2−12α s2+16 tα s+16 t2α+7 s3+8 ts2−8 t2s)
(26α2−26α s−8α t−79 s2+4 st−88 t2)2 . I find that arg mint δ
M =
tδ2 ≡ −(−4α
2+4α s+2 s2+3
√
2
√
s2(2α2−2α s+s2))
4(2α−s) ∈ [s, ty). Thus,
∂δM
∂t
> 0 if
 t ∈
(
tδ2 , ty
)
and s ∈ (0, α)
t ∈ (s, ty) and s ∈ (0, α4 )
Otherwise, ∂δ
M
∂s ≤ 0 if t ≤ tδ2 .
If t ∈ [ty, tx), then δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−2α s−8α t+5 s2+4 st+8 t2)
22α2−58α s−40α t+s2+164 st−8 t2 and
∂δM
∂t =
−432(2α3−3α2s−8 tα2−6α s2+20 tα s+8 t2α+17 s3−2 ts2−28 t2s)
(22α2−58α s−40 tα+s2+164 ts−8 t2)2 . Solving for the value of t that
minimizes δM (t, s, 0) in this case gives
arg mint δ
M (t, s, 0) = tδ3 ≡ − −4α
2+10α s−s2+3
√
s2(8α2−36α s+53 s2)
4(2α−7 s) ∈ [ty, tx). Thus, ∂δ
M
∂t T 0
for any t T tδ3 and s ∈ (0, α).
Part (b.iii)
If s ∈ [0, s¯y), then δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−2α s−8α t+5 s2+4 st+8 t2)
26α2−26α s−8α t−79 s2+4 st−88 t2 and
∂δM
∂s =
432(12α2s−2 tα2−6α s2−28 tα s+8 t2α+7 ts2+8 t2s−8 t3)
(−88 t2−8 tα+4 ts+26α2−26α s−79 s2)2 . Following the same procedure, let
arg mins δ
M = sδ3 ≡ −6α
2+14 tα−4 t2+3√2
√
(t2−2 tα+2α2)(−2 t+α)2
6α−7 t ∈ [0, s¯y). Thus, ∂δ
M
∂s T 0 for
any s T sδ3 and t ∈
(
0, α2
)
.
If s ∈ [s¯y, s¯x), then δM (t, s, 0) = 9(2α
2−2α s−8α t+5 s2+4 st+8 t2)
22α2−58α s−40α t+s2+164 st−8 t2 and
∂δM
∂s =
216(3α3+9α2s−26 tα2−12α s2−16 tα s+68 t2α+34 ts2−4 t2s−56 t3)
(22α2−58α s−40 tα+s2+164 ts−8 t2)2 . In this case, the derivative
is positive for any value of s in the relevant range, namely, ∂δ
M
∂s > 0 for any s ∈ [s¯x, t).
Part (c): t = s
When t = s, the monopolist is indifferent between shutting down trade and producing
both goods in both countries or specializing completely in the production of the cost-
efficient good and exporting it. In this case the optimal solution to the cartel problem is a
correspondence: any combination of outputs satisfying xM2 + y
M
2 =
α(1−γ)−s
2(1−γ2) maximizes the
monopolist’s profits, when t = s. The optimal deviation payoffs, however, are minimized
when both cartel members share equally each market due to the strict convexity of ΠD in
(xk, yk) for k = 1, 2. Thus, when t = s, each firm will choose to maintain a presence in it’s
rival’s market and xM2 = y
M
2 =
1
2
α(1−γ)−s
2(1−γ2) . In this case, Π
M (s, s, 0) = 14
(
2α2 − 2αs+ s2)
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and ΠD(s, s, 0) = 132
(
19α2 − 34αs+ 41s2). Therefore, it follows
δM (s, s, 0) = 3(α
2−6α s+11 s2)
19α2−34α s+41 s2−32 ΠN 6= lim δMt→s = 2α
2−10α s+17 s2
10α2−18α s+21 s2−16 ΠN . To obtain all
possible values of δM at t = s, one needs to substitute for ΠN for the different ranges of t
and s as described in equation (5).
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A.2 Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs
Proposition A4: (Bond and Syropoulos, 2008) Suppose τ ≥ τ¯ , so that there is
no trade with ROW. Then the minimum discount factor that sustains the monopoly
outcome, δM(t, τ¯ , β), has the following properties:
a) δ ≡ δM(0, τ¯ , β) = 9
17
and δ ≡ δM(t, τ¯ , β) = 18(t¯−t)
13A+22t
for t ∈ (0, t¯]
b) limt→0 δ = 913 , limt→t¯ δ = 0 and dδ/dt < 0 for t ∈ (0, t¯].
Proof of Proposition A4 and Proposition 3. In order to describe the de-
pendence of δM on trade costs and market size, I need to specify ΠD, ΠC and ΠN
in the definition of Φ in (ICC) for q = qM . Recall from the discussion in the main
text that the value of ΠD varies depending on whether t = 0 or t > 0. If t = 0 then
qM = (x, y, A−τ
4β
) for any x+ y = QM and ΠD = (A−y)
2
4
+ (A−x)
2
4
+ 9(A−τ)
2
64β
. In this case
ΠD is lowest when x = y = QM/2; hence, ΠD = 9A
2
32
+ 9(A−τ)
2
64β
for t = 0. On the other
hand, if t > 0 then qM = (Q
M
2
, 0, A−τ
4β
) and thus ΠD = A
2
4
+ (A/2−t)
2
4
+ 9(A−τ)
2
64β
.
Next, note that ΠC = ΠM , with ΠM satisfying (15) regardless of the value of t.
Lastly, note that ΠN conforms to (13).
Now define the local variable Ψ = Ψ (t, τ, β) ≡ 72Φ(qM(τ, β), t, τ, β, δ). Applying
the above ideas onto Φ in (ICC), simplifying the resulting expression and searching
for the lowest discount factor that ensures Ψ = 0 implies the following. First, for t = 0
and τ ≥ τ¯ , I find Ψ = (δM − δ) [17
4
A2
]
= 0 where δ = 9
17
; therefore, δM (0, τ, β) = δ
as stated in part (a) of Proposition 1. Similarly, for t = 0 and τ < τ¯ , I have
Ψ = (δM − δ)
[
17
4
A2 + 17(τ¯−τ)
2
8β
]
= 0 which, once again, implies δM (0, τ, β) = δ, as
stated in part (a.i) of Proposition 1. Second, if t ≥ t¯ (= A/2) and τ < τ¯ , then
Ψ = (δM − δ)
[
17(τ¯−τ)2
8β
]
= 0 which demands δM = δ, as required in part (a.i) of
Proposition 1.
Let us now focus on t ∈ (0, t¯). If τ ≥ τ¯ , then
Ψ =
[
δM − 18(t¯− t)
13A+ 22t
]
(t¯− t) (13A+ 22t) = 0.
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This helps prove the remainder of Proposition A4. On the other hand, if τ < τ¯ , as
required in Proposition 3, I find (after some algebra)
Ψ =
[
δM − 18(t¯− t)
13A+ 22t
]
(t¯− t) (13A+ 22t) + (δM − δ) [17 (τ¯ − τ)2
8β
]
= 0.
The above expression can be rewritten as
Ψ =
504
17
(t− t1) (t¯− t) +
(
δM − δ) [(t¯− t) (13A+ 22t) + 17 (τ¯ − τ)2
8β
]
= 0, (A.1)
where t1 ≡ A/14. Solving (A.1) for δM and simplifying the resulting expression gives
δM =
18 (t¯− t)2 + 9(τ¯−τ)2
8β
(t¯− t) (13A+ 22t) + 17(τ¯−τ)2
8β
= κ
[
18 (t¯− t)
13A+ 22t
]
+ (1− κ)
[
9
17
]
(A.2)
where κ ≡ (t¯−t)(13A+22t)
(t¯−t)(13A+22t)+ 17(τ¯−τ)2
8
< 1. The last expression in (A.2) is the weighted
sum of the minimum discount factors that would arise in the hosts of the cartel and
in ROW if firms did not pool their incentives constraints in these regions. One can
verify that δM < 1.
Remainder of part (a), and parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 3. Since the focus is
on t < t¯, part (a.ii) follows readily from (A4). I will demonstrate part (a.iii) shortly.
First note though that dδM/dγ = −Ψγ/Ψδ, for γ ∈ {t, τ, β}. Differentiating (A.1)
and simplifying terms gives
Ψδ = (t¯− t) (13A+ 22t) + 17 (τ¯ − τ)
2
8β
> 0
Ψt = −2 (A+ 22t)
[
δM − 18(t¯− t)
A+ 22t
]
= 4
[
9
4
A
(
3− δM)+ (9 + 11δM) (t1 − t)]
Ψτ = −
(
δM − δ) [17 (τ¯ − τ)
4β
]
T 0 if δM S δ
Ψβ = −
(
δM − δ) [17 (τ¯ − τ)2
8β2
]
T 0 if δM S δ.
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Parts (b) and (c) follow from inspection of the above expressions and from studying
the limits of δM in (A.2) as β → 0 and β →∞, respectively.
To prove part (a.iii), note the following. First, Ψt(t, τ, β) > 0 for any t ∈ (0, t1];
therefore, δMt < 0 for t ∈ (0, t1]. Second, from (A.2) I have limt→t¯ δM → δ as t → t¯
from below. Moreover, limt→t¯ δMt > 0 since limt→t¯ Ψt(t, τ, β) < 0. By the continuity
of δM in t ∈ (0, t¯), there will exist a trade cost t2 ≡ arg mint δM (t, τ, β) ∈ (t1, t¯) for
any τ < τ¯ . Setting Ψt = 0, utilizing the definition of δ
M in the resulting expression,
and solving for t gives
t2 (k) ≡ 1
6A
[
3A2 + 7k −
√
k (18A2 + 49k)
]
where k = k (τ, β) ≡ 17 (A− τ)
2
8β
.
Differentiating t2 (·) appropriately gives ∂t2/∂γ = t′2 (k) kγ for γ ∈ {τ, β} where
t′2 (k) = −
[
27A3
2k (18A2 + 49k)
] [
7 +
9A2 + 49k√
k (18A2 + 49k)
]−1
< 0 and kγ < 0.
Thus ∂t2/∂γ > 0 for γ ∈ {τ, β}. Moreover, limτ→τ¯ t2 = limβ→∞ t2 = t¯ because
limτ→τ¯ k = limβ→∞ k = 0. ||
Proof of Lemma 5: Henceforth I simplify notation a bit by defining x˜ ≡ xD,
y˜ ≡ yD, z˜ ≡ zD. Further, to avoid cluttering, I drop superscript ”∗”. The active ICC
requires Φ1 (θ, δ, t, τ, β) = 0 and, as noted in the text, 1− δ − θ > 0. Recalling from
(20) that Φ1j = Π
C
j − (1− δ) ΠDj for j = x, y, z, taking into account (21) and defining
Φ1θ ≡ dΦ1/dθ yields
Φ1θ = (1− δ − θ)
[(−ΠDx )x1θ + (−ΠDy ) y1θ + (−ΠDz ) z1θ] from (18)
= (1− δ − θ) [y˜x1θ + x˜y1θ + βz˜z1θ] from (16). (A.3)
I will argue that Φ1θ > 0 which is tantamount to showing that Π
D (q1 (θ, ·) , ·) is
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decreasing in θ. Differentiation of the expressions in (21a) with respect to θ yields
Q1θ =
3(2A− t)
(8 + θ)2
> 0 (A.4a)
x1θ =
1
2
(
Q1θ −
t
θ2
)
(A.4b)
y1θ =
1
2
(
Q1θ +
t
θ2
)
> 0 (A.4c)
z1θ =
6 (A− τ)
β (8 + θ)2
> 0. (A.4d)
The above equations enable us to transform the expression inside the square brackets
of (A.3) into
y˜x1θ + x˜y
1
θ + βz˜z
1
θ = y˜
(
Q1θ −
t
θ2
)
+ x˜
(
Q1θ +
t
θ2
)
+ z˜
6 (A− τ)
(8 + θ)2
= (x˜+ y˜)Q1θ + (x˜− y˜)
t
θ2
+ z˜
6 (A− τ)
(8 + θ)2
=
9(2A− t)2
(8 + θ)3
+
t2
θ3
+
18 (A− τ)2
β (8 + θ)3
> 0,
where the last term was obtained from (A.4) and the facts that
x˜ =
1
2
[
3(2A− t)
8 + θ
+
t
θ
]
(A.5a)
y˜ =
1
2
[
3(2A− t)
8 + θ
− t
θ
]
(A.5b)
z˜ =
3 (A− τ)
β (8 + θ)
, (A.5c)
which imply x˜+ y˜ = 3(2A−t)
8+θ
and x˜− y˜ = t/θ.98 For clarity, I rewrite (A.3) as
Φ1θ = (1− δ − θ)
[
9(2A− t)2
(8 + θ)3
+
t2
θ3
+
18 (A− τ)2
β (8 + θ)3
]
> 0. (A.3′)
98 Direct comparison of (21c) and (A.5b) reveal that y˜ > 0 for all values of t that ensure y1 > 0;
therefore, keeping track of the non-negativity constraint on y1 also takes care of the non-
negativity constraint on y˜.
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The positive sign of (A.3′) establishes that weaker cartel discipline (θ ↑) relaxes the
ICC.
To take a closer look at the solution θ1∗ to Φ1 = 0, substitute (21) into the ICC
and simplify the resulting expression to obtain
Φ1 =
(1− θ) (17 + θ)
(8 + θ)2
Ω1 = 0, (A.6a)
where
Ω1 = −9 (1− θ)
17 + θ
[
4t2 (4− θ) (2 + θ)
9θ2
+ ΠN
]
+ δ
[
8t2 (4 + 5θ)
θ2(17 + θ)
+ ΠN
]
(A.6b)
for t > 0 and δ < δM . One can see from (A.6a) that, indeed, θ1∗ = 1 is a generic
solution, as noted in the text. Moreover, the ICC binds as δ → 0 only if lim δ→0Ω1 = 0
for t ≤ t¯ which can happen only if lim δ→0θ1∗ = 1.
Next, suppose t = 0 and δ < δ̂. If δ ∈ [δ, δ̂) then θ1∗ = 0 because maximal
collusion is sustainable. However, if δ ∈ [0, δ) the ICC will be binding (i.e., Ω1 = 0)
requires θ = θg where θg ≡ 17(δ − δ)/(9 + δ) > 0. Thus, θ1∗ = max(θg, 0) for t = 0
and δ < δ̂.
One can check from (A.6a) and (A.6b) (using L’Hoˆpital’s rule) that Φ1 < 0 as θ
becomes arbitrarily small and that limθ→1−δ Φ1 > 0. Since, by (A.6), Φ1 is continuous
and increasing in θ on (0, 1− δ) there will exist a unique solution θ1∗ ∈ (0, 1− δ) to
Φ1 = 0, as claimed in Lemma 1.
Part (a). Since, by the implicit function theorem, dθ1∗/dδ = −Φ1δ/Φ1θ to prove this
part it suffices to prove Φ1δ > 0. But this is trivially true since Φ
1
δ = Π
D − ΠN > 0.
Part (b). Since dθ1∗/dt = −Φ1t/Φ1θ, to prove the first part of (b) I must first show
that Φ1t < 0. Differentiating Φ
1 with respect to t and utilizing (21a) and the fact that
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ΠCj − (1− δ) ΠDj = (1− δ − θ) (−ΠDj ) > 0 for j = x, y gives
Φ1t = Π
C
t − (1− δ) ΠDt − δΠNt + (1− δ − θ)
[−ΠDx x1t − ΠDy y1t ]
= −y1 + (1− δ) y˜ − δΠNt + (1− δ − θ)
[
y˜x1t + x˜y
1
t
]
. (A.7)
For clarity and future reference, I note that
Q1t = −
2 + θ
8 + θ
< 0 (A.8a)
x1t =
1
2
(
Q1t +
2− θ
θ
)
=
8− 4θ − θ2
θ(8 + θ)
> 0 (A.8b)
y1t =
1
2
(
Q1t −
2− θ
θ
)
= − 4− θ
θ(8 + θ)
< 0. (A.8c)
Equation (A.7) reveals that, for given cartel discipline, changes in t affect Φ1 through
four channels. The first three channels involve the direct effects of t on ΠC , ΠD and
ΠN , respectively. The fourth channel is indirect and is associated with the effect of
t on x1 and y1. The direct effects of t on Φ1 through ΠC and ΠD are clear. Since
ΠCt = −y1 and ΠDt = −y˜, the former effect is negative whereas the latter effect is
positive (see (A.7)). The direct effect of t on Φ1 through ΠN depends on the level of
t. Since arg mint Π
N = A/5, as discussed earlier, the punishment effect on the ICC is
positive for low t levels and negative at high t levels.99 One can verify (by utilizing
(A.5) and (A.8) in (A.7)) that y˜x1t + x˜y
1
t = y˜Q
1
t + (x˜− y˜)y1t < 0, which implies that
the fourth (and indirect) effect of t on Φ1 is negative.
The interesting thing for the purposes is that, despite the apparent ambiguity
of the effects of t on Φ1 noted above, I can sign Φ1t by using the fact that Φ
1 = 0.
99 Naturally, if the punishment payoff is invariant to changes in trade costs, this effect vanishes.
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Substituting the values of variables in the relevant expressions and simplifying yields:
Φ1t = −
8 (1− θ)3 t [ΠN − tΠNt /2]
[8t2 (4 + 5θ) + θ2 (17 + θ) ΠN ]
= −8 (1− θ)
3 t
[
A (2A− t) + (A− τ)2 /β]
9 [8t2 (4 + 5θ) + θ2 (17 + θ) ΠN ]
< 0. (A.7′)
This affirms the idea that the direct effect of t on ΠC , together with its indirect effect
on ΠD through (x1, y1), dominate the positive direct effects on ΠD and ΠN , thereby
tightening the ICC.
Part (c). Note that θ∗1 is invariant to changes in external trade costs (τ) and
market size (β) for t = 0 and δ ∈ [0, δ̂) because θ∗1 = max (θg, 0) in this case. For
t ∈ (0, t¯) and δ ∈ [0, δM), the dependence of θ1∗ on τ and β is through the dependence
of ΠC , ΠD, ΠN and of z1 (θ, τ, β) on these variables on θ. Differentiation of Φ1 with
respect to τ gives
Φ1τ = Π
C
τ − (1− δ) ΠDτ − δΠNτ + (1− δ − θ)
[−ΠDz z1τ ]
= −z1 + (1− δ) z˜ + δ2 (A− τ)
9β
+ (1− δ − θ) [βz˜z1τ ] , (A.9)
where z˜ is defined in (A.5c) z1τ = − 2+θβ(8+θ) < 0. Inspection of the terms in (A.9) for
Φ1τ reveals that the channels of transmission of changes in τ are similar to the ones
associated with internal trade cost t changes. One difference is that now the impact
of τ on Φ1 through the punishment payoff ΠN is unambiguously positive. Still, the
sign of Φ1τ appears to be ambiguous. However, this ambiguity disappears when I
substitute the values of z˜, z1 and z1τ into Φ
1
τ to obtain
Φ1τ =
2(9 + δ) (A− τ)
9β (8 + θ)2
(1− θ) (θg − θ) (A.9′)
where, again, θg ≡ 17(δ − δ)/(9 + δ) T 0 as δ T δ. Since part (b) implies θ1∗ > θg for
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t ∈ (0, t¯), I will have Φ1τ < 0 for changes along the ICC. Thus, an increase in external
trade costs tightens the ICC and relaxes cartel discipline. The effect of market size
β on cartel discipline is similar. ||
Next, I prove several lemmas that describe the properties of the lowest prohibitive
trade cost level ty < t¯ and the properties of Φ
2 (·) laid out in Lemma 2.
Lemma A3: Φ2 (θ, t, ·) is strictly concave in (t, θ) ∈ [0, t¯]×[0, 1] and is maximized
at (tmax, θmax) =
(
A
2
[
9+δ−2δ2
9+16δ−5δ2
]
, 1− δ
)
. Moreover,
Φ2max ≡ Φ2 (θmax, tmax, ·) = δ2
[
A2 (5− δ)
4 (9 + 16δ − 5δ2) +
(τ¯ − τ)2
9β (9− δ)
]
> 0 for δ > 0.
Proof of Lemma A3: Utilizing a procedure similar to the one in the proof of
Lemma 1, I may differentiate Φ2 with respect to θ and use (22) to obtain
Φ2θ = (1− δ − θ)
[
y˜x2θ + βz˜z
2
θ
]
.
To sign this expression and several others to follow, note that
y˜ =
2(A/2− t)
4 + θ
and z˜ =
3 (A− τ)
β (8 + θ)
(A.10a)
x2θ =
4 (A/2− t)
(4 + θ)2
> 0 and z2θ =
6 (A− τ)
β (8 + θ)2
> 0 (A.10b)
x2t = −
θ
4 + θ
< 0, z2τ = −
2 + θ
β (8 + θ)
< 0 and z2β = −
z2
β
< 0. (A.10c)
The partial derivatives of x2 and z2 in (A.10b) and (A10c) were obtained by differ-
entiating (23). With the help of the above expressions I find
Φ2θ = (1− δ − θ)
[
8 (A/2− t)2
(4 + θ)3
+
18 (A− τ)2
β (8 + θ)3
]
⇒ Φ2θ T 0 if θ S 1− δ. (A.11a)
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In due course I will recognize that 1− δ− θ > 0 for the reasons outlined earlier in the
study of Φ1. However, to obtain a complete view of the properties of Φ2 I initially
abstract from this possibility.
Differentiating Φ2 with respect to t gives
Φ2t = Π
C
t − (1− δ) ΠDt − δΠNt + (1− δ − θ)
(−ΠDx x2t )
= 0 + (1− δ) y˜ + δ10
9
(A/5− t) + (1− δ − θ) (y˜x2t )
= δ
10
9
(
A
5
− t
)
+
2 [4 (1− δ) + θ2]
(4 + θ)2
(
A
2
− t
)
.
To obtain the last expression for Φ2t I used (A.10). It now follows that
Φ2t S 0 if t S
A
2
 2δ9 + 4(1−δ)+θ2(4+θ)2
5δ
9
+ 4(1−δ)+θ
2
(4+θ)2
 < t¯ ≡ A
2
. (A.11b)
Taking the second and cross partial derivatives of Φ2 gives
Φ2θθ = −
[
8 (A/2− t)2 (7− 3δ − 2θ)
(4 + θ)4
+
18 (A− τ)2 (11− 3δ − 2θ)
β (8 + θ)4
]
< 0
Φ2tt = −
[
10
9
δ +
2 [4(1− δ) + θ2]
(4 + θ)2
]
< 0
Φ2θt = −
16 (1− δ − θ) (A− t)
(4 + θ)3
.
Moreover, direct algebra implies Φ2θθΦ
2
tt − (Φ2θt)2 > 0 which establishes the strict
concavity of Φ2 in (t, θ). (Note that, in contrast to Φ2, Φ1 is not necessarily concave
in (t, θ).) Therefore, the solution to Φ2θ = 0 and Φ
2
t = 0 in (A.11a) and (A.11b),
respectively, which is given by (tmax, θmax) =
(
A
2
[
9+δ−2δ2
9+16δ−5δ2
]
, 1− δ
)
, is the (unique)
maximizer of Φ2. Substituting this solution back into Φ2 and simplifying the resulting
expression readily implies Φ2max > 0. ||
Lemma A4: For given δ < δ̂, τ ≤ τ¯ , and β <∞, Φ2 (θ, t, ·) = 0 implicitly defines
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a contour over the (t, θ) plane that goes through four points that are independent of
τ and β. These points are given by: D = (t¯, θg), E = (t¯, 1), F = (tf , 1) and
G = (tg, θg), where
θg =
17 (δ − δ)
9 + δ
, tg =
A
2
[
(2 + θg)
(
4 + 10θg + θ
2
g
)
56− 9θ2g − 2θ3g
]
, tf =
A
2
[
45− 61δ
45 + 89δ
]
.
Proof of Lemma A4: The impact of τ on Φ2 is captured by
Φ2τ = −
2 (A− τ) (9 + δ)
9β (8 + θ)2
(θ − θg) (1− θ) . (A.12a)
Therefore, changes in τ do not affect Φ2 if: (i) θ = θg, or (ii) θ = 1. The impact of β
on Φ2 is similar since
Φ2β = −
(A− τ)2 (9 + δ)
9β2 (8 + θ)2
(θ − θg) (1− θ) . (A.12b)
To find the values of t that are associated with the pivot points noted in the lemma,
I sequentially consider cases (i) and (ii). Starting with case (i), invert θ = θg (δ) to
obtain δg = 9(1 − θ)/(17 + θ). Substituting δg into Φ2 yields, after some algebraic
manipulation,
Φ2 (·) = − 2 (56− 9θ
2 − 2θ3)
(4 + θ)2 (17 + θ)
(tg − t) (t¯− t) = 0.
The solutions to the above equation deliver the values of intra-regional trade costs tg
and t¯ associated with θ = θg noted in the lemma. Since dtg/dδ = (dtg/dθg) (dθg/dδ)
and dtg/dθg > 0 while dθg/dδ < 0 I will have dtg/dδ < 0.
Turning to case (ii), I set θ = 1 in Φ2 = 0 and simplify the resulting expression to
obtain
Φ2 (·) = − (45 + 89δ)
225
(tf − t) (t¯− t) = 0,
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where dtf/dδ < 0. As noted in the text, the pivot points are illustrated in Figure
3(b). ||
Lemma A5: Suppose the conditions of Lemma A2 are satisfied. Then the contour
defined by Φ2 (t, θ, ·) = 0 for (t, θ) ∈ (0, t¯)× (−∞, 1− δ) is a convex function θs (t, ·)
such that ∂θs/∂t S 0 as t S tmin, where tmin = arg mint θs (t, ·) ∈ (tg, t¯).
Proof of Lemma A5: The proof follows from the properties of Φ2 (t, θ, ·) de-
scribed in Lemmas A2− A3 and can be visualized with the help of Figure 3(b). It’s
important to note that, as defined, θs can take negative values which, in due course,
will be ruled out (see Lemma 2) because they imply the monopoly solution is sus-
tainable (i.e., θ = 0). These portions of θs are not drawn in Figure 3(b) to avoid
cluttering. Also note that, depending on market size β and external trade costs τ ,
θs (t, ·) may intersect the vertical axis below 1−δ. But this is inconsequential because
all points of θs (t, ·) above θo (t) are irrelevant in this case, as noted above. ||
Lemma A6: For given δ < δ̂ and β < ∞, there exists a unique internal trade
cost level ty ≡ ty (δ, τ, β) < t¯, such that y > 0 for t ∈ (0, ty) and y = 0 otherwise.
Moreover,
a) dty/dδ < 0 with limδ→δ̂ ty = 0 and limδ→0 ty = t¯
b) sign(dty/dτ) = sign (dty/dβ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma A6: The conditions of the lemma, the properties of θ1∗ (t, ·)
noted in Lemma 1 and of θs (t, ·) laid out in Lemma A3 (including the facts that
∂θ1∗/∂t > 0 and ∂θs/∂t < 0) imply that these functions will intersect each other at a
unique point ty along θo (t) so that θ
1∗ (ty) = θs (ty) = θo(ty). The proofs to parts (a)
and (b) follow from Lemma 1 and can be visualized with the help of the two panels
in Figure 3. ||
Proof of Lemma 6: The proof relies on Lemmas A1 − A3 which establish the
key properties of the ICC when intra-regional trade is absent. Since t ∈ [ty, t¯] in
this case, only the portion of θs (t, ·) that lies below θo (t) is potentially admissible.
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Moreover, whenever θs < 0, maximal collusion will be sustainable, so θ
2∗ = 0 because
the ICC is inactive.
Part (a). Figure 3(a) illustrates the various cases that arise as I consider alter-
native values for δ. The condition δ ≤ δ in (a.i) ensures that maximal collusion is
unsustainable for all t ∈ [ty, t¯], so θ2∗ = θs, as depicted by the blue, solid-line curve
in Figure 3(a). The proof to this part then follows from Lemma A3.100
If δ ∈ (δ, δ], there will exist a range of intra-regional trade costs [tm, tm] that
imply θ2∗ = 0 for all t in this range and θ2∗ = θs for all other values of t. The pink,
solid-line curve in Figure 3(a) illustrates θ2∗ in this case. Part (a.iii) should be clear.
It is illustrated by the green, solid-line curve in Figure 3(a).
Part (b). This part follows from Lemmas A2 and A3. The key point here is that,
for given δ, increases in external trade costs (τ ↑) or decreases in market size (β ↓)
weaken cartel discipline if intra-regional trade costs are sufficiently close to ty and
may strengthen it if these costs are sufficiently high. Figure 3(b) sheds light on this
case. ||
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof follows readily from Lemmas 1 and 2. ||
Lemma A7: (Welfare under Competition) In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
ROW welfare is invariant to changes in internal trade costs t. In contrast, when
internal trade costs take the form of tariffs (resp., transportation costs), reciprocal
reductions in these costs enhance (resp., affect ambiguously) the welfare of countries
that are hosts to firms. Moreover, if external trade costs τ are transportation costs,
reductions in these costs raise global profits and welfare levels in all countries. For
host countries, I also have
a) arg mint V
N(t, τ, β) = 4A
11
∈ (0, t¯)
b) V N(t, τ, β) T V N(t¯, τ, β) if t S tV , where tV ≡ 5A22 ∈ (0, t¯)
100 Figures 4(a) and 4(b) also illustrate this case. Additionally, Figure 4(a) depicts the various
ranges within which the discount factors may lie.
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c) WN(0, τ, β) = V N(0, τ, β) > V N(t¯, τ, β) = WN(t¯, τ, β)
d) WN(t, τ, β) > V N(t, τ, β) for all t ∈ (0, t¯).
Proof of Lemma A7: From the definitions of welfare in (24a) under tariffs and
transport costs one can show, after rearranging terms, that
V N =
3A2
8
+
(A/2− t) (5A+ 2t)
36
+
(A− τ)2
9β
(A.13a)
WN =
3A2
8
+
(A/2− t) (5A− 22t)
36
+
(A− τ)2
9β
. (A.13b)
for t ∈ [0, t¯]. It is now easy to see that, for t > t¯, the above expressions of welfare
become
WN = V N =
3A2
8
+
(A− τ)2
9β
. (A.14)
Part (a). Differentiating (A.13a) partially gives ∂V N/∂t = (−4A + 11t)/9 and
∂2V N/∂t2 > 0, which readily implies arg mint V
N = 4A/11 ∈ (0, t¯).
Part (b). This part follows by utilizing (A.13a) to form the difference V N(t, τ, β)−
V N(t¯, τ, β) = 11
18
(t¯− t)(5A
22
− t) for t < t¯ ≡ A
2
.
Parts (c) and (d). These parts follow from inspection and direct comparison of
the payoffs in (A.13a), (A.13b) and (A.14). ||
Lemma A8: (Competition vs Monopoly) Suppose τ < τ¯ and interpret intra-
regional trade costs t as “tariffs”. Then
a) WM > WN for t ≥ t¯.
b) If t ∈ [0, t¯), then WM T WN for β S β˘, where β˘ ≡ (A−τ)2
2(A/2−t)(5A+2t) .
c) WMROW < W
N
ROW for all t ≥ 0 and finite β.
Proof of Lemma A8: The proof to parts (a) and (b) follows readily by noting
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that
WM = V M =
3A2
8
+
(A− τ)2
8β
(A.15)
and by comparing WN in (A.13b) and WM in (A.15) for the different values of t.
Part (c) follows from the fact that zM < zN and the discussion in the text which
argued that welfare in ROW is increasing in z. ||
In part (a), WM > WN , because (i) the presence of prohibitive internal tariffs
implies each firm is able to fully exploit its domestic market power both under com-
petition and under monopoly, and (ii) profits in ROW are higher under monopoly.
Part (b) points out that this welfare ranking remains intact even in the presence of in-
ternal trade if ROW ’s relative market size is sufficiently large (specifically, if β ≤ β˘).
One can verify that β˘t > 0 and β˘τ < 0. Therefore, the higher the volume of internal
(external) trade the stronger (weaker) the requirement on β. Part (c) underscores
the point that ROW always prefers competition over unconstrained collusion.
Proposition A5: (Shipments) For given δ < δ̂, β <∞, and t ∈ [0, t¯], cartel shipments
depend on time preferences, trade costs, and market size as follows:
a) Domestic Output (Q∗)
i) If δ ∈ [δ, δ̂), then Q∗ is single-peaked at some tQ ∈ (0, ty] where
◦ tQ < ty if δ → δ and the market in ROW is small (large β)
◦ tQ = ty if δ → δ̂ or the market in ROW is sufficiently large (small β).
Moreover,
◦ Q∗ (t) > QM and ∂Q∗/∂t T 0 as t S tQ for t ∈ (0, t′m)
◦ Q∗ (t) = QM if t = 0 or t ≥ t′m.
ii) If δ ∈ (0, δ), then Q∗ may have multiple peaks, including one at t = 0, another
at some tQ ∈ (0, ty], and possibly another at t′Q close to t¯. The global max is at
◦ tQ for δ close to δ and sufficiently large β
◦ 0 for sufficiently small δ or β
Moreover, ∂Q∗/∂t < 0 for all t ∈ [0, t¯] if β < β, for some threshold level β.
iii) sign (∂Q∗/∂γ) = sign (∂θ∗/∂γ) for γ ∈ {δ, β, τ}.
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b) Intra-Regional Trade (y∗)
◦ ∂y∗/∂γ < 0 for γ ∈ {δ, t} if δ ∈ (0, δ̂) and t ∈ (0, ty)
◦ sign(∂y∗/∂γ) = sign (∂θ∗/∂γ) > 0 for γ ∈ {β, τ}.
c) Extra-Regional Trade (z∗)
◦ sign (∂z∗/∂γ) = sign (∂θ∗/∂γ) for γ ∈ {δ, t}
◦ ∂z∗/∂γ < 0 for γ ∈ {β, τ}.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof follows readily from the facts that dW ∗ROW /dt =
(∂WROW /∂z) z
∗
θθ
∗
t , dpi
∗
ROW /dt = (∂piROW /∂z) z
∗
θθ
∗
t and Proposition 4. ||
Proof of Proposition 6: The definition of (x1, y1) in (21) implies
Q1∗ = x1∗ + y1∗ =
(2A− t) (2 + θ1∗)
(8 + θ1∗)
from which it follows that Q1∗t = Q1θθ
1∗
t +Q
1
t where Q
1
θ =
6(2A−t)
(8+θ1)2
> 0 and Q1t = −2+θ
1
8+θ1
< 0;
therefore, the sign ofQ1∗t is generally ambiguous. Moreover, using the definition of welfare, it
follows dW
∗
dt =
∂u(x+y)
∂Q
(
∂Q
∂θ
∂θ
∂t +
∂Q
∂t
)
+
dpi∗ROW
dt . I already know that
∂u(x+y)
∂Q = (A−Q) > 0
and that −sign
(
dpi∗ROW
dt
)
= sign (θ∗t ). The results from Proposition 2 show that when
regional trade liberalization has already advanced significantly, i.e. t < ty, then θ
∗
t > 0,
hence
(
dpi∗ROW
dt
)
< 0. Thus, it follows that
dW ∗
dt =
∂u(x+ y)
∂Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂Q∂θ ∂θ∂t︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
∂Q
∂t︸︷︷︸
−
+ dpi∗ROWdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
.
And in order for
dW ∗i
dt > 0, the indirect effect of internal trade costs on the utility
derived from consuming the non-numeraire good should be sufficiently strong. That is,
dW ∗
dt > 0 if
(
∂u(x+y)
∂Q
∂Q
∂θ
∂θ
∂t
)
>
(
∂u(x+y)
∂Q
∂Q
∂t +
dpi∗ROW
dt
)
. As for the non-cartel country, it is
straightforward to establish that dW ∗ROW /dt > 0 when t < ty with the help of Proposition
2 and Proposition 3. ||
Proof of Proposition 7: Recall that the definition of welfare for countries i = 1, 2
is Wi = u(x+ y︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) + piROW ( z︸︷︷︸
−
). I know that piROW (z) is decreasing in z, while z
1∗
θ > 0
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and z2∗θ > 0. Now, let us consider the extremes of free trade, t = 0 and θ
1∗ ≡ θg, and no
intra-union trade, t ≥ ty and θ2∗. The region of internal trade costs, which prohibit trade
between the host countries of the cartel, can be divided into two subregions: 1) t ∈ [ty, tg)
and 2) t ∈ [tg, tN ).
For values of t ∈ [ty, tg), θ2∗ > θg and x2∗ > (x1∗ + y1∗) (recall that x2∗θ > 0 and
(x1∗ + y1∗)θ > 0). Therefore, u(x2∗) > u(x1∗ + y1∗) for t ∈ [ty, tg). However, in this same
region of internal trade costs, more exports will be directed towards the outside country and
profits in that market will be lower than under free trade, i.e. piROW |t∈[ty ,tg) < piROW |t=0.
So, the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous and as long as the increase in utility, u(x+y) ↑,
is stronger than the reduction in profits gained in the third market, piROW ↓, it is possible
for welfare under no intra-union trade to be greater than welfare under free intra-union
trade for the host countries of the cartel.
For values of t ∈ [tg, tN ), θ2∗ < θg and x2∗ < (x1∗+y1∗). Therefore, u(x2∗) < u(x1∗+y1∗)
for t ∈ [tg, tN ). However, in this same region of internal trade costs, less exports will be
directed towards the outside country and profits in that market will be higher than under
free trade, i.e. piROW |t∈[tg ,tN ) > piROW |t=0. So, the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous
again and as long as the increase in profits gained in the third market, piROW ↑, is stronger
than the reduction in utility, u(x+y) ↓, it is possible for welfare under no intra-union trade
to be greater than welfare under free intra-union trade for the host countries of the cartel.
As for the non-cartel country, using the definition of welfare in that market, W ∗ROW =
CSROW ( z︸︷︷︸
+
) and the fact that z1∗θ > 0 and z
2∗
θ > 0, it is clear that the outside market will
enjoy a greater level of welfare only if it receives more imports from the cartel countries.
Again, when t ∈ [ty, tg), θ2∗ > θg and, therefore, more shipments will be directed towards
the third country than under free internal trade, i.e. z2∗(θ2∗, t ∈ [ty, tg)) > z1∗(θg, 0). Thus,
W ∗ROW (θ
2∗, t ∈ [ty, tg)) > W ∗ROW (θg, 0) and even the outside country might enjoy a larger
level of welfare in the absence of intra-union trade than under free intra-union trade. ||
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof of Proposition 6 follows readily from the definition
of welfare, W = u(x+y)+piROW , Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. Essentially,
(
dpi∗ROW
dt
)
<
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0, when t is sufficiently low due to the negative indirect effect of internal trade costs on
profits in the outside country challenged through cartel discipline. Thus, the possibility of
trade with ROW makes it more likely that the home countries of the cartel will benefit from
internal trade liberalization when trade costs are initially low. ||
Proof of Proposition 9: Lemma 2 already showed that it is possible for unconstrained
collusion to welfare-dominate Cournot-Nash competition, i.e. WM > WN , if the outside
country is sufficiently large. Moreover, it is also possible for unconstrained collusion to
provide a greater level of welfare than Cournot-Nash competition, i.e. W ∗ > WN . Using
the definitions of (x1, y1, z1) from (21) to obtain W ∗ and comparing it with WN for any
of the home countries of the cartel members, I can show that W ∗ > WN as long as β <
(A−τ)2(5 θ+4)
(2A−t)(A(10−θ)+t(2 θ+7)) . Even if there is no intra-industry trade, i.e. t ≥ ty, W ∗ > WN as
long as β < 4(5 θ+4)(1−θ)(4+θ)
2(A−τ)2
(2−θ)(8+θ)2(A−2 t)(A(θ+10)+4t(1+ θ)) .
Even more interestingly, I can show that it is also possible for the host countries of the
cartel constrained collusion to welfare-dominate maximal collusion, i.e. W ∗ > WM . Again,
using the equilibrium output allocations and the definition of welfare, and comparing them,
I find that W ∗ > WM if β > 9θ
2(A−τ)2
(A(16−θ)+2 t(2+θ))(3Aθ−2 t(2+θ)) when internal trade persists
between the cartel members (t < ty). In the absence of such trade (t ≥ ty), it is still possible
that W ∗ > WM if β > 9θ (A−τ)
2(4+θ)2
(8+θ)2(A−2 t)(8A+θ A+2 θ t) . This result arises as long as the increase
in consumers’ utility more than offsets the decrease in the representative cartel member’s
profits when the market structure changes from unconstrained collusion to constrained
collusion. ||
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B Empirical Appendix
Table B.1: List of International Cartels
Cartel Span Firms
1 Beer, Horeca (FRA and NLD) 3/21/1996-2002 4
2 Beer, Horeca (Belgium) 01/28/1993-01/28/1998 4
3 Beer, Horeca 02/27/1996-11/03/1999 4
4 Beer, Horeca (Luxembourg) 1985-2/2000 4
5 Beer, Private Label 10/09/1997-07/07/1998 4
6 Beta Carotene 09/22/1992-12/01/1998 2
7 Biotin (Vitamin H) 10/01/1991-04/19/1994 6
8 Bridge, California 12/1994-08/1996 2
9 Bridges, Cable-Stayed 9/1996-12/1997 2
10 Sugar, Industrial White Granulated 06/20/1986-07/02/1990 4
11 Bromines - Methyl Bromide 03/1997-04/1998 2
12 Bromines - Decabromodiphenyl Ether 10/1997-04/1998 2
13 Bromines - Tetrabrombisphenol-A 07/1995-04/1998 2
14 Calcium carbide 04/07/2004-01/16/2007 9
15 Carbon cathode block 6/1995-12/1997 5
16 Carbon electrical products (brushes) 01/10/1988-01/12/1999 6
17 Carbon fiber 1993-1999 3
18 Carotenoids/Carotinoids 05/01/1993-12/01/1998 2
19 Cartonboard 06/01/1986-04/30/1991 19
20 Cement, EU 01/14/1983-03/26/1993 42
21 Citric Acid 03/06/1991-05/22/1995 5
22 Industrial and Medical Gases 09/01/1993-12/01/1997 7
23 Copper Tubes, Industrial 05/03/1988-03/22/2001 6
24 Copper Tubes, Plumbing 06/03/1988-03/22/2001 8
25 District heating pipe (Pre-Insulated Pipe) 11/01/1990-04/01/1996 10
26 DRAMs (Memory Chips) 07/01/1998-06/15/2002 11
27 Elevators and Escalators 08/01/1995-03/09/2004 5
28 ESBR synthetic rubber 05/20/1996-11/28/2002 6
29 Butadiene rubber (BR) 05/20/1996-11/28/2002 4
30 Neoprene (chloroprene) rubber 05/13/1993-05/13/2002 6
31 Nitrile Butadiene rubber (NBR) 10/09/2000-09/30/2002 2
32 Explosives, Commercial 1985-12/1993 14
33 Extruded Graphite 02/01/1993-11/01/1996 2
34 Ferrosilicon 10/1989-8/1991 5
35 Fine Arts Auctions 4/30/1993-02/07/2000 2
36 Flat Glass, U.S. 1986-1995 5
37 Folic Acid (Vitamin M or Vitamin B9) 01/01/1991-06/01/1994 4
38 Gasoline, Sweden 11/1999-2/2000 5
39 Gasoline, Netherlands 4/2000-7/2000 4
40 Graphite Electrodes 05/21/1992-03/01/1998 8
41 Hydrogen Peroxide (bleaching chemicals) 01/31/1994-12/31/2001 9
42 Isostatic Graphite 07/01/1993-02/01/1998 8
43 Lysine 07/01/1990-06/27/1995 5
44 Magnesium granulates 04/07/2004-01/16/2007 15
45 Magnetic iron oxide 1/1991-4/1998 4
46 Maltol (synthetic)/Sodium Erythorbate 12/1989-12/1995 2
47 Monochloroacetic Acid (MCAA) Chemicals 01/01/1984-05/07/1999 5
Continued on next page
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48 Methionine 02/01/1986-02/04/1999 3
49 Methylglucamine 11/22/1990-12/31/1999 3
50 MSG, IMP, GMP: Nucleotides 11/08/1988-06/02/1998 4
51 Organic peroxides 01/01/1971-12/31/1999 6
52 Paper (Thermal Fax) 2/1990-3/1992 10
53 Plasterboard 03/31/1992-11/25/1998 4
54 Plastic dinnerware 1991-12/1992 5
55 Polyester staple 1999-2001 4
56 Seamless Steel Tubes 1990-1995 8
57 Soda ash 01/01/1973-11/1990 3
58 Sodium erythorbate 7/1992-12/1994 3
59 Sodium gluconate 02/01/1987-06/01/1995 6
60 Sorbates 12/31/1978-10/31/1996 5
61 Stamp auctions 1/1980-11/1997 8
62 Steel beams 1/1984-1/1991 18
63 Steel, flat stainless 1/1994-11/1996 7
64 Tactile Tile, US 3/1998-10/1998 2
65 Tampico Fiber, US 1/1990-4/1995 4
66 Toys and Games, UK 1/1999-4/2001 3
67 Tubes (Laminated) 1987-1995 2
68 Vitamin A 09/01/1989-02/01/1999 3
69 Vitamin B1 (Thiamine) 01/01/1991-06/01/1994 3
70 Vitamin B2 (Riboflavin) 07/14/1991-09/01/1995 3
71 Vitamin B3 (Niacin) 01/1992-3/1998 4
72 Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) 1988-09/30/1998 6
73 Vitamin B5 (Calpan) 01/01/1991-02/12/1999 3
74 Vitamin B6 01/01/1991-06/01/1994 3
75 Vitamin B12 1/1991-12/1994 2
76 Vitamin C 01/01/1991-08/01/1995 4
77 Vitamin D3 01/01/1994-07/01/1998 4
78 Vitamin E 09/01/1989-02/01/1999 4
79 Vitamin premixes 01/1991-12/1997 2
80 Zinc phosphate 03/24/1994-05/13/1998 6
81 Polyester polyols, aliphatic 02/1998-12/2002 2
82 Iron Pipe (Ductile) 01/1990-09/1990 2
83 Raw Tobacco, Spain 03/13/1996-08/10/2001 5
84 Haberdashery products 05/24/1991-03/15/2001 5
85 Haberdashery products 08/13/1999-01/13/2003 2
86 Haberdashery products 04/28/1998-11/12/1999 3
87 Industrial Thread - Benelux 01/01/1990-09/01/2001 8
88 Industrial Thread - United Kingdom 01/01/1990-09/01/1996 5
89 Automotive Thread 05/01/1998-05/15/2000 4
90 Raw Tobacco, Italy 09/29/1995-02/19/2002 5
91 ESBO/esters 09/11/1991-09/26/2000 9
92 Heat (or tin) stabilizers, PVC 02/24/1987-3/21/2000 8
93 Industrial Bags 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 15
94 Industrial Bags - French Subgroup 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 5
95 Industrial Bags - Germany Subgroup 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 6
96 Industrial Bags - Benelux Subgroup 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 10
97 Industrial Bags - Belgian Subgroup 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 6
98 Industrial Bags - Teppema Subgroup 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 7
Continued on next page
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99 Industrial Bags - Block Bags 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 9
100 Elect. & Mech. Carbon & Graphite Products 01/10/1988-01/12/1999 6
101 Rubber Chemicals 01/01/1996-12/31/2001 4
102 Acrylic Glass (Methacrylates) 01/23/1997-09/12/2002 5
103 Copper Fittings 12/31/1998-04/01/2004 11
104 Gas Insulated Switchgear 04/05/1988-05/11/2004 11
105 Power Transformers 06/09/1999-05/15/2003 7
106 Power Transformers - Australia 1993-1999 2
107 Bitumen, Spain 03/01/1991-10/01/2002 5
108 Window Mountings 11/1999-7/2007 9
109 Bathroom Equipment 10/16/1992-11/9/2004 17
110 Automobile Parts 01/2000-02/2010 8
111 Instrumental Panel Clusters 2002-2010 8
112 Industrial Diamonds 1991-1992 2
113 Marine Hoses 04/01/1986-05/02/2007 6
114 Household Laundry Powder Detergents 01/07/2002-03/08/2005 3
115 Laundry Detergents, France 09/1997-08/2004 4
116 Sodium Perborate (bleaching chemicals) 9/21/1994-12/1/2001 9
117 Car Glass 03/10/1998-03/11/2003 4
118 Flat Glass 01/09/2004-02/22/2005 4
119 Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT) Glass 2/23/1999-12/27/2004 4
120 Animal Feed Phosphates 3/19/1969-02/10/2004 7
121 Refrigerator Compressors 4/2004-10/2007 10
122 Wire Harness - Renaut I 09/28/2004-03/13/2006 2
123 Wire Harness - Renaut II 05/5/2009-12/22/2009 3
124 Wire Harness - Toyota 3/6/2000-8/5/2009 3
125 Wire Harness - Honda 3/5/2001-9/7/2009 3
126 Wire Harness - Nissan 09/14/2006-11/16/2006 2
127 High Fructose Corn Syrup 1988-1995 5
128 Aluminum phosphide 1990-11/1990 4
129 Asphalt, Sweden 1997-2001 5
130 Asphalt paving, Finland 1994-2001 6
131 Ball bearings 1962-1972 6
132 Bicycles, NL 1998-2003 5
133 Beef, France 10/24/2001-01/11/2002 6
134 Bitumen, Netherlands 04/1/1994-04/15/2002 14
135 Banks, Euro zone 12/1997-1/2002 12
136 Carbonless (self-copy) paper 01/01/1992-09/01/1995 11
137 Concrete, Ready-mixed, Italy 9/1999-12/2002 10
138 Cement, DE 6/1990-6/2002 12
139 Concrete, Ready-mixed 1990-5/1999 69
140 Construction, marine 1990-1995 3
141 Construction, marine 1995-1997 3
142 Construction, USAID 5/1988-9/1996 5
143 Cable, High-voltage, Germany 1958-9/1996 17
144 Concrete reinforcing steel bars, Italy 1989-2000 8
145 Tobacco Leaf Auctions 2000-2006 4
146 Transport, marine 1990-5/1995 4
147 Ferries, Adriatic 1987-7/1994 7
148 Ferries, Channel 11/1/1992-1/1993 5
149 PVC plastic 1980-1984 14
Continued on next page
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150 Power Equipment (Hydro-Electric) 1990-1997 2
151 Liquid crystal display (TFT - LCD) panels 9/2001-12/2006 12
152 Color Display Tube (CDT) 1999-2004 4
153 Air Transportation (Cargo) 2000-2006 3
154 Metal (Bronze and Copper) Flakes 10/1986-11/1988 2
155 Timber, Finland 1997-2004 3
156 Insurance, Spain 2002-2007 6
157 Candle Wax 1992-2005 10
158 Air Cargo Shipments 3/2002 - 2/2006 10
159 Sugar, Spain 1995-1996 4
160 Auction Services 1993-2000 2
161 Banks, Austria 01/01/1995-06/23/1998 8
162 Shipping, FETTSCA (Far East) 1991-1994 15
163 Shipping conference FEFC, EU 1/1990-1/1994 4
164 Shipping (French-African) 1/1975-12/1992 17
165 Shipping, TACA (No. Atlantic) 1/1994-12/1998 15
166 Shipping (W. Cent. Afr.) Cewal 1/1972-12/1992 13
167 New Export System Cartel 2002-2007 6
168 Advanced Manifest System Cartel 2004-2007 9
169 Currency Adjustment Factor Cartel 2005-2007 11
170 Peak Season Surcharge Cartel 2002-2007 9
171 Shrimp 6/2000-1/2009 4
172 Banana I 1/2000-12/2002 2
173 Banana II 7/2004-4/2005 2
Notes: This table list all the cartels in my dataset, their duration and corresponding number of firms
participating in them.
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Table B.2: List of International Cartels and HS Codes
Cartel Span HS Code
1 Beer, Horeca (FRA and NLD) 3/21/1996-2002 220300
2 Beer, Horeca (Belgium) 01/28/1993-01/28/1998 220300
3 Beer, Horeca - Combined 02/27/1996-11/03/1999 220300
4 Beer, Horeca (Luxembourg) 1985-2/2000 220300
5 Beer, Horeca 1985-2000 220300
6 Beta Carotene 09/22/1992-12/01/1998 320419
7 Biotin (Vitamin H) 10/01/1991-04/19/1994 293629
8 Bridge, California 12/1994-08/1996 730810
9 Bridges, Cable-Stayed 9/1996-12/1997 730810
10 Sugar, Industrial White Granulated 06/20/1986-07/02/1990 1701
11 Bromines - Methyl Bromide 03/1997-04/1998 290329
12 Bromines - Decabromodiphenyl Ether 10/1997-04/1998 290930
13 Bromines - Tetrabrombisphenol-A 07/1995-04/1998 290723
14 Calcium carbide 04/07/2004-01/16/2007 284910
15 Carbon cathode block 6/1995-12/1997 280300
16 Carbon electrical products (brushes) 01/10/1988-01/12/1999 854520
17 Carbon fiber 1993-1999 681510
18 Carotenoids/Carotinoids 05/01/1993-12/01/1998 320419
19 Cartonboard 06/01/1986-04/30/1991 481910
20 Cartonboard 06/01/1986-04/30/1991 481920
21 Cement, EU 01/14/1983-03/26/1993 252321
22 Cement, EU 01/14/1983-03/26/1993 252329
23 Citric Acid 03/06/1991-05/22/1995 291814
24 Industrial and Medical Gases 09/01/1993-12/01/1997 2804
25 Copper Tubes, Industrial 05/03/1988-03/22/2001 7411
26 Copper Tubes, Plumbing 06/03/1988-03/22/2001 7411
27 District heating pipe (Pre-Insulated Pipe) 11/01/1990-04/01/1996 7304
28 DRAMs (Memory Chips) 07/01/1998-06/15/2002 8471
29 DRAMs (Memory Chips) 07/01/1998-06/15/2002 854280
30 DRAMs (Memory Chips) 07/01/1998-06/15/2002 854211
31 Elevator s and Escalators 08/01/1995-03/09/2004 842840
32 Elevator s and Escalators 08/01/1995-03/09/2004 842820
33 ESBR synthetic rubber 05/20/1996-11/28/2002 400211
34 ESBR synthetic rubber 05/20/1996-11/28/2002 400219
35 ESBR synthetic rubber 05/20/1996-11/28/2002 400220
36 Butadiene rubber (BR) 05/20/1996-11/28/2002 400220
37 Neoprene (chloroprene) rubber 05/13/1993-05/13/2002 400241
38 Nitrile Butadiene rubber (NBR) 10/09/2000-09/30/2002 400251
39 Explosives, Commercial 1985-12/1993 360200
40 Extruded Graphite 02/01/1993-11/01/1996 380110
41 Ferrosilicon 10/1989-8/1991 7202
42 Fine Arts Auctions 4/30/1993-02/07/2000 970110
43 Flat Glass, U.S. 1986-1995 7005
44 Folic Acid (Vitamin M or Vitamin B9) 01/01/1991-06/01/1994 293629
45 Gasoline, Sweden 11/1999-2/2000 270900
46 Gasoline, Netherlands 4/2000-7/2000 270900
47 Gasoline - Combined 11/1999-7/2000 270900
48 Graphite Electrodes 05/21/1992-03/01/1998 854511
49 Graphite Electrodes 05/21/1992-03/01/1998 854519
50 Hydrogen Peroxide (bleaching chemicals) 01/31/1994-12/31/2001 284700
Continued on next page
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51 Isostatic Graphite 07/01/1993-02/01/1998 380110
52 Lysine 07/01/1990-06/27/1995 292241
53 Magnesium granulates 04/07/2004-01/16/2007 810430
54 Magnetic iron oxide 1/1991-4/1998 282110
55 Maltol (synthetic)/Sodium Erythorbate 12/1989-12/1995 293221
56 Monochloroacetic Acid (MCAA) Chemicals 01/01/1984-05/07/1999 291540
57 Methionine 02/01/1986-02/04/1999 293040
58 Methylglucamine 11/22/1990-12/31/1999 294000
59 MSG, IMP, GMP: Nucleotides 11/08/1988-06/02/1998 2934
60 Organic peroxides 01/01/1971-12/31/1999 290960
61 Organic peroxides 01/01/1971-12/31/1999 291632
62 Organic peroxides 01/01/1971-12/31/1999 292112
63 Paper (Thermal Fax) 2/1990-3/1992 481190
64 Plasterboard 03/31/1992-11/25/1998 680800
65 Plastic dinnerware 1991-12/1992 392410
66 Polyester staple 1999-2001 550320
67 Seamless Steel Tubes 1990-1995 730410
68 Soda ash 01/01/1973-11/1990 283630
69 Sodium erythorbate 7/1992-12/1994 293221
70 Sodium gluconate 02/01/1987-06/01/1995 291816
71 Sorbates 12/31/1978-10/31/1996 291619
72 Stamp auctions 1/1980-11/1997 970400
73 Steel beams 1/1984-1/1991 721631
74 Steel beams 1/1984-1/1991 721632
75 Steel beams 1/1984-1/1991 721633
76 Steel beams - Combined 1/1984-1/1991 721633
77 Steel, flat stainless 1/1994-11/1996 7219
78 Steel, flat stainless 1/1994-11/1996 7220
79 Tactile Tile, US 3/1998-10/1998 701690
80 Tampico Fiber, US 1/1990-4/1995 560790
81 Toys and Games, UK 1/1999-4/2001 95
82 Tubes (Laminated) 1987-1995 3917
83 Vitamin A 09/01/1989-02/01/1999 293621
84 Vitamin B1 (Thiamine) 01/01/1991-06/01/1994 293622
85 Vitamin B2 (Riboflavin) 07/14/1991-09/01/1995 293623
86 Vitamin B3 (Niacin) 01/1992-3/1998 293629
87 Vitamin B3 (Niacin) 01/1992-3/1998 293624
88 Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) 1988-09/30/1998 292310
89 Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) 1988-09/30/1998 293629
90 Vitamin B5 (Calpan) 01/01/1991-02/12/1999 293629
91 Vitamin B5 (Calpan) 01/01/1991-02/12/1999 293624
92 Vitamin B6 01/01/1991-06/01/1994 293625
93 Vitamin B12 1/1991-12/1994 293626
94 Vitamin C 01/01/1991-08/01/1995 293627
95 Vitamin D3 01/01/1994-07/01/1998 293629
96 Vitamin E 09/01/1989-02/01/1999 293628
97 Vitamin premixes 01/1991-12/1997 293690
98 Vitamin premixes 01/1991-12/1997 293629
99 Vitamin premixes 01/1991-12/1997 293610
100 Zinc phosphate 03/24/1994-05/13/1998 281700
101 Polyester polyols, aliphatic 02/1998-12/2002 390950
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102 Iron Pipe (Ductile) 01/1990-09/1990 730300
103 Raw Tobacco, Spain 03/13/1996-08/10/2001 240120
104 Raw Tobacco - Combined 09/29/1995-02/19/2002 240120
105 Haberdashery products 05/24/1991-03/15/2001 9606
106 Haberdashery products 05/24/1991-03/15/2001 7319
107 Haberdashery products 08/13/1999-01/13/2003 9606
108 Haberdashery products 08/13/1999-01/13/2003 7319
109 Haberdashery products 04/28/1998-11/12/1999 9607
110 Haberdashery products 04/28/1998-11/12/1999 7319
111 Industrial Thread - Benelux 01/01/1990-09/01/2001 5401
112 Industrial Thread - United Kingdom 01/01/1990-09/01/1996 5401
113 Automotive Thread 05/01/1998-05/15/2000 5401
114 Raw Tobacco, Italy 09/29/1995-02/19/2002 240120
115 ESBO/esters 09/11/1991-09/26/2000 390730
116 Heat (or tin) stabilizers, PVC 02/24/1987-3/21/2000 381220
117 Heat (or tin) stabilizers, PVC 02/24/1987-3/21/2000 381230
118 Industrial Bags 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 392321
119 Industrial Bags - Benelux Subgroup 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 392321
120 Industrial Bags - Teppema Subgroup 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 392321
121 Industrial Bags - Block Bags 01/06/1982-06/26/2002 392321
122 Elect. & Mech. Carbon & Graphite Products 01/10/1988-01/12/1999 380190
123 Elect. & Mech. Carbon & Graphite Products 01/10/1988-01/12/1999 681510
124 Elect. & Mech. Carbon & Graphite Products 01/10/1988-01/12/1999 854519
125 Elect. & Mech. Carbon & Graphite Products 01/10/1988-01/12/1999 854590
126 Rubber Chemicals 01/01/1996-12/31/2001 381210
127 Rubber Chemicals 01/01/1996-12/31/2001 381220
128 Rubber Chemicals 01/01/1996-12/31/2001 381230
129 Acrylic Glass (Methacrylates) 01/23/1997-09/12/2002 392051
130 Copper Fittings 12/31/1998-04/01/2004 741220
131 Gas Insulated Switchgear 04/05/1988-05/11/2004 853530
132 Power Transformers 06/09/1999-05/15/2003 8504
133 Power Transformers - Australia 1993-1999 8504
134 Power Transformers - Combined 06/09/1999-05/15/2003 8504
135 Bitumen, Spain 03/01/1991-10/01/2002 271410
136 Bitumen, Spain 03/01/1991-10/01/2002 271490
137 Bitumen, Spain 03/01/1991-10/01/2002 271320
138 Window Mountings 11/1999-7/2007 830241
139 Bathroom Equipment 10/16/1992-11/9/2004 691010
140 Bathroom Equipment 10/16/1992-11/9/2004 732410
141 Bathroom Equipment 10/16/1992-11/9/2004 732421
142 Bathroom Equipment 10/16/1992-11/9/2004 732429
143 Automobile Parts 01/2000-02/2010 8708
144 Instrumental Panel Clusters 2002-2010 910400
145 Industrial Diamonds 1991-1992 710221
146 Marine Hoses 04/01/1986-05/02/2007 4009
147 Household Laundry Powder Detergents 01/07/2002-03/08/2005 340290
148 Household Laundry Powder Detergents 01/07/2002-03/08/2005 340119
149 Laundry Detergents, France 09/1997-08/2004 340290
150 Laundry Detergents, France 09/1997-08/2004 340119
151 Laundry Detergents - Combined 09/1997-03/08/2005 340290
152 Sodium Perborate (bleaching chemicals) 9/21/1994-12/1/2001 284030
Continued on next page
206
Table B.2 – Continued from previous page
Cartel Span HS Code
153 Car Glass 03/10/1998-03/11/2003 7007
154 Flat Glass 01/09/2004-02/22/2005 7005
155 Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT) Glass 2/23/1999-12/27/2004 701120
156 Animal Feed Phosphates 3/19/1969-02/10/2004 283525
157 Animal Feed Phosphates 3/19/1969-02/10/2004 283526
158 Animal Feed Phosphates 3/19/1969-02/10/2004 283522
159 Wire Harness - Renaut I 09/28/2004-03/13/2006 854430
160 Wire Harness - Renaut II 05/5/2009-12/22/2009 854430
161 Refrigerator Compressors 4/2004-10/2007 841430
162 Wire Harness - Toyota 3/6/2000-8/5/2009 854430
163 Wire Harness - Honda 3/5/2001-9/7/2009 854430
164 Wire Harness - Nissan 09/14/2006-11/16/2006 854430
165 High Fructose Corn Syrup 1988-1995 170260
166 Aluminum phosphide 1990-11/1990 284890
167 Asphalt, Sweden 1997-2001 271490
168 Asphalt paving, Finland 1994-2001 271490
169 Ball bearings 1962-1972 848210
170 Bicycles, NL 1998-2003 871200
171 Beef, France 10/24/2001-01/11/2002 020110
172 Bitumen, Netherlands 04/1/1994-04/15/2002 271500
173 Banks, Euro zone 12/1997-1/2002 993699
174 Carbonless (self-copy) paper 01/01/1992-09/01/1995 481620
175 Concrete, Ready-mixed, Italy 9/1999-12/2002 381600
176 Cement, DE 6/1990-6/2002 252321
177 Concrete, Ready-mixed 1990-5/1999 381600
178 Construction, marine 1990-1995 981899
179 Construction, marine 1995-1997 981899
180 Construction, USAID 5/1988-9/1996 981899
181 Cable, High-voltage, Germany 1958-9/1996 854460
182 Concrete reinforcing steel bars, Italy 1989-2000 721310
183 Tobacco Leaf Auctions 2000-2006 2401
184 Transport, marine 1990-5/1995 984199
185 Ferries, Adriatic 1987-7/1994 890110
186 Ferries, Channel 11/1/1992-1/1993 890110
187 PVC plastic 1980-1984 390422
188 Power Equipment (Hydro-Electric) 1990-1997
189 Liquid crystal display (TFT - LCD) panels 9/2001-12/2006 853120
190 Color Display Tube (CDT) 1999-2004 854011
191 Air Transportation (Cargo) 2000-2006 984799
192 Metal (Bronze and Copper) Flakes 10/1986-11/1988 740620
193 Timber, Finland 1997-2004 44
194 Insurance, Spain 2002-2007 993899
195 Candle Wax 1992-2005 271220
196 Air Cargo Shipments 3/2002 - 2/2006 984799
197 Sugar, Spain 1995-1996 1701
198 Auction Services 1993-2000 99
199 Banks, Austria 01/01/1995-06/23/1998 993699
200 Shipping, FETTSCA (Far East) 1991-1994 984199
201 Shipping conference FEFC, EU 1/1990-1/1994 984199
202 Shipping (French-African) 1/1975-12/1992 984199
203 Shipping, TACA (No. Atlantic) 1/1994-12/1998 984199
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204 Shipping (W. Cent. Afr.) Cewal 1/1972-12/1992 984199
205 New Export System Cartel 2002-2007
206 Advanced Manifest System Cartel 2004-2007
207 Currency Adjustment Factor Cartel 2005-2007
208 Peak Season Surcharge Cartel 2002-2007
209 Shrimp 6/2000-1/2009 030613
210 Shrimp 6/2000-1/2009 030623
211 Shrimp 6/2000-1/2009 160520
212 Banana I 1/2000-12/2002 080300
213 Banana II 7/2004-4/2005 080300
Notes: This table list all the cartels in my dataset, their duration and corresponding HS product codes.
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics: ‘Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?’
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
TRADE 2682.561 43435.313 0.001 5838886 312207
DIST 7.809 1.164 5.081 9.880 312207
LANG 0.106 0.308 0 1 312207
CNTG 0.12 0.325 0 1 312207
CLNY 0.063 0.244 0 1 312207
RTA 0.677 0.468 0 1 312207
CARTEL 0.013 0.115 0 1 312207
CARTEL MLTPRD 0.009 0.096 0 1 312207
CARTEL SINGLEPRD 0.004 0.064 0 1 312207
CARTEL MLTPRD DFRNT GOODS 0.005 0.069 0 1 293917
CARTEL MLTPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS 0.004 0.061 0 1 293917
CARTEL MLTPRD HMGNS GOODS 0.001 0.035 0 1 293917
CARTEL SINGLEPRD DFRNT GOODS 0.002 0.04 0 1 293917
CARTEL SINGLEPRD RFRNCPRC GOODS 0.002 0.04 0 1 293917
CARTEL SINGLEPRD HMGNS GOODS 0.001 0.026 0 1 293917
DFRNT GOODS 0.466 0.499 0 1 293917
RFRNCPRC GOODS 0.465 0.499 0 1 293917
HMGNS GOODS 0.069 0.253 0 1 293917
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the main specifications in ‘Trade-
Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?’.
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Table B.4: Summary Statistics: ‘Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs’
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
TRADE COSTS
DIST INTRL -12.174 1.555 -14.913 -5.821 153
TRFF INTRL 0.986 0.813 0 4.312 119
DIST EXTRL -13.707 1.145 -15.934 -10.424 153
TRFF EXTRL 0.86 0.816 0 4.076 123
∆ % TRFF INTRL 0.445 0.844 -2.406 2.773 113
∆ % TRFF EXTRL 0.409 0.789 -3.819 2.416 114
DISCPLN CNTRLS
MONTHS 97.915 79.312 4 419 153
FIRMS 6.5 5.71 2 42 153
LGMRKSHR 0.791 0.408 0 1 153
ALLCTN 0.529 0.501 0 1 153
DOMFIRM 0.281 0.451 0 1 153
PRCFIX 0.935 0.248 0 1 153
INFRMN 0.654 0.477 0 1 153
QUOTA 0.399 0.491 0 1 153
BIDRGG 0.144 0.352 0 1 153
RCDVST 0.739 0.441 0 1 153
BUYBCK 0.196 0.398 0 1 153
CLTRDV 0.838 0.354 0.2 2 153
DSCVR US 0.497 0.502 0 1 153
DSCVR CA 0.013 0.114 0 1 153
DSCVR EU 0.471 0.501 0 1 153
DSCVR OTHER 0.078 0.27 0 1 153
TRADE 8756.929 218700.359 0.001 50465896 447306
DIST 7.834 1.161 5.081 9.880 447306
CNTG 0.112 0.316 0 1 447306
LANG 0.101 0.302 0 1 447306
CLNY 0.061 0.239 0 1 447306
RTA 0.673 0.469 0 1 447306
CARTEL INTRNL 0.011 0.106 0 1 447306
CARTEL INTRNL DSCPLNE 0.162 1.423 0 14.421 324011
CARTEL EXTRNL 0.042 0.201 0 1 447306
CARTEL EXTRNL DSCPLN 0.565 2.598 0 14.421 324011
CARTEL 0.054 0.225 0 1 447306
CARTEL DSCPLN 0.727 2.931 0 14.421 324011
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the main specifications in ‘Cartel Discipline
and Trade Costs’.
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Table B.5: Countries Cartel-Members
Country OECD Member
Angola No
Australia Yes
Austria Yes
Belgium Yes
Brazil No
Burkina Faso No
Cameroon No
Canada Yes
Central African Republic No
China No
Congo No
Czech Republic Yes
Denmark Yes
Finland Yes
France Yes
Gabon No
Germany Yes
Greece Yes
Guinea No
Hong Kong No
India No
Ireland Yes
Israel Yes
Italy Yes
Japan Yes
Korea Yes
Kuwait No
Luxembourg Yes
Malawi No
Malaysia No
Mali No
Mexico Yes
Niger No
Netherlands Yes
Norway Yes
Poland Yes
Portugal Yes
Senegal No
Singapore No
Slovenia Yes
Slovak Republic Yes
Spain Yes
Sweden Yes
Switzerland Yes
Taiwan No
Togo No
United Kingdom Yes
United States Yes
Notes: This table lists all countries present in
the International Cartels Data and also specifies
whether they are OECD members or not.
211
Vitae
Delina Emilova Agnosteva
School of Economics
LeBow College of Business
Drexel University
Education
—————————————————————————————————————–
Drexel University, LeBow College of Business, Philadelphia, PA
Ph.D., Economics, Expected: March 2017
Ramapo College of New Jersey, Mahwah, NJ
B.A., Economics and International Business (Double Major), Mathematics (Minor), 2011
Research Interests
—————————————————————————————————————–
International Trade, Industrial Organization, Cartels, Gravity Model, Trade Costs
Working Papers
—————————————————————————————————————–
Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?, 2017
Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs, 2017, with Constantinos Syropoulos and Yoto
V. Yotov
Intra-national Trade Costs: Assaying Regional Frictions, 2017, with James E. An-
derson and Yoto V. Yotov
International Cartels and Bilateral Trade: An Empirical Investigation, 2017
Conference Presentations
—————————————————————————————————————–
Trade-Promoting and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels?
Economics Seminar Series, Drexel University October 2015, November 2016
Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs
Southern Economics Association Conference November 2015
Midwest International Trade Conference October 2014
Economics Seminar Series, Drexel University October 2014
International Cartels and Bilateral Trade: An Empirical Investigation
Midwest International Trade Conference October 2015
European Trade Study Group Conference, Paris, France September 2015
Canadian Economics Association 2014 Conference May 2014
Second-year paper presentation, Drexel University September 2013

